Camm v. Peyton
| Decision Date | 06 May 1969 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 69-C-2-L. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia |
| Parties | Sylvester W. CAMM, Petitioner, v. C. C. PEYTON, Superintendent Virginia State Penitentiary, Respondent. |
Reno S. Harp, III, Asst. Atty. Gen., Richmond, Va., for respondent.
This case comes before this court on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed in forma pauperis by Sylvester W. Camm, a state prisoner, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241. The petition was originally filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia and was ordered transferred to this court by order dated January 17, 1969.
Petitioner is serving a sentence of twenty-five years in the Virginia State Penitentiary pursuant to a judgment of the Corporation Court of Lynchburg of February 10, 1967, wherein he was convicted for the crime of first degree murder. The conviction resulted after a trial by a judge without a jury in which the petitioner, represented by court appointed counsel, entered a plea of guilty. No appeal was taken from the conviction.
The petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the state courts on April 19, 1967. The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals issued a writ of habeas corpus returnable to the Corporation Court for the City of Lynchburg on March 6, 1968. On June 14, 1968, the Corporation Court, after hearing argument of counsel, denied the petitioner's request for a plenary hearing and by order dated June 24, 1968, denied the writ and dismissed the petition. An appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals resulted in the writ being rejected by order dated December 6, 1968. Thus having exhausted his state remedies, the petitioner is properly before this court in compliance with 28 U.S.C. A. § 2254, as interpreted by Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L. Ed.2d 837 (1963).
The petitioner alleges that his conviction should be voided because he received ineffective assistance from his court-appointed counsel at his trial because the counsel did not raise the defense that petitioner was intoxicated at the time of the commission of the crime which would negate the requisite intent for first degree murder, and that an extra-judicial confession, obtained illegally, was used at the trial.
It is unnecessary for this court to have a plenary hearing concerning petitioner's claim. Such a hearing would be unproductive since the state court records now before this court provide an adequate basis for decision. See Grundler v. North Carolina, 283 F.2d 798 (4th Cir. 1960).
Upon an examination of the records before this court, including a transcript of the trial, there can be no doubt that the plea of guilty was entered voluntarily by the petitioner. The trial court made a searching inquiry to determine that the petitioner understood his rights and the nature of his plea. The petitioner, in answer to the court's questioning, stated: that he knew he had a right to plead not guilty and to be tried by a jury; that the decision to plead guilty was his own after consultation with his attorney; that his plea was not coerced by the court-appointed attorney or anyone else; that he had no witnesses to testify on his behalf; that he was satisfied with the representation of his attorney and; that he had no complaint against any law enforcement person concerning their conduct toward him. The judgment order of the court states that the plea of guilty was entered knowingly and voluntarily with the advice of counsel and that the court was of the opinion that the petitioner understood the nature of his plea. This court also notes that the petitioner readily admits that he accepted the advice of counsel in pleading guilty in return for a recommendation by the Commonwealth Attorney for a sentence of twenty-five years. The petition, filed in this court, reads in part as follows:
On February 10, 1967, I was tried before the Corporation Court for the City of Lynchburg, Virginia, without a jury for the first degree murder of my wife and was sentenced to 25 years in the Virginia State Penitentiary. Before the trial, the Commonwealth Attorney informed Mr. George Fralin, Jr., my attorney at the time, that he would recommend the sentence of 25 years if I would pled sic guilty to the charge of first degree murder. Mr. Fralin discussed the plea with me and my attitude was that I would rely on the advise sic of my attorney since he presented no evidence...
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