Camp Richardson Resort, Inc. v. Phila. Indem. Ins. Co., 2:15-cv-01101-TLN-AC
| Decision Date | 08 December 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:15-cv-01101-TLN-AC,2:15-cv-01101-TLN-AC |
| Citation | 150 F.Supp.3d 1186 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
| Parties | Camp Richardson Resort, Inc., Plaintiff, v. Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company, Defendant. |
James Joseph Banks, Banks & Watson, Sacramento, CA, for Plaintiff.
Daniel N. Katibah, James C. Nielsen, Christine Bradley Cusick, Nielsen, Haley & Abbott LLP, San Rafael, CA, for Defendant.
Troy L. Nunley
This matter is before the Court pursuant to Defendant Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company's (“Defendant” or “Philadelphia”) Motion to Dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
. (ECF No. 9.) Plaintiff Camp Richardson Resort (“Plaintiff” or “CRR”) opposes Defendant's motion. (ECF No. 12.) The Court has carefully considered the arguments raised by both parties. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.
On May 5, 2015, Plaintiff filed its complaint seeking declaratory relief and damages for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith against Defendant. (ECF No. 2) The complaint arises from a third-party suit against Plaintiff by the Jameson Beach Property Owners' Association and other individuals (hereinafter the “third party”), currently pending in this District, 13-cv-01025-MCE-AC.
In summary: (Pl.'s Opp., ECF No. 12 at 8.)
In the third-party suit, the (ECF No. 12 at 8–9.)
The third party plaintiffs (ECF No. 12 at 9) (internal citations to the third party pleadings omitted).
In pertinent part, the first amended complaint in the third party lawsuit brings claims for quiet title, interference with an easement, ejectment, trespass, public nuisance, private nuisance, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and negligence. (ECF No. 10, Ex. C.)
The instant action arises because Plaintiff, Camp Richardson Resort, is insured by Defendant, Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Co., under a commercial general liability coverage policy (“CGL Policy”), which contains three relevant provisions: Coverage A, Coverage B, and Liquor Liability Coverage.
Coverage A insures Plaintiff against liability for bodily injury and property damages as a result of an “occurrence.” (ECF No. 2-1 at 159.) An “occurrence” is defined under the CGL Policy as “an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions.” (ECF No. 2-1 at 172.) The definition of “property damage” includes (ECF No. 2-1 at 173.)
Coverage B insures Plaintiff against “personal and advertising liability.” (ECF No. 2-1 at 164–165.) Personal and advertising liability is defined in pertinent part as (ECF No. 2-1 at 172.)
Under the Liquor Liability Coverage, Plaintiff is insured against liability for damages because of ‘injury’ ... [if] such ‘injury’ is imposed on the insured by reason of the selling, serving or furnishing of any alcoholic beverage.” (ECF No. 2-1 at 203.)
On July, 17, 2015, Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim, arguing that the facts do not support a duty to defend or indemnify under the CGL Policy.1 (ECF No. 9.) Plaintiff filed an opposition on August 8, 2015. (ECF No. 12.) Defendant filed a reply on September 3, 2015. (ECF No. 13).
A court may consider documents external to the pleadings in a motion to dismiss under the incorporation by reference doctrine, where the contents of the documents are alleged in the complaint and neither party questions the authenticity of the documents. Knievel v. ESPN , 393 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir.2005)
. The Court hereby takes judicial notice of the documents filed as ECF Nos. 2–1, 2–2, and 10. These documents include the insurance policy in question, the third-party complaints, declarations, and communications between Plaintiff and Defendant regarding the policy and coverage.
standard of Law
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. Navarro v. Block , 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir.2001). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a pleading contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” See Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678–79, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Under notice pleading in federal court, the complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim…is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (internal quotations omitted). “This simplified notice pleading standard relies on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious claims.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A. , 534 U.S. 506, 512, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002).
On a motion to dismiss, the factual allegations of the complaint must be accepted as true. Cruz v. Beto , 405 U.S. 319, 322, 92 S.Ct. 1079, 31 L.Ed.2d 263 (1972)
. A court is bound to give plaintiff the benefit of every reasonable inference to be drawn from the “well-pleaded” allegations of the complaint. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. Schermerhorn , 373 U.S. 746, 753 n. 6, 83 S.Ct. 1461, 10 L.Ed.2d 678 (1963). A plaintiff need not allege “ ‘specific facts' beyond those necessary to state his claim and the grounds showing entitlement to relief.” Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007) ).
Nevertheless, a court “need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.” United States ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose , 788 F.2d 638, 643 n. 2 (9th Cir.1986)
. While Rule 8(a) does not require detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. A pleading is insufficient if it offers mere “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ; see also Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (). Moreover, it is inappropriate to assume that the plaintiff “can prove facts that it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated the...laws in ways that have not been alleged[.]” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters , 459 U.S. 519, 526, 103 S.Ct. 897, 74 L.Ed.2d 723 (1983).
Ultimately, a court may not dismiss a complaint in which the plaintiff has alleged “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 697, 129 S.Ct. 1937
(quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). Only where a plaintiff fails to “nudge[ ] [his or her] claims ... across the line from conceivable to plausible[,]” is the complaint properly dismissed. Id. at 680, 129 S.Ct. 1937. While the plausibility requirement is not akin to a probability requirement, it demands more than “a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. This plausibility inquiry is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937
.
In ruling upon a motion to dismiss, the court may consider only the complaint, any exhibits thereto, and matters which may be judicially noticed pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201
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