Cameron v. United States
| Decision Date | 03 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL 2:19cv691,Criminal 218cr8 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
| Parties | TASHAYLA NICOLE CAMERON, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent. |
This matter is before the Court on Tashayla Nichole Cameron's (“Petitioner”) pro se motion to Vacate Set Aside, or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. ECF No. 69. The Government filed a brief in opposition to Petitioner's motion, ECF No. 74, and Petitioner has not filed a reply. For the reasons set forth below Petitioner's § 2255 motion is DISMISSED AND DENIED.
On March 5, 2018, Petitioner pled guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to one count of Possessing Ammunition by a Convicted Felon, in violation of Title 18 United States Code § 922(g)(1). ECF No. 30. On August 2, 2018, Petitioner was sentenced to twenty-four (24) months imprisonment followed by three (3) years of supervised release. ECF No. 58. Petitioner did not file a direct appeal.
Petitioner began her federal habeas efforts by filing a “motion requesting acquittal, ” ECF No. 65, which Petitioner later elected to “reclassify” as a § 2255 motion, ECF No. 67. Petitioner thereafter submitted a § 2255 motion on the standardized § 2255 form for use by pro se litigants. ECF No. 69. Petitioner's motion and earlier filing advance two claims: (1) that her § 922(g) conviction is invalid pursuant to Rehaif v. United States, 139 S.Ct. 2191 (2019); and (2) that her counsel rendered ineffective assistance for failing to raise a Rehaif-like claim. After obtaining a briefing extension, the Government filed a brief in opposition conceding that Petitioner's § 2255 motion is timely due to retroactivity principles. ECF Nos. 70-71, 74. The Government, however, opposes Petitioner's motion on procedural and substantive grounds, with Petitioner offering no response to the Government's opposition.[1] ECF No. 74.
A federal prisoner, in custody, may collaterally attack her sentence or conviction by moving the district court “to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). To obtain such relief, a petitioner must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that her sentence or conviction was “imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, ” that the district court “was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, ” that the sentence exceeds “the maximum authorized by law, ” or that the sentence or conviction is “otherwise subject to collateral attack.” Id.; Miller v. United States, 261 F.2d 546, 547 (4th Cir. 1958). Because a § 2255 motion “is ordinarily presented to the judge who presided at the original conviction and sentencing . . . the judge's recollection of the events at issue” may inform the resolution of the motion. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 n.4 (1977).
A § 2255 motion is, in essence, a statutory federal habeas corpus action that enables a petitioner to collaterally attack her sentence or conviction through the filing of a new proceeding, as contrasted with a direct appeal. United States v. Hadden, 475 F.3d 652, 663 (4th Cir. 2007). The existence of the right to pursue a collateral attack does not displace a direct appeal as the “usual and customary method of correcting trial errors.” United States v. Allgood, 48 F.Supp.2d 554, 558 (E.D. Va. 1999) . On the contrary, with limited exceptions, a petitioner advancing new claims asserted for the first time in a § 2255 motion “must clear a significantly higher hurdle than would exist on direct appeal.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 166 (1982).
The “higher hurdle” applies because, once a petitioner's opportunity to pursue a direct appeal has been waived or exhausted, there is “a final judgment [that] commands respect.” Id. at 16566. Accordingly, the doctrine of procedural default generally prevents a district court from reaching the merits of § 2255 claims that could have been raised on direct appeal unless a petitioner can show: (1) “cause” excusing the failure to directly appeal such alleged errors; and (2) “actual prejudice resulting from the errors of which [s]he complains.” United States v. Mikalajunas, 186 F.3d 490, 492-93 (4th Cir. 1999) . Alternatively, a Petitioner may overcome her default by demonstrating a “miscarriage of justice” through demonstrating “actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence.” Id.
“The existence of cause for a procedural default must turn on something external to the defense, such as the novelty of the claim or a denial of effective assistance of counsel.” United States v. Pettiford, 612 F.3d 270, 280 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting Mikalajunas, 186 F.3d at 493). As for prejudice, it is not enough for a petitioner to demonstrate “a possibility of prejudice, ” but rather, she must show that errors “worked to h[er] actual and substantial disadvantage, ” infecting the entire criminal proceeding with an “error of constitutional dimensions.” Frady, 456 U.S. at 170.
A § 2255 petitioner need not overcome the procedural default bar to advance a freestanding claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, which is properly asserted for the first time in a § 2255 motion. See United States v. King, 119 F.3d 290, 295 (4th Cir. 1997) . To obtain relief based on an allegation of ineffective assistance, a petitioner must establish both: (1) that counsel's performance was so deficient that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) that counsel's inadequate performance resulted in prejudice to the petitioner. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). Conclusory statements are insufficient to carry a petitioner's burden. See United States v. Dyess, 730 F.3d 354, 359 (4th Cir. 2013) () (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Satisfying the first prong of Strickland requires a showing that counsel “made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Reviewing courts strongly presume that counsel exercised reasonable professional judgment, and only in “relatively rare situations” will a § 2255 motion establish that, “‘in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.'” Tice v. Johnson, 647 F.3d 87, 102 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690).
The second prong of Strickland requires a petitioner to “affirmatively prove prejudice, ” which requires a showing that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-94. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694. The prejudice prong is slightly modified where, as here, a petitioner challenges a conviction entered after a guilty plea; in such circumstances, the petitioner “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, [s]he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hooper v. Garraghty, 845 F.2d 471, 475 (4th Cir. 1988) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Petitioner's § 2255 motion advances two claims: (1) a direct attack on the validity of her conviction pursuant to Rehaif; and (2) an ineffective assistance of counsel claim predicated on defense counsel's failure to advance a Rehaif-like challenge to Petitioner's § 922(g) felon in possession charge. In Rehaif, the Supreme Court interpreted the statutory language in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) to require the Government to “prove both that the defendant knew [s]he possessed a firearm [or ammunition] and that [s]he knew [s]he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm [or ammunition].” Rehaif, 139 S.Ct. at 2200. Requiring proof of the latter mens rea element was a newly recognized element of the offense established by the Supreme Court in Rehaif.
Petitioner's Rehaif claim is based on the fact that the Court failed to inform her, at the time of her guilty plea, that she could not be convicted of the § 922(g) felon in possession offense unless the Government proved that she knew she was a prohibited person (i.e., a felon). The Fourth Circuit's opinion in United States v. Gary, 954 F.3d 194 (4th Cir. 2020), rev'd sub nom. Greer v. United States, 141 S.Ct. 2090 (June 14, 2021), supported Petitioner's position, holding that failure to properly advise a defendant of the mens rea element is a “structural error” subject to reversal without a showing of prejudice. Id. at 207-08. However, the Supreme Court recently reversed Gary, finding that:
[D]iscrete defects in the criminal process-such as the omission of a single element from jury instructions or the omission of a required warning from a Rule 11 plea colloquy-are not structural because they do not necessarily render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair or an unreliable vehicle for determining guilt or innocence. . . . A Rehaif error in jury instructions is therefore not structural. And it follows that a Rehaif error in a plea colloquy is likewise not structural. The omission of that mens rea element...
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