Camp v. State

• Decision Date: 27 April 2007
• Docket Number: CR-05-1207.
• Parties: Alan Thomas CAMP v. STATE of Alabama.
• Court: Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

983 So.2d 1141

Alan Thomas CAMP v. STATE of Alabama.

CR-05-1207.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

April 27, 2007.

Rehearing Denied June 29, 2007.

Certiorari Denied October 26, 2007.

Alabama Supreme Court 1061481.

Britt Cauthen, Decatur, for appellant.

Troy King, atty. gen., and Tracy Daniel, asst. atty. gen., for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

The appellant, Alan Thomas Camp, pleaded guilty to possessing methamphetamines and drug paraphernalia, violations of §§ 13A-12-212 and 13A-12-260, Ala. Code 1975. Camp was sentenced to 3 years' imprisonment for possessing methamphetamines and to 180 days in the Morgan County jail for possessing drug paraphernalia, both sentences to run concurrently. The court split the sentence and ordered Camp to serve 180 days in the county jail and 3 years on probation. Before entering his guilty plea, Camp specifically reserved his right to appeal the circuit court's ruling denying his motion to suppress the evidence seized as a result of what he alleges was an illegal search and seizure.

The evidence at the suppression hearing established the following. Shannon Wayne Ferguson, a deputy with the Morgan County Sheriff's Department, testified that in the early morning hours of August 21, 2004, at approximately 3:30 a.m., he was in his patrol car on his way to Falkville when he saw a vehicle "parked down beside a bridge in Lacon." He pulled down to where the vehicle was with his spotlights on to see if the driver was in trouble. The vehicle was parked with the rear facing the water and the nose of the vehicle facing the road. When he pulled near the vehicle he asked the driver to show both his hands. After he asked three times, Camp, the driver of the vehicle, complied. Deputy Ferguson asked for his identification, checked his identification, and found that Camp was from Hayden. Deputy Ferguson said that while he was checking his identification Camp was moving "very furiously around in the vehicle." He said that he asked him to step out of the vehicle because he was afraid that Camp had a weapon. Deputy Ferguson then inquired as to why he was at that place at 3:30 a.m. in the morning. Camp said that he was meeting a friend to go fishing. Camp refused to identify the friend, Deputy Ferguson said, but he said the friend was from Georgia and they were going to Lake Smith. Deputy Ferguson testified that he wondered why the two were meeting in Lacon to go to Lake Smith when they could have met at other areas closer to Lake Smith which, he said, was further south. Deputy Ferguson asked Camp if he could search his vehicle and Camp responded that he could not. Camp got out of his vehicle and locked it, using his remote keyless entry device. Deputy Ferguson stated that he was having trouble communicating with his dispatcher because the area he was located in was lower than the surrounding area. Deputy Ferguson said that he wanted to secure Camp in a safe place so that he could look through the windows of Camp's vehicle to make certain that there were no weapons or contraband in plain view. Deputy Ferguson, with the assistance of another officer who had arrived at the scene, put Camp in his patrol car while he went back to the vehicle to look through the windows. Deputy Ferguson said that he saw a syringe on the back floorboard and a piece of aluminum foil. He then searched the vehicle and found methamphetamine pills under a stack of papers beneath the armrest.

Troy Harville, a police officer with the City of Falkville, testified that he was dispatched to Lacon in the early morning hours of August 21, 2004, to assist a fellow police officer. When he arrived at the location he observed "Officer Ferguson and the subject standing in front of the patrol car, having what I considered a confrontation." He said: "It set me on edge that he was — had that demeanor, and two police officers standing in front of him in a situation in the area we was at and the time of the morning, he seemed uncompliant [sic], as an average person would be trying to explain or comply." The officers placed handcuffs on Camp, and Harville explained the reason for putting Camp in handcuffs: "His demeanor, again, could have been a threat to us or could have ran off, or fled from us and the vehicle was some distance away, and we didn't know who might be in the vehicle with him or what the situation was, so we were determined to place him in cuffs, and then go look in the vehicle just to check and see what or may not be there." (R. 30.) After placing Camp in Deputy Ferguson's patrol car they walked back to Camp's vehicle, looked into the vehicle with a flashlight, and saw a syringe on the back floorboard. Officer Harville also said that he saw a piece of aluminum foil with a powder residue on it through the window.

