Campanelli v. Candlewood Hills Tax Dist.

• Decision Date: 18 January 2011
• Docket Number: No. 32523.,32523.
• Citation: 126 Conn.App. 135,10 A.3d 1073
• Parties: Robert J. CAMPANELLI et al. v. CANDLEWOOD HILLS TAX DISTRICT.
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals

10 A.3d 1073

126 Conn.App. 135

Robert J. CAMPANELLI et al.

v.CANDLEWOOD HILLS TAX DISTRICT.

No. 32523.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued Oct. 13, 2010.

Decided Jan. 18, 2011.

Doris B. D'Ambrosio, West Hartford, for the appellants (plaintiffs).

Joseph L. Gegeny, for the appellee (defendant).

DiPENTIMA, C.J., and BEAR and FLYNN, Js.

BEAR, J.

The plaintiffs, Robert J. Campanelli and Linda DiSarro, appeal from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the defendant, the Candlewood Hills Tax District (district). The plaintiffs allege that they acquired title by adverse possession to a portion of undeveloped property owned by the district located adjacent to their property. The trial court found that the plaintiffs had failed to rebut the presumption that the district, a quasi-municipal corporation, held its property for public use and, therefore, was immune from a claim of adverse possession. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The trial court found the following facts. The property at issue is located at 20 Brook Drive, New Fairfield, and is owned by the district. The property is partially wooded, undeveloped land, part of which contains wetlands. Testimony and other evidence at trial demonstrated that, from 1988 until 2007, the district used its property for a variety of purposes. During the winter season, the property was used for the disposal of excess plowed roadway snow, and, during the fall season, it was used for the disposal of leaves and debristhat would accumulate in the catch basins on or near the residents' property. The residents often were permitted to dispose of household garbage and debris in a dumpster located on the property.

On October 15, 2004, however, the town of New Fairfield instructed the district to cease and to desist from using the property as a waste disposal site because it is located in a designated wetlands area. Thereafter, the district installed "no trespassing" signage and a locked gate to deter private users and, to the extent possible, to ensure entry only by those who were authorized by the district.

In late 2006, the district's board of directors considered a proposal to build a clubhouse on the property that "could be used for community functions, rented out for private parties and as a playground for kids." Deep soil test tests were performed by an engineering company to determine if the property would be an appropriate location for a septic system. The proposal subsequently was defeated by a vote of the district.

The plaintiffs have resided at 18 Brook Drive since November, 1983, and have been the record titleholders of 18 Brook Drive since September, 1988. At trial, testimony and other evidence demonstrated that the plaintiffs had engaged in a number of activities for their own purposes on a portion of 20 Brook Drive that abuts their own property. Campanelli maintained this portion of the district's property by clearing high bushes, removing weeds and cutting the grass. He also stored a large pile of wood and parked his trailer on this portion of the property. Campanelli also purchased and distributedfill to level the surface on this portion of the property.

Following receipt of the October, 2004 notice from the town of New Fairfield, the district advised Campanelli in writing to remove his woodpile from the district's property. A subcontractor, who was in theprocess of removing the dumpster on the district's property, knocked down the fence at the entrance to the property. Campanelli took it upon himself to install a new post and chain at the entrance. The district's manager then cut the lock placed there by Campanelli. In a letter dated December 27, 2004, Campanelli informed the district's tax collector, business manager and board that he was deducting from his tax bill the cost of supplies and labor for installing the post and chain. In that same letter, Campanelli informed the district that he was entitled to use the property as he had done for more than twenty years. He also claimed to have protected the property "from illegal dumping on a wetlands site" and advised the district about the need for tree, drain and road maintenance. In a February 11, 2005 response to Campanelli's letter, the tax collector and business manager for the board rejected the payment and credit claim, returned Campanelli's check and issued a new statement to the plaintiffs charging the full assessment with interest for late payment.

