Campbell County v. Johnson

• Decision Date: 05 April 1966
• Docket Number: No. 10226,10226
• Citation: 82 S.D. 79,141 N.W.2d 475
• Parties: CAMPBELL COUNTY, South Dakota, a Municipal Corporation, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Myron JOHNSON, Edwin Zimmerman, Alvin Berndt, Edwin Tronson and Otto Schick, Individually and as Members of the Board of County Commissioners, Campbell County, South Dakota, a Municipal Corporation, Defendants and Appellants.
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Page 475

141 N.W.2d 475

82 S.D. 79

CAMPBELL COUNTY, South Dakota, a Municipal Corporation Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Myron JOHNSON, Edwin Zimmerman, Alvin Berndt, Edwin Tronson and Otto Schick, Individually and as Members of the Board of County Commissioners, Campbell County, South Dakota, a Municipal Corporation, Defendants and Appellants.

No. 10226.

Supreme Court of South Dakota.

April 5, 1966.

Andrew Aberle, Timber Lake, for defendants and appellants.

Paul O. Kretschmar, Eureka, Erwin L. Wiest, Herried, for plaintiff and respondent.

NORBECK, Circuit Judge.

Appellants, County Commissioners of Campbell County, appeal from a circuit court judgment adjusting boundaries of county commissioner districts in Campbell County.

Respondent raises the question of the right of appellants, Board of County Commissioners, to appeal the decision of the Circuit Court. It was decided in Codington County v. Board of Commissioners of Codington County, 47 S.D. 520, 199 N.W. 594, that adjusting county commissioner district boundaries required the exercise of quasi-judicial power, and the order was reviewable. The fact that in the instant case the Circuit Court made a final judgment does not require a different holding. County School Board of Pennington County v. Cottonwood School District No. 41 of Pennington County, S.D., 137 N.W.2d 882, is distinguished as it has been held that when a County Board of Education adjusted boundaries, its decision was 'made in its capacity of a tribunal exercising delegated legislative authority'.

The assignments of error raised by appellants are: 1. The trial court erred in its judgment that the disparity in voting population was avoidable and was an abuse of discretion; 2, respondents did not submit any plan nor introduce any evidence whereby each district could have contained as near as within 100 of the same number of votes and introduced no evidence nor records that appellants abused their discretion in redistricting, and; 3, the trial court erred in its judgment by dividing election precincts in establishing county commissioner districts.

Voting population in the respective commissioner districts as determined by the Board and by the court on appeal are as follows:

                                      District    I       II     III      IV      V
                Board--population               357     281     236     415     370
                Court--population               302     312     329     419     303
                Percentage of voters             21.5%   17.0%   14.2%   25.0%   22.3%
                Board
                Court                            18%     19%     20%     25%     18%
                

It is apparent that the difference in voter representation under the decision of the board ranged from one commissioner to represent 415 in District IV to one commissioner to represent 236 in District II, a disparity of 179. Such apportionment does not meet the statutory test of 'as near as may be within one hundred of the same number of votes' (SDC 12.0608) and certainly not the 'one person, one vote' doctrine.

The apportionment plan of the court ranged from one commissioner to 419 in District IV to one commissioner to represent 302 in District I, a disparity of 117, which very nearly meets the letter of the statutory requirement, and certainly the spirit. Does it satisfy 'one person, one vote'? County commissioner districts are made up of election precincts. These are Townships...