Campaign Legal Ctr. v. Fed. Election Comm'n
| Decision Date | 30 December 2021 |
| Docket Number | 20-cv-00730 (CRC) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
| Parties | CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER and DEMOCRACY 21, Plaintiffs, v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, Defendant, RIGHT TO RISE SUPER PAC, INC., Intervenor-Defendant. |
Before the Court is intervenor-defendant Right to Rise's (“RTR”) motion to reconsider the Court's February 19, 2021 order granting RTR's motion to dismiss in part. RTR asks the Court to revisit its holding that plaintiffs Campaign Legal Center and Democracy 21 have standing to pursue their claim. Also before the Court is plaintiffs' motion for a default judgment against the Federal Election Commission (“FEC”). For the reasons described below, the court will grant RTR's motion for reconsideration, and, finding that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, dismiss the case and deny plaintiffs' motion for a default judgment against the FEC.
In early 2015, Campaign Legal Center and Democracy 21 filed two administrative complaints with the Federal Election Commission (“FEC”). The groups alleged that during the 2016 presidential election cycle, then-Florida Governor Jeb Bush and the Right to Rise super PAC (“RTR”), failed to abide by various disclosure requirements under the Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”). Those complaints sat dormant for nearly five years without action from the FEC. In March 2020, plaintiffs brought this action, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to compel the FEC to act on their complaints. RTR intervened as a defendant and moved to dismiss.
On February 19, 2021, the Court granted RTR's motion to dismiss in part and denied it in part. See Campaign Legal Ctr. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 520 F.Supp.3d 38 (D.D.C. 2021) (Cooper, J.) (“CLC”). The Court agreed with RTR that plaintiffs failed to state a claim under the APA. Because FECA provides an “alternative, comprehensive” scheme for judicial review, it “precludes review of FEC enforcement provisions under the APA.” Id. at 50 (). The Court additionally agreed with RTR that, to the extent plaintiffs sought a determination from the FEC that certain of RTR and Bush's expenditures were “coordinated, ” such a request is precluded by Wertheimer v. FEC, 268 F.3d 1070, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 2001). CLC, 520 F.Supp.3d at 47.
However, the Court rejected RTR's argument that plaintiffs had not alleged an informational injury sufficient for Article III standing. Id. at 46. The Court reasoned as follows. The testing-the-waters provisions of FECA “permit would-be candidates to evaluate the feasibility of candidacy without triggering candidate status when the funds they raise or spend for that purpose exceed $5, 000.” Id. at 43. While potential candidates do not need to disclose that spending during the testing-the-waters phase preceding their candidacy, if they eventually become a candidate, FECA requires them to disclose all of those transactions in their campaign committee's first report. Id.[1] If the would-be-candidate decides not to run, though, no disclosure is required.
Plaintiffs alleged that Governor Bush was testing the waters of a possible presidential run as early as January 2015. Id. at 45. But, Bush's first report as a candidate, filed on July 15, 2015, appeared to only disclose testing-the-waters spending going back to June 5, 2015. This left the five or so months of testing-the-waters spending between January and June 2015 undisclosed. See PL's Resp. at 17, ECF No. 13. Taking the plaintiffs' allegations as true-that is, that Bush engaged in various testing-the-waters activity as early as January 2015-it appeared Bush had failed to disclose months of spending that FECA required him to disclose in his campaign's first report. 520 F.Supp.3d at 46. This would constitute an informational injury sufficient for Article III standing. See id. at 45-46 (citing Campaign Legal Ctr. & Democracy 21 v. FEC, 952 F.3d 352, 356 (D.C. Cir. 2020)).
On March 5, 2021, RTR moved for reconsideration. RTR argued the Court had incorrectly applied the legal standard applicable to a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P 12(b)(6) to RTR's motion under Rule 12(b)(1). RTR also claimed the Court's decision was mistaken as to standing, because “Governor Bush disclosed all his testing-the-waters activities on his presidential campaign's first campaign finance report.” Recon. Mot. at 2, ECF No. 19. In support of that contention, RTR claimed Bush reported “$386, 020.15 of testing-the-waters activity for the period January 2015 through June 2015 in his presidential campaign's first disclosure report, ” id. at 8, without citation to the report or any explanation of how that sum was derived. In the alternative, RTR sought an order certifying the Court's decision for interlocutory appeal.