On April 10, 2007, the district installed a chain-link fence along the property line that separates 18 Brook Drive and 20 Brook Drive. The district also hired a contractor to move Campanelli's woodpile onto his property at 18 Brook Drive. The plaintiffs commenced this action on or about April 19, 2007.

Following a trial on January 9, 2009, the court, Sommer, J., concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to satisfy their burden of rebutting the presumption that the district held the relevant property for public use and consequently was immune from a claim of adverse possession. This appeal followed.

Both the plaintiffs and the defendant agree that the applicable standard of review is the clearly erroneousstandard.¹ "A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to support it ... or when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.... In making this determination, every reasonable presumptionmust be given in favor of the trial court's ruling." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gordon v. Tobias, 262 Conn. 844, 849, 817 A.2d 683 (2003).

The issue before this court is whether the trial court properly determined that the disputed property could not be taken by adverse possession because it was held for public use by a tax district.

A legally created tax district is a quasi-municipal corporation. Alarm Applications Co. v. Simsbury Volunteer Fire Co., 179 Conn. 541, 547, 427 A.2d 822 (1980);Larkin v. Bontatibus, 145 Conn. 570, 576, 145 A.2d 133 (1958). "Quasi-municipal corporations are governed by the law applicable to municipal corporations." Stroiney v. Crescent Lake Tax District, 205 Conn. 290, 294, 533 A.2d 208 (1987).

"Title to realty held in fee by a state or any of its subdivisions for a public use cannot be acquired by adverse possession." Goldman v. Quadrato, 142 Conn. 398, 402-403, 114 A.2d 687 (1955). "In light of the myriad of public uses that may be advanced through public ownership of undeveloped lands ... property that is held in fee simple ownership by municipalities must be presumed to be held for public use. It follows that the party seeking title by adverse possession must bear the burden of rebutting that presumption. Municipal immunity from adverse possession is the rule and not the exception, and we have consistently held that the party seeking to acquire title by adverse possession bears the burden of proving all the elements of adverse possession." American Trading Real Estate Properties, Inc. v. Trumbull, 215 Conn. 68, 80, 574 A.2d 796 (1990).² Public rights to municipal property will not be forfeited by lack of use absent some additional evidence indicating that the municipality intended to abandon the property. Appeal of Phillips, 113 Conn. 40, 45, 154 A. 238 (1931). "[T]he public use requirement can be satisfied even if a property is not presently subject to public use so long as it is held with an intention to develop it at some time in the future." American Trading Real Estate Properties, Inc. v. Trumbull, supra, at 79, 574 A.2d 796.

The plaintiffs' burden, therefore, was to rebut the presumption that the property was being held for public use. See id., at 79-80, 574 A.2d 796; Cornfield Point Assn. v. Old Saybrook, 91 Conn.App. 539, 563, 882 A.2d 117 (2005). We agree with the court that the plaintiffs failed to meet this burden.

The trial court expressly found that there was no evidence that the district intended to abandon the property. Whether the district continued to hold the property for public use without abandoning it presents a question of fact and, accordingly, the trial court's finding will not be disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous. Id., at 564, 882 A.2d 117. Over the years, the district used the property for a variety of community based activities, including disposal of leaves and plowed roadway snow. The district also permitted property owners in the district to dispose of household garbage and debris on the property. The district's board later considered a proposal to build a community center on the land. The proposal was considered only months before the filing ofthis action, and the fact that the proposal was defeated does not definitively indicate that there is no intention to pursue possible development at the property in the future. These actual and proposed uses of the property over many years clearly support the trial court's finding that the property was not abandoned by the district.

The plaintiffs, however, argue that in order for a use to be "public," it must be open to the general public. The plaintiffs assert that an essential feature of property dedicated to public use is that it is not confined to " 'privileged individuals....' " The plaintiffs, in effect, are asking this court to require of all municipal property the level of public access associated with state owned or municipally owned public parks and beaches in order to be eligible for immunity from adverse possession. See ...