Camp also testified at the suppression hearing. He said: "I'd just got back into my vehicle from relieving myself, and the lights came up on me and — just blinding lights, and I locked my doors and put my keys in the ignition, because I didn't know who it was." Camp said that Deputy Ferguson got very agitated when he went for his identification, and "it just escalated." "He asked me if I would consent to a search, and I said, no, and at some point he wanted the keys to my truck and I had told him that I had thrown them in the bushes or that I had lost them, I'm not sure which."

"`"Where evidence is presented to the trial court tore tenus in a nonjury case, a presumption of correctness exists as to the court's conclusions on issues of fact; its determination will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous, without supporting evidence, manifestly unjust, or against the great weight of the evidence. Odom v. Hull, 658 So.2d 442 (Ala.1995). However, when the trial court improperly applies the law to the facts, no presumption of correctness exists as to the court's judgment. Ex parte Board of Zoning Adjustment of the City of Mobile, 636 So.2d 415 (Ala. 1994)."

"`[Ex parte Agee,] 669 So.2d [102,] at 104 [(Ala.1995)]. "Where the evidence before the trial court was undisputed the ore tenus is inapplicable, and the Supreme Court will sit in judgment on the evidence de novo, indulging no presumption in favor of the trial court's application of the law to those facts."'"

Ex parte Jackson, 886 So.2d 155, 159 (Ala. 2004), quoting State v. Hill, 690 So.2d 1201, 1203 (Ala.1996). Here, the evidence presented at the suppression hearing was disputed.

Camp argues that Deputy Ferguson's actions exceeded the duration and scope of a constitutionally valid investigatory Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), stop; therefore, he argues, the evidence recovered from his vehicle should have been suppressed. Camp correctly acknowledges that there was no seizure when Deputy Ferguson first approached his parked vehicle.¹

"The Fourth Amendment prohibits `unreasonable searches and seizures' by the Government, and its protections extend to brief investigatory stops of persons or vehicles that fall short of traditional arrest." United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002).

"It is well established that officers conducting a traffic stop may `take such steps as [are] reasonably necessary to protect their personal safety.' United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 235, 105 S.Ct. 675, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985). This includes conducting a protective search of the driver, Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111, 112, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977), the passengers, id., and the vehicle, Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049-51, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983). The officer may seize any contraband, including weapons, in plain view. Id. at 1049, 103 S.Ct. 3469. The officer may use a flash light to illuminate a vehicle's dark interior. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 305, 107 S.Ct. 1134, 94 L.Ed.2d 326 (1987). The officer may also prolong the detention to investigate the driver's license and the vehicle registration, Prouse, 440 U.S. at 657-59, 99 S.Ct. 1391, and may do so by requesting a computer check. United States v. Simmons, 172 F.3d 775, 778 (11th Cir.1999); Pruitt, 174 F.3d at 1219. See also United States v. Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d 1345, 1349 (10th Cir.1998); Foote v. Dunagan, 33 F.3d 445, 448-50 (4th Cir.1994); United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 437 (5th Cir.1993); McFadden v. United States, 814 F.2d 144, 147 (3d Cir.1987)."

United States v. Purcell, 236 F.3d 1274, 1277-78 (11th Cir.2001).

A routine traffic stop may be prolonged if police have a "reasonable suspicion" of other criminal activity.

"[I]f reasonable suspicion of additional criminal activity arises in the course of a stop and before the purpose of the stop is fulfilled, then a continued detention may be justified until the new suspicion has been confirmed or dispelled. Thus, an investigation pursuant to a traffic stop `may last as long as is reasonably necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop, including the resolution of reasonable suspicion, supported by articulable facts within the officer's professional judgment, that emerges during the stop.'"

St. George v. State, 197 S.W.3d 806, 817 (Tex.App.2006).

In R.W. v. State, 913 So.2d 505, 510-11 (Ala.Crim.App.2005), we stated the following concerning "reasonable suspicion":

"[R]easonable suspicion is determined not by looking at each circumstance individually, but by looking at the totality of the circumstances surrounding the incident. As explained by the United States Supreme Court:

"`When discussing how reviewing courts should make reasonable-suspicion determinations, we have said repeatedly that they must look at the "totality of the circumstances" of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a "particularized and objective basis" for suspecting legal wrongdoing. See, e.g., [United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411] at 417-418 [(1981)]. This process allows officers to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make...