Cameron v. Wall

• Decision Date: 24 November 2010
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:09cv234KS-MTP
• Parties: SUSAN CAMERON PLAINTIFF v. TOMMY WALL, et al DEFENDANTS
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi

SUSAN CAMERON PLAINTIFF

v.TOMMY WALL, et al DEFENDANTS

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:09cv234KS-MTP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI

HATTIESBURG DIVISION

Date: November 24, 2010

Memorandum Opinion and Order

This matter is before the Court on three separate motions:

(1) Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant State of Mississippi, through the Mississippi Transportation Commission and the Mississippi Department of Transportation ("MDOT") [Doc. # 54] (Sept. 7, 2010) which was joined by Defendants National Railroad Passenger Corporation ("Amtrak"), Tommy Wall, and R.M. Treadwell [Doc. # 58] and joined by Defendants Alabama Great Southern Railway Company ("AGS") and Norfolk Southern Railway Company ("Norfolk Southern") [Doc. # 62];

(2) Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Amtrak, Tommy Wall, and R.M. Treadwell [Doc. # 58] (Sept. 9, 2010); and

(3) Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed by Defendants AGS and Norfolk Southern [Doc. # 64] (Sept. 15, 2010).

The Court, having reviewed the motions, the responses, the pleadings, and exhibits on file and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, finds as follows:

I. Facts

On March 24, 2008, Plaintiff Susan Cameron's vehicle collided with an Amtrak train at a railroad crossing in Eastabuchie, Jones County, Mississippi. Defendant Tommy Wall was the train conductor, R.M. Treadwell was the engineer, and the track was owned by AGS and/or Norfolk Southern.¹ All parties agree that the incident happened at the DOT Crossing No. 725585G. This crossing is sometimes called "North Eastabuchie crossing" or "North Eastabuchie Road crossing." While Church Street actually intersects the railroad tracks at this crossing, North Eastabuchie Road is proximately located and feeds auto traffic into this crossing. Two-tenths of a mile south of the crossing in question is another crossing, DOT Crossing No. 725586N, which is located in Forrest County and is sometimes referred to as "Eastabuchie crossing" or "Eastabuchie Road crossing." Eastabuchie Road intersects with the railroad track at this crossing. See Matt Griffin Aff. ¶¶ 2-5, Norfolk's Reb., Ex. A [Doc. # 76-1]. Although the common names of the crossing can lead to confusion, both parties agree that the accident in this litigation occurred at the northern railroad crossing, DOT Crossing No. 725585G.² Robert A. Burt, MDOT's Director of Freight, Rails, Port & Waterways Division in Jackson, Mississippi, testified that "pursuant to the 1981 project identified as MDOT Project No. 75-0916-00-026-10, Federal Aid Project No. OP-0916-00-026-10, MDOT records show that federal funds were approved, and actually used, to fund the installation of advanced warning signs located at North Eastabuchie Road, Eastabuchie, Jones County, Mississippi, DOT Crossing No. 725585G." Burt Aff ¶ 3, MDOT's Mot. Summ. J., Ex. 3 [Doc. # 54-3]. At the time of the accident, DOT Crossing No. 725585G was protected by advance warning signs (round, yellow sign with black letters 'rXr'), pavement markings (the letters 'rXr' painted on the pavement immediately before the tracks), and crossbucks (white signs in an 'X' configuration with the words "RAILROAD CROSSING"). See Griffin Aff. ¶ 6 & Ex. A.

In her Amended Complaint, Cameron alleges several negligent acts by Defendants. See Am. Compl. [Doc. # 24] (Jan. 4, 2010). Specifically, Cameron alleges that the MDOT: (A) failed to inspect and locate unsafe conditions at the crossing as required by statute; (B) failed to direct railroad owner to make necessary repairs; (C) failed to enforce statutory requirement to post signage; (D) knew of and failed to rectify dangerous conditions at the crossing; (E) violated federal, state and municipal regulations, statutes, and ordinances; and (F) failed to enforce statutory requirements for railroad crossing safety. See Am. Compl. ¶ 20.

Cameron alleges that AGS and Norfolk Southern negligently failed to (A) remove vegetation by crossing; (B) provide adequate warning signs; (C) provide a reasonably safe crossing; and (D) provide adequate roadway signage; and that they (E) knew of and failed to rectify dangerous conditions at the crossing; and (F) violated federal, state and municipal regulations, statutes, and ordinances. See Am. Compl. ¶ 18.

