Cameron v. United States, 205
Decision Date | 19 April 1920 |
Docket Number | No. 205,205 |
Citation | 40 S.Ct. 410,64 L.Ed. 659,252 U.S. 450 |
Parties | CAMERON et al. v. UNITED STATES |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Messrs. Wm. C. Prentiss, of Washington, D. C., and Joseph E. Morrison, of Phoenix, Ariz., for appellants.
[Argument of Counsel from pages 451-454 intentionally omitted] Mr. Assistant Attorney General Nebeker, for appellee.
This is a suit by the United States to enjoin Ralph H. Cameron and others from occupying, using for business purposes, asserting any right to, or interfering with the public use of, a tract of land in Arizona, approximately 1,500 feet long and 600 feet wide, which Cameron is claiming as a lode mining claim, and to require the defendants to remove therefrom certain buildings, filth and refuse placed thereon in the course of its use by them as a livery stable site and otherwise. In the District Court there was a decree for the United States, and this was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. 250 Fed. 943, 163 C. C. A. 193.
The tract is on the southern rim of the Grand Canyon of the Colorado, is immediately adjacent to the railroad terminal and hotel buildings used by visitors to the canyon and embraces the head of the trail,1 over which visitors descend to and ascend from the bottom of the canyon. Formerly it was public land and open to acquisition under the public land laws. But since February 20, 1893, it has been within a public forest reserve2 eatablished and continued by proclamations of the President under the Acts of March 3, 1891, § 24, 26 Stat. 1095, 1103 (Comp. St. § 5121), and June 4, 1897, c. 2, 30 Stat. 34-36 (Comp. St. §§ 5123-5134), and since January 11, 1908, all but a minor part of it has been within a monument reserve3 establish by a proclamation of the President under the act of June 8, 1906, c. 3060, 34 Stat. 225 (Comp. St. §§ 5278-5281). The forest reserve remained effective after the creation of the monument reserve, but in so far as both embraced the same land the monument reserve became the dominant one. 35 Stat. 2175. The inclusion of the tract in the forest reserve withdrew it from the operation of the public land laws, other than the mineral land law; and the inclusion of the major part of it in the monument reserve withdrew that part from the operation of the mineral land law, but there was a saving clause in respect of any 'valid' mining claim theretofore acquired. The United States still has the paramount legal title to the tract, and also has the full beneficial ownership if Cameron's asserted mining claim is not valid.
The defendants insist that the monument reserve should be disregarded on the ground that there was no authority for its creation. To this we cannot assent. The act under which the President proceeded empowered him toe stablish reserves embracing 'objects of historic or scientific interest.' The Grand Canyon, as stated in his proclamation, 'is an object of unusual scientific interest.' It is the greatest eroded canyon in the United States, if not in the world, is over a mile in depth, has attracted wide attention among explorers and scientists, affords an unexampled field for geologic study, is regarded as one of the great natural wonders, and annually draws to its borders thousands of visitors.
The defendants also insist that in holding the United States entitled to the relief sought the courts below gave undue effect and weight to decisions of the Secretary of the Interior dealing with Cameron's asserted claim and pronouncing it invalid. Rightly to appreciate and dispose of this contention requires a further statement.
The claim in question is known as the Cape Horn lode claim and was located by Cameron in 1902 after the creation of the forest reserve and before the creation of the monument reserve. To make the claim valid, or to invest the locator with a right to the possession, it was essential that the land be mineral in character and that there be an adequate mineral discovery within the limits of the claim as located, Rev. Stat. § 2320 (Comp. St. § 4615); Cole v. Ralph, 252 U. S. 286, 40 Sup. Ct. 321, 64 L. Ed. ——; and to bring the claim within the saving clause in the withdrawal for the monument reserve the discovery must have preceded the creation of that reserve.
Cameron applied to the Land Department for the issue to him of a patent for the claim and similarly sought patents for other claims embracing other portions of the trail into the canyon. A protest was interposed charging that the land was not mineral, that there had been no supporting mineral discoveries and that the claims were located and used for purposes not contemplated by the mineral land law; and the Secretary of the Interior directed that a hearing be had in the local land office to enable the parties concerned—the protestant, Cameron and the government—to produce evidence bearing on the questions thus presented. Grand Canyon Ry. Co. v. Cameron, 35 Land Dec. 495; Id., 36 Land Dec. 66. After due notice the hearing was had, Cameron fully participating in it. This was shortly after the creation of the monument reserve. In due course the evidence was laid before the Commissioner of the General Land Office and he concluded therefrom that the claims were not valuable for mining purposes, and therefore were invalid. The matter was then taken before the Secretary of the Interior and that officer rendered a decision in which, after reviewing the evidence, he said:
And further:
'It follows from the foregoing that each of Cameron's applications for patent * * * must be rejected and canceled, and it is so ordered.
Directions were given for a further hearing respecting the Magician claim, but this is of no moment here.
That decision was adhered to on a motion for review, and in a later decision denying a renewed application by Cameron for a patent for the claim here in question the Secretary said:
After and notwithstanding these decisions Cameron asserted an exclusive right to the possession and enjoyment of the tract, as it the lode claim wer valid; and he and his codefendants, who were acting for or under him, continued to occupy and use the ground for livery and other business purposes, and in that and other ways obstructed its use by the public as a part of the reserves. In this situation, and to put an end to what the government deemed a continuing trespass, purpresture and public nuisance, the present suit was brought.
The courts below ruled that the decisions of the Secretary of the Interior should be taken as conclusively determining the nonmineral character of the land and the absence of an adequate mineral discovery, and also as showing that the matter before the Secretary was not merely the application for a patent but also the status of the claim—whether it was valid or was wanting in essential elements of validity, and whether it entitled Cameron to the use of the land as against the public and the government. As before stated, the defendants complain of that ruling. The objections urged against it are, first, that the Secretary's decisions show that he proceeded upon a misconception of what under the law constitutes an adequate mineral discovery, and, second, that although the Secretary had ample authority to determine whether Cameron was entitled to a patent, he was without authority to determine the character of the land or the question of discovery, or to pronounce the claim invalid.
As to the first objection little need be said. A reading of each decision in its entirety, and not merely the excerpts to which the defendants invite attention, makes it plain that the Secretary proceeded upon the theory that to support a mining location the discovery should be such as would justify a person of ordinary prudence in...
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