Campbell v. Board of Educ. of Town of New Milford

• Decision Date: 01 May 1984
• Citation: 475 A.2d 289,193 Conn. 93
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: , 17 Ed. Law Rep. 840 John A. CAMPBELL v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the TOWN OF NEW MILFORD et al.

Page 289

475 A.2d 289

193 Conn. 93, 17 Ed. Law Rep. 840

John A. CAMPBELL v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the TOWN OF NEW MILFORD et al.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 1, 1984.

Decided May 1, 1984.

Shelley White, Hartford, with whom, on the brief, were Margaret Hayman and Martha Stone, Hartford, for appellant (plaintiff).

Thomas N. Sullivan, Hartford, for appellees (defendants).

Before SPEZIALE, C.J., and PETERS, HEALEY, SHEA and GRILLO, JJ.

PETERS, Associate Justice.

This case concerns the validity of the policy of a local school board that imposes academic sanctions for nonattendance upon high school students. In a class action brought by the named plaintiff, John A. Campbell, for himself and others similarly situated, the plaintiff class sought injunctive and declaratory relief, mandamus, and compensatory damages from the named defendant, the New Milford board of education, and others. ¹ The plaintiff claimed that the defendants' policy was ultra vires in light of governing state statutes, and unconstitutional in light of operative provisions of the Connecticut constitution and the United States constitution. The trial court rendered judgment for the defendants and the plaintiff has appealed.

The underlying facts are undisputed. The New Milford attendance policy, set out in an annually distributed student handbook, provides two sets of academic sanctions for students who are absent from school. Course credit is withheld from any student who, without receiving an administrative waiver, is absent from any year-long course for more than twenty-four class periods. ² In the calculation of the twenty-four maximum absences, all class absences are included except absences on school-sponsored activities or essential administrative business. In addition to the twenty-four absence limit, the course grade of any student whose absence from school is unapproved is subject to a five-point reduction for each unapproved absence after the first. In any one marking period, the grade may not, however, be reduced to a grade lower than 50, which is a failing grade. The grade reduction for unexcused absences is, like the twenty-four maximum absence policy, subject to administrative waiver. The policy of the school board entails extensive opportunities for counseling after a student's first confirmed unapproved absence from a class and thereafter.

The stated purpose of the attendance policy is educational rather than disciplinary. A student's disciplinary suspension from school, for reasons unrelated to attendance, is considered an approved rather than an unapproved absence. Such an absence cannot result in the diminution of a class grade although it may be counted, unless waived, as part of the twenty-four maximum absences for class credit. A student's absence from school, whether approved or unapproved, is not a ground for suspension or expulsion.

A student's report card lists, for each course, grades for each marking period, a final examination grade, a final grade, the amount of credit awarded, and the number of approved and unapproved absences. The report card conspicuously bears the following legend: "A circled grade indicates that the grade was reduced due to unapproved absences." In the case of the named plaintiff, his report card indicated grade reductions by the circling of grades in each of his academic courses, with the result that in three of the courses his final grade was lowered from passing to failing. ³ In a fourth course, Architectual Drafting II, where the plaintiff's final grade was passing despite an indicated reduction for unapproved absences, the report card assigned him no credit because of a total of thirty-eight absences, thirty-one of which were approved and seven of which were unapproved. Any report card thus discloses, on its face, those grades which are affected by the enforcement of the attendance policy.

The plaintiff's appeal argues that the trial court erred in ruling that the defendants' attendance policy: (1) was not ultra vires or preempted by governing state statutes; (2) did not violate the rights of the plaintiff class to substantive due process under the Connecticut and the United States constitutions; (3) did not deprive the plaintiff class of procedural due process under the Connecticut and the United States constitutions; (4) did not deny the rights of the plaintiff class to equal protection of the law under the Connecticut and the United States constitutions. We find no error.

I

The plaintiff's first argument on appeal is that the defendant school board's policy is invalid because it conflicts with a number of state statutes. This argument is twofold, that the attendance policy is ultra vires because it exceeds the authority conferred upon local school boards by state law and that the policy is preempted by state statutes with which it is inconsistent. We find neither argument persuasive.