Cameron alleges that Wall and Treadwell failed to (A) maintain a safe speed; (B) sound the train's warning signal; (C) stop the train prior to the collision; and (D) use reasonable care under the circumstances, and that they (E) operated the train in a reckless manner; and (F) violated federal, state and municipal regulations, statutes, and ordinances. See Am. Compl. ¶ 17.

Finally, Cameron alleges that Amtrak negligently: (A) failed to supervise its employees; (B) failed to properly instruct its employees; (C) negligently entrusted the train to its operators; (G) [sic] failed to provide adequate warnings of approaching trains; (H) [sic] failed to provide adequate roadway signs; (I) [sic] knew of and failed to rectify dangerous conditions at the crossing; and (J) [sic] violated federal, state and municipal regulations, statutes, and ordinances. See Am. Compl. ¶ 19.

MDOT argues that despite Cameron's artful pleading, all of her claims against it are warning and signalization claims that are preempted because federal funds were used to equip the subject crossing with warning signs. The remaining defendants, Wall, Treadwell, Amtrak, AGS, and Norfolk Southern join MDOT's motion and argue separately for partial summary judgment on the railroad crossing warning claims because these claims are preempted.

II. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is warranted if "the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 91 L.Ed.2d 265, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (1986). To support a motion for summary judgment, "the moving party... [has] the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact." Burleson v. Tex. Dept. of Criminal Justice, 393 F.3d 577, 589 (5th Cir. 2004). Material facts are those that "could affect the outcome of the action." Weeks Marine, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 340 F.3d 233, 235 (5th Cir. 2003) (internal citations omitted). Disputes about material facts are genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party" on that issue. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the court views all evidence "in the light most favorable to the non-moving party" and "draw[s] all reasonable inferences in its favor." Breen v. Texas A&M Univ., 485 F.3d 325, 331 (5th Cir. 2007). If the movant satisfies its initial burden, then the burden shifts back to the nonmoving party to produce evidence indicating that a genuine issue of material fact exists for each essential element of its case. Rivera v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 349 F.3d 244, 246-47 (5th Cir. 2003). The nonmovant is not entitled to merely rest on his pleadings, but must set forth "specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial." DirecTV, Inc. v. Robson, 420 F.3d 532, 536 (5th Cir. 2005). If the nonmovant responds and still "no reasonable juror could find for the nonmovant, summary judgment will be granted." Caboni v. General Motors Corp, 278 F.3d 448, 451 (5th Cir. 2002).

III. Application

The Federal Highway Administration ("FHWA") has promulgated several regulations implementing the Federal Railway-Highway Crossings Program, 23 U.S.C. § 130, which provides federal funding for states to eliminate certain hazards at railway crossings. See Norfolk Southern Ry. Co. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344, 348 (2000). One such regulation, § 646.214(b)(3), lists certain possible railroad crossing conditions, and requires the installation of automatic gates and flashing lights if any of the conditions are present and federal funds "participate in the installation of the devices." 23 C.F.R. §646.214(b) (1999). When federal funds are being used but none of the conditions in (b)(3) are present, the decision of what warning devices to install is subject to FHWA approval regardless of whether the state or the railroad makes the determination. See 23 C.F.R. § 646.214(b)(4). "When the FHWA approves a crossing improvement project and the State installs the warning devices using federal funds, §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4) establish a federal standard for the adequacy of those devices that displaces state tort law addressing the same subject." Shanklin, 529 U.S. at 357; see also Hester v. CSXTransp., Inc., 61 F.3d 382 (5th Cir. 1995). The United States Supreme Court further noted:

It is this displacement of state law concerning the devices' adequacy, and not the State's or the FHWA's adherence to the standard set out in §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4) or to the requirements of the MUTCD [U.S. Dep't of Transp., FHWA, Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices], that pre-empts state tort actions. Whether the State should have originally installed different or additional devices, or whether conditions at the crossing have since changed such that automatic gates and flashing lights would be appropriate, is immaterial to the pre-emption question.

Shanklin, 529 at 357-58. "[P]reemption of a grade crossing warning device claim under the FRSA may not, under certain circumstances, preclude other types of claims in connection with crossing accidents, such as failure to sound a train's whistle, train speed faster than federal limits, failure to use train's headlights, and inadequate maintenance of the crossing surface." 65 Am.Jur.2d Railroads § 384.

A. Claims Against MDOT

Here, Cameron's claim "C" that the MDOT negligently failed to enforce the statutory requirement to post signage is only preempted if federal funds were approved and spent on...