Camp Bird Colo. v. Board of County Com'Rs, No. 08CA0852.

• Decision Date: 23 July 2009
• Docket Number: No. 08CA0852.
• Citation: 215 P.3d 1277
• Parties: CAMP BIRD COLORADO, INC., a Colorado corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF the COUNTY OF OURAY, Colorado, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

215 P.3d 1277

CAMP BIRD COLORADO, INC., a Colorado corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF the COUNTY OF OURAY, Colorado, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 08CA0852.

Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. I.

July 23, 2009.

Dufford & Brown, P.C., Christian D. Hammond, Joanne Herlihy, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Mary E. Deganhart, County Attorney, Ridgway, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee.

Opinion by Judge ROY.

Camp Bird Colorado, Inc. (the mining company) appeals a judgment quieting title in the Board of County Commissioners of the County of Ouray (the county) to a public right-of-way (the road segment) traversing five mining claims owned by the mining company. The mining company maintains the road segment is private. We affirm but on grounds different from those relied upon by the trial court.

More specifically, because we conclude the public accepted the federal grant of a public right-of-way on the public domain under a federal statute, R.S. 2477, we do not address the trial court's conclusion that the public obtained ownership of the right-of-way through adverse possession of private property and related arguments.

County Road 361 proceeds southwest out of Ouray, Colorado. Approximately 4.3 miles southwest of Ouray, it forks, and, according to a 1961 county road map, County Road 361 bears left to a bridge over Sneffels Creek and the other fork becomes County Road 26 and proceeds west to Sneffels; one fork then proceeds up to Yankee Boy Basin and over Blue Lake Pass while the other fork proceeds to the Humboldt Mine on Mendota Peak.

The road segment begins at the south end of the bridge over Sneffels Creek, which was built and is maintained by the county. It then proceeds generally south up Imogene Gulch, loosely paralleling Imogene Creek, and connects to a forest service road, which proceeds to the upper level of the Camp Bird Mine as a road, then on to Imogene Basin, and over Imogene Pass as a trail. When we say "loosely paralleling Imogene Creek," we refer to the lower portion of the road segment that makes a 650-foot open loop to the west to take advantage of relatively flat terrain.

The forest service road, prior to intersecting with the road segment, begins just east of Sneffels and proceeds east-south-east to the intersection, a distance of approximately 1.1 miles, and is the road the mining company claims is the intended public road. The road segment provides a much shorter and steeper route to the intersection than that provided by the forest service road and was used by the mining company as a route from its mill and lower level of the mine to the upper levels of the mine.

The road segment (1) enters the mining company's properties on the Emily Mill Site, Mining Survey No. (MS) 5478 and Glen Monarch Mill Site, MS 535B; (2) traverses the Deadwood Mill Site, MS 12637B, the Glen Monarch Lode, MS 535A (Glen Monarch Lode), and the Launaka Lode, MS 8239A; (3) encroaches on the Launaka Mill Site, MS 8239B; and (4) terminates on the Agnew Lode, MS 19795. See Appendix A. The italicized lode or mill site claims were included in a 1983 quiet title action brought by the mining company more fully discussed later.

At trial, the county put on evidence that the road segment was declared a public trail upon the public domain in 1878 and 1879, and its public use commenced in the 1870s and continued to the present. The mining company contended the county's claim was barred by the 1983 quiet title decree, the declaration of the road segment as a public road was not effective, and the road segment had not been adversely possessed by the public. The trial court, in a detailed order, concluded the 1983 quiet title decree had no preclusive effect on the county's claim, determined the road segment was a public road by adverse possession, and quieted title in the county.

On appeal, the mining company contends (1) the trial court erred in holding that the 1983 decree quieting title to claims does not bar this action; (2) the trial court erred in concluding as a factual matter that the road segment is a public road; and (3) the trial court erred in admitting some evidence.

I. Appellate Jurisdiction

As a preliminary matter, the county contends the mining company did not timely file its notice of appeal. We disagree.

A notice of appeal must be filed within forty-five days of the date of the trial court's final judgment. C.A.R. 4(a). A judgment is final when it ends the action at issue and leaves nothing further for the court pronouncing the judgment to do except execute that judgment. Baldwin v. Bright Mortgage Co., 757 P.2d 1072, 1073 (Colo.1988).