The authority of local boards of education derives from their role as agents of the state. "[T]he furnishing of education for the general public, required by article eighth, § 1, of the Connecticut constitution, is by its very nature a state function and duty." (Footnote omitted.) Murphy v. Board of Education, 167 Conn. 368, 372, 355 A.2d 265 (1974). This responsibility has been delegated to local boards which, as "agencies of the state in charge of education in the town ... possess only such powers as are granted to them by the General Statutes expressly or by necessary implication." Herzig v. Board of Education, 152 Conn. 144, 150, 204 A.2d 827 (1964); City Council v. Hall, 180 Conn. 243, 248, 429 A.2d 481 (1980).

The trial court found authority for the defendant school board's attendance policy in General Statutes §§ 10-220 and 10-221. ⁴ The first of these statutes, § 10-220, requires a local school board to "implement the educational interests of the state" and to "provide such other educational activities as in its judgment will best serve the interests of the school district." The second statute, § 10-221, instructs local boards of education to "prescribe rules for the management, studies, classification and discipline of the public schools." In addition, the trial court noted that General Statutes §§ 10-184 and 10-199 ⁵ permit local school boards to investigate and to regulate "the irregular attendance of pupils at school." General Statutes § 10-199.

The plaintiff contends that these statutes do not furnish support for the defendant school board's policy because its policy is properly to be characterized not as an academic regulation assigning a uniform grading value to classroom presence but rather as unauthorized punishment for nonattendance. The plaintiff concedes that school boards may properly require classroom teachers to take classroom participation into account in assigning numerical grades. Boards of education, however, according to the plaintiff, may not prescribe school-wide rules for nonattendance except by way of imposition of disciplinary sanctions of suspension and expulsion in accordance with the narrow and specifically defined procedures permitted by General Statutes §§ 10-233a through 10-233f.

We do not read the school board's authority in so limited a fashion. The authority to adopt uniform rules concerning irregularity of attendance is necessarily implied in the conjunction of statutory provisions authorizing local implementation of the educational mission of the state. Significantly, § 10-220 expressly charges local boards with responsibility for the oversight of the school attendance of children from the ages of seven to sixteen made mandatory by § 10-184. Furthermore, the plaintiff's concession that school teachers, upon the instruction of local school boards, may properly consider class participation in the assignment of grades, logically implies the existence of an educational nexus between classroom presence and grading. If local school boards can delegate to others the authority to impose academic sanctions for nonattendance, the decision to adopt uniform school-wide rules for such sanctions can hardly be deemed ultra vires.

None of the out-of-state cases upon which the plaintiff relies compels the conclusion that school-wide academic sanctions for nonattendance should generally be adjudged to be ultra vires. It may well be improper to reduce a student's grade for nonattendance as an additional punishment for unrelated conduct leading to a suspension from class; Gutierrez v. School District R-1, 41 Colo.App. 411, 413, 585 P.2d 935 (1978); Dorsey v. Bale, 521 S.W.2d 76, 78 (Ky.1975); but this school board's program does not permit such double punishment. It would indubitably be unlawful to apply a nonattendance program in an unreasonable, capricious, arbitrary or inequitable manner; State ex rel. Miller v. McLeod, 605 S.W.2d 160, 162 (Mo.App.1980); State ex rel. Sageser v. Ledbetter, 559 S.W.2d 230, 234 (Mo.App.1977); but no such allegation has been factually demonstrated. It would finally be troublesome to bar a truant student from further class attendance and from taking a final examination; Matter of Blackman v. Brown, 100 Misc.2d 566, 568, 419 N.Y.S.2d 796 (S.Ct.1978); but the defendant board's program neither removes such a student from class nor excuses further compliance with the state's compulsory education law. In short, the plaintiff has cited no authority for his claim that attendance rules promulgated by local school boards, if carefully drafted and fairly applied, are to be deemed per se ultra vires. Our own research has likewise revealed no such caselaw. We agree that such regulations fall within the authority granted to local school boards by the statutes of this state.

In the alternative, the plaintiff maintains that the defendant school board's attendance policy is preempted by state statutes governing school attendance. The trial court recognized that the state has enacted legislation dealing with truancy but...