Campanaro v. Pennsylvania Elec. Co.

• Decision Date: 08 September 1999
• Citation: 738 A.2d 472
• Parties: Anita L. CAMPANARO, Lois Diggins, Janice M. Duffy, Nancy A. Foster, Melissa K. Fultz, Patricia Kay Germann, Mary Ann Grove, Karen A. Hallman, Theresa M. Heane, Kimberlee A. Johnnie, Michelle R. Jones, Rhonda E. Miller, Gloria J. Morgan, Cathy D. Reifsteck, Beverly J. Rosenberry, Kimberly A. Sager, Paula J. Schunk, Robin M. Washington, Patricia A. Wertz, Beverly M. Wilson, Leann B. Wray, Appellants, v. PENNSYLVANIA ELECTRIC COMPANY, v. Utility Workers Union of America, Local Union NO. 180, AFL-CIO, Appellees.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

738 A.2d 472

Anita L. CAMPANARO, Lois Diggins, Janice M. Duffy, Nancy A. Foster, Melissa K. Fultz, Patricia Kay Germann, Mary Ann Grove, Karen A. Hallman, Theresa M. Heane, Kimberlee A. Johnnie, Michelle R. Jones, Rhonda E. Miller, Gloria J. Morgan, Cathy D. Reifsteck, Beverly J. Rosenberry, Kimberly A. Sager, Paula J. Schunk, Robin M. Washington, Patricia A. Wertz, Beverly M. Wilson, Leann B. Wray, Appellants, v. PENNSYLVANIA ELECTRIC COMPANY, v. Utility Workers Union of America, Local Union NO. 180, AFL-CIO, Appellees.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued June 8, 1999.

Filed September 8, 1999.

Stephen D. Wicks, Altoona, for appellants.

William J. Payne, Wayne, for PA Electric Co., appellee.

Marianne Oliver, Pittsburgh, for Utility Workers Union, appellee.

Before JOHNSON, LALLY-GREEN and HESTER, JJ.

LALLY-GREEN, J.:

¶ 1 Appellants, Anita L. Campanaro, Lois Diggins, Janice M. Duffy, Nancy A. Foster, Melissa K. Fultz, Patricia Kay Germann, Mary Ann Grove, Karen A. Hallman, Theresa M. Heane, Kimberlee A. Johnnie, Michelle R. Jones, Rhonda E. Miller, Gloria J. Morgan, Cathy D. Reifsteck, Beverly J. Rosenberry, Kimberly A. Sager, Paula J. Schunk, Robin M. Washington, Patricia A. Wertz, Beverly M. Wilson, and Leann B. Wray, appeal the trial court's grant of summary judgment entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County. We affirm.

¶ 2 Preliminarily, we note that the record reveals that Appellants initiated this class action lawsuit after exhausting all administrative remedies against Appellee, Pennsylvania Electric Company ("Penelec").¹

¶ 3 The record reflects that on August 26, 1993, Appellants filed a complaint against Penelec alleging that wage rates negotiated between Penelec and Appellants' union, Utility Workers Union of America, Local Union No. 180, AFL-CIO ("Local 180"), discriminated against Appellants because of their sex in violation of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 P.S. §§ 951-963 ("PHRA"). At all relevant times, Appellants were employees of Penelec and members of a collective bargaining unit of Local 180.

¶ 4 Appellants belonged to clerical/commercial employment classifications that, together with janitorial employees, were subject to a wage freeze. Of these 42 clerical/commercial and janitorial employees, 39 were female. Although some of the Appellants belonged to the commercial employment classification, these members' essential functions were clerical. We will, therefore, refer to the classifications of which Appellants were members as clerical.

¶ 5 In August 1990, the collective bargaining agreement that governed relations between Local 180 and Penelec expired. On August 23, 1990, Local 180 ratified a new collective bargaining agreement that increased compensation for members who were not in Appellants' employment classification, approximately 92 percent of whom were males. Wages were frozen for the clerical classification as well as for the janitorial classification. Wages were also frozen for two unskilled labor classifications; however, no unskilled laborers were employed at the time. In lieu of wage increases, cash performance rewards were given in lump sum payments to members of these classifications.

¶ 6 In defending this lawsuit, Penelec alleges that this wage structure reflected an effort to move pay scales to competitive levels because clerical employees were being paid significantly more than similar workers in other area businesses and utilities as well as the established norms for the utility industry. Appellants contend that this wage structure was the result of sex discrimination in violation of the PHRA.

¶ 7 On October 27, 1993, Penelec filed preliminary objections to Appellants' complaint. On March 8, 1994, the court granted Penelec's preliminary objections and dismissed Appellants' complaint for lack of jurisdiction and failure to join an indispensable party, Local 180. Thereafter, the court denied Appellants' petition for reconsideration, and Appellants appealed to this Court.