Here, the trial court's initial order, dated November 14, 2007, expressly deferred the determination of the road segment's width until a later date. In January 2008, the parties stipulated that the right-of-way for the road segment was eighteen feet in width along a surveyed route. On March 7, 2008, the trial court amended its order by incorporating this stipulation. The mining company's notice of appeal was filed on April 21, 2008, which was within forty-five days after March 7, 2008, and is, therefore, timely. C.A.R. 4(a).

II. Claim Preclusion

The mining company contends the trial court erred in holding the county's claims are not barred by claim preclusion, or res judicata, arising from the 1983 quiet title decree. We disagree.

A. Standard of Review

Claim preclusion is sometimes a strict question of law and other times a mixed question of law and fact. Feightner v. Bank of Okla., 65 P.3d 624, 627 (Okla.2003). If the facts in the case are undisputed and the question of preclusion either can be answered by review of the judgment or can be determined solely by reviewing the record, it is strictly a question of law and thus reviewed de novo. Id.; see also Satsky v. Paramount Commc'ns, Inc., 7 F.3d 1464, 1468-69 (10th Cir.1993). However, if there are disputed facts, then facts supported by reasonable evidence are given a deferential standard of review and application of the law is reviewed de novo. Feightner, 65 P.3d at 627; see also People v. Gonzales, 987 P.2d 239, 242 (Colo.1999) (while we defer to a trial court's findings of disputed facts, the application of a legal standard to historical fact is a matter for de novo appellate review).

B. The 1983 Quiet Title Action

The mining company brought the 1983 quiet title action to quiet title to mining claims and mill sites it owned or leased in Ouray County or part in Ouray County and part in an adjacent county. For the leased claims or mill sites, title was to be quieted in the lessor subject to the lease.

It was a multi-faceted action involving fourteen claims for relief; a large number of named plaintiffs in individual or representative capacities; a large number of known and named defendants and their heirs if deceased or believed to be deceased; unknown persons; approximately 175 lode, placer, and mill site claims; and a wide variety of interests. The mining company and others were named party plaintiffs; the county and others were named defendants; and "All Unknown Persons who claim any Interest in the Subject Matter of this Action" also were named defendants. The State of Colorado was a named defendant as to all claims.

The county was named as a party in the fourteenth claim for relief, which involved Domingo Lode, MS 18203, Domingo No. 2 Lode, MS 18203, and the Matzanas Lode, MS 14787, claims not here pertinent, and alleged that the county might have an interest in those claims by virtue of a county treasurer's deed for unpaid taxes that was prepared and recorded because of an administrative error. Attached to the complaint were appendices that listed all the named defendants alphabetically and identified the lode or mill site claim or claims in which they were alleged to have an interest. The county was listed in the appendix only as to the Matzanas and the two Domingo claims. The county attorney acknowledged receipt of the summons and complaint, and the county filed a disclaimer as to any interest in the three claims. The 1983 decree recited this disclaimer.

The twelfth claim for relief alleged that the mining company executed and delivered a promissory note in favor of a lender and its assignee and secured payment of that promissory note with two deeds of trust on a number of claims, including those pertinent here. The complaint further alleged that the obligation had been satisfied and the deeds of trust had expired. The public trustee of the county was joined as a defendant because he or she was a non-signatory party to the deeds of trust. The lender filed a disclaimer and the assignee and the mining company entered into a stipulation defining "certain rights" of the assignee which were ultimately preserved in the decree.

C. Analysis

Claim preclusion bars relitigating matters that already have been decided as well as matters that could have been raised in a previous litigation but were not. Argus Real Estate, Inc. v. E-470 Pub. Highway Auth., 109 P.3d 604, 608 (Colo.2005). For a claim to be precluded in subsequent litigation, the following must be present: (1) a final judgment in the first matter; (2) identity of subject matter; (3) identity of claims for relief; and (4) identity of, or privity between, the parties. Id. Claim preclusion bars relitigating not only all the claims actually decided in the previous action, but also all claims that might have been decided if the claims arose from the same injury. Id. at 609. Whether the claims or causes of action are the same is determined by the injury for which relief is demanded, not by the legal theory on which the person asserting the claim relies. Id.

Quiet title actions are governed by C.R.C.P. 105. The relief sought is clear title to the subject property by means of a complete adjudication of the rights of all parties to the action. C.R.C. P. 105(a); Argus, 109 P.3d at 609. Quiet title actions are intended to grant...