In response, plaintiffs argued that RTR had “no basis for its assertion that all testing the waters activity at issue here was publicly disclosed, ” because it was not clear how RTR would know the full scope of the Bush campaign's testing-the-waters activities. Resp. at 9, ECF No. 21. Plaintiffs maintained that, although Bush “reported some portion of his testing-the-waters spending, ” there is no indication that “this reporting was remotely complete or accurate, ” given the extensive travel and fundraising done by Bush in the months before his candidacy was announced. Id. at 11.
Plaintiffs separately filed a motion for default judgment against the FEC on March 26, 2021. Plaintiffs claimed that the FEC “failed to appear, answer, plead, or otherwise defend this action as required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Default Mot. at 1, ECF No. 23. RTR opposed the motion, arguing that default judgment was not appropriate because (in its view) the plaintiffs do not have standing and therefore cannot establish subject matter jurisdiction. Default Resp. at 1, ECF No. 24.
The Court held a hearing on the reconsideration motion on April 20, 2021. At the hearing, the Court invited the parties to address what specifically was disclosed in the Bush campaign's first report and for what time period. Transcript of Mot. Hearing at 2-3. It was only then that RTR pointed out-for the first time-that the testing-the-waters spending dated June 5, 2015 in Bush's first report was listed on that date because that was the date Bush became a candidate. Transcript at 6. Under RTR's legal theory, spending during the earlier testing-the-waters phase became an in-kind disbursement to the campaign on the date the campaign was announced, because there was no campaign before then. Id. at 5-6. Counsel also explained that, underneath the disbursement date there was an earlier date listed, indicating the date that Bush actually paid the relevant vendor for the testing-the-waters expense. Id. Looking at this second date, some of this testing-the-waters spending seemed to occur as early as the summer of 2014. See e.g., Jeb 2016 Inc., 2015 July Quarterly Report, FEC Form 3P at 1675 (filed July 15, 2015; amended Jan. 31, 2016) (listing, as an example an “In-kind (TTW)” disbursement for communications consulting in the amount of $1875, with the date of disbursement listed as 06/05/2015 and the notes listing the date 7/11/2014).[2] The total amount of Bush's testing-the-waters activity from July 2014 to June 2015 now appeared to be roughly the $386, 000 that RTR had claimed earlier.
Counsel for the plaintiffs agreed with RTR's reading of the forms. Transcript at 7. However, plaintiffs continued to argue that there had to be more than $386, 000 worth of testing-the-waters activity during this time, given the widespread media coverage of Bush's travel before his candidacy was announced, and the fact that the reports still only showed a single testing-the-waters travel disbursement in the amount of $1, 089. Id. at 10, 13. RTR responded by asserting that most of Bush's travel was done on behalf of RTR and was therefore paid for by RTR and disclosed in RTR's quarterly reports, not the campaign's. Id. at 11-12.
Because the parties had not, up until that point in the litigation, focused the Court's attention on particular instances of Bush's travel, the Court invited further briefing from the parties on the matter. Id. at 23-25. The Court has received that supplemental briefing and the motions are ripe for the Court's consideration.
Rule 60(b) authorizes a court to grant relief from an order in certain limited circumstances-based on “fraud, ” “mistake, ” or, “any other reason that justifies relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1), 60(b)(6). “It is well-settled that the party seeking relief from a judgment bears the burden of demonstrating that he satisfies the perquisites for such relief.” Green v. AFL-CIO, 811 F.Supp.2d 250, 254 (D.D.C. 2011). “Relief under Rule 60(b)(1) motions is rare, ” Hall v. CIA, 437 F.3d 94, 99 (D.C. Cir. 2006), and should only be granted when the movant shows the Court's order contains a clear or obvious error, Douglas v. D.C. Hous. Auth., 306 F.R.D. 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2014). Although the moving party must demonstrate that it is entitled to relief under Rule 60, the court “is vested with a large measure of discretion in deciding whether to grant a Rule 60(b) motion.” Twelve John Does v. District of Columbia, 841 F.2d 1133, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
The plaintiff “bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over her claims.” Schmidt v. U.S. Capitol Police...
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