¶ 8 On February 10, 1995, this Court reversed and remanded after finding that Local 180 was not an indispensable party because Appellants sought equalization of pay increases from Penelec and sought no relief from Local 180. Campanaro v. Pennsylvania Elec. Co., 440 Pa.Super. 519, 656 A.2d 491, 493 (1995). On October 3, 1995, our Supreme Court denied Penelec's petition for allowance of appeal. Campanaro v. Pennsylvania Elec. Co., 542 Pa. 639, 666 A.2d 1049 (1995). Penelec thereafter joined Local 180 as an additional defendant.

¶ 9 On January 30, 1995, the trial court granted Penelec's preliminary objections in the nature of a motion to strike Appellants' demand for a jury trial.² Thereafter, Penelec and Local 180 filed motions for summary judgment alleging that Appellants failed to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment sex discrimination under the PHRA; or, even assuming arguendo that they did, Penelec produced legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the payment structure. The motions further alleged that Appellants failed to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact sex discrimination because: the disparate impact model is not applicable to collectively-bargained and market-based wage compensation systems; Appellants failed to present any evidence of disparate impact; and Appellees negated any claim of disparate impact by demonstrating that the collective bargaining proposal was based on a "legitimate business justification." Appellee's Brief at 44-45. On June 5, 1998, the court granted Appellees' motions for summary judgment. This appeal followed.

¶ 10 Appellants raise the following issues on appeal:

I. The Lower Court Erred in Dismissing [Appellants'] Claims For Sex Discrimination Based Upon The Theory of Disparate Treatment;

II. The Lower Court Erred in Its Selection of Standards For Summary Judgment; and

III. The Lower Court Erred in Dismissing [Appellants'] Claims for Sex Discrimination Based Upon The Theory of Disparate Impact.

Appellants' Brief at 4.

¶ 11 Our standard of review of an order granting summary judgment is well settled. Summary judgment may be properly entered only where (1) there is no genuine issue of material fact as to a necessary element of the cause of action which could be established by additional discovery or an expert report, or (2) after completion of discovery and production of expert reports, an adverse party who will bear the burden of proof at trial has failed to produce evidence of facts essential to the cause of action. Pa.R.Civ.P. 1035.2. When reviewing the propriety of a trial court's grant of summary judgment in this Commonwealth, we must view the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and determine whether the moving party established that no genuine issue of material fact exists, thus entitling it to judgment as a matter of law. Roman Mosaic & Tile Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 704 A.2d 665, 668 (Pa.Super.1997). In making this determination, the non-moving party is entitled to all reasonable inferences. Id. Any doubts as to the existence of a factual dispute are resolved in favor of the non-moving party. Id. Summary judgment is appropriate only in the clearest of cases. Id. With these principles in mind, we proceed to examine whether summary judgment was properly granted.

I.

¶ 12 Appellants first complain that that the court erred in dismissing their sex discrimination claims based on the disparate treatment theory. Specifically, the trial court stated that while it did not believe that Appellants had established a prima facie case of intentional discrimination, even if they had, Appellee clearly had legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its adverse employment action. Trial Court Opinion, 6/5/98, at 9-11.

¶ 13 The PHRA and its federal counterpart, Title VII, clearly define unlawful discriminatory practices. Under the PHRA, it is unlawful for any employer because of sex to discriminate against an individual with respect to, among other things, compensation if the individual is the best able and most competent to perform the services required. 43 P.S. § 955(a). Under Title VII, it is similarly unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any individual with respect to, among other things, hiring, compensation or terms or conditions of employment because of sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).

¶ 14 In employment discrimination cases, Pennsylvania courts utilize the analytical model adopted by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Fairfield Township Volunteer Fire Co. No. 1 v. Commonwealth, Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, 530 Pa. 441, 444, 609 A.2d 804, 805 (1992). Under that model, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. Bailey v. Storlazzi, 729 A.2d 1206, 1212 (Pa.Super.1999). A prima facie case is established by showing that complainant is a member of a protected class, has suffered an adverse employment action and others not in the protected class have been treated differently. Kryeski v. Schott Glass Technologies, Inc., 426 Pa.Super. 105, 626 A.2d 595, 597-98 (1993), appeal denied, 536 Pa. 643, 639 A.2d 29 (1994).

¶ 15 If plaintiff proves his or her prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the employment action. Bailey, 729 A.2d at 1212. If defendant meets this burden, then plaintiff has the opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the employer were not its true reasons, but, rather, a pretext for discrimination. Id. See also Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981)

. The ultimate burden of proving intentional discrimination returns to the plaintiff even after the employer offers its legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons...