Campbell Motor Co. v. Stanfield

• Decision Date: 06 May 1926
• Docket Number: 8 Div. 848
• Parties: CAMPBELL MOTOR CO. v. STANFIELD.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

108 So. 515

214 Ala. 506

CAMPBELL MOTOR CO. v. STANFIELD.

8 Div. 848

Supreme Court of Alabama

May 6, 1926

Appeal from Circuit Court, Lauderdale County; C.P. Almon, Judge.

Action in detinue by the Campbell Motor Company against Henry Stanfield. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Transferred from Court of Appeals under Code 1923, § 7326. Reversed and remanded.

Bradshaw & Barnett, of Florence, for appellant.

J.C Roberts, of Florence, for appellee.

GARDNER J.

Suit in detinue by appellant against appellee for recovery of a Ford car. Plaintiff relied for recovery upon a mortgage, duly recorded, executed by one Gray, to whom plaintiff had sold the car, permitting him to have the possession and use thereof. About one month from the date of sale the car was badly damaged by Gray, and was carried by him to the garage of Young and Poore for repairs, which were made, and considerable expense incurred. The repair bill was not paid and defendant's title is that of a purchaser at a public sale of the car, had pursuant to the enforcement of the statutory mechanic's lien. Section 8863, Code 1923. Whether or not the mechanic's lien is superior to plaintiff's title as mortgagee, was the pivotal question in the case.

Defendant offered evidence to the effect that one Bond (who was in the employ of plaintiff, and looking after the sale of its cars including this particular car) came into the garage while the repairs were in progress, and was informed that the car under repair was the Gray car, and, with such knowledge, made no objection thereto. Bond denied this, and a controverted issue of fact was thus presented.

In Walden Auto Co. v. Mixon, 196 Ala. 346, 71 So. 694, the general rule was recognized that such statutory lien will not take precedence of a prior chattel mortgage, of which the lien claimant had actual or constructive notice at the time, unless the mortgagee expressly or impliedly authorized the mortgagor to engage the services or material for which the lien is claimed.

The case of Watts v. Sweeney, 127 Ind. 116, 26 N.E. 680 22 Am.St.Rep. 615, was noted in the Mixon Case, supra, as an illustration of the doctrine that, in some instances, by the very circumstances of the case, as to property left by the mortgagee in possession of the mortgagor for some indefinite time with a knowledge of the necessity of repair for its continued use, preservation, and maintenance of its value as security, the incurring of such charges by the mortgagor may be held as having been done under the implied...