Campbell v. City of Waterbury
| Docket Number | 3:21-cv-107 (JAM) |
| Decision Date | 09 February 2022 |
| Parties | TACARA CAMPBELL, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF WATERBURY et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
ORDER GRANTING STATE DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
The plaintiff let a friend drive her car. But the friend got arrested for drug dealing, and the police seized the car, and then the State of Connecticut filed a civil forfeiture action against the car. Although the plaintiff claims she is an innocent owner of the car, she has been unable to secure its return even after years of state court litigation.
The plaintiff has now filed this federal court action. She primarily claims that the defendants engaged in an unconstitutional “taking” of her property. As relevant here, she seeks relief against the State of Connecticut Judicial Branch, against a state prosecutor who signed a stipulation during the state civil forfeiture proceedings, and against a deputy state court clerk who did not serve the plaintiff with notice about the entry of a stipulation and judgments in the forfeiture proceedings.
All three of these defendants now move to dismiss, and I will grant their motion. As to all claims against the State of Connecticut Judicial Branch and the official-capacity claims against the prosecutor and deputy court clerk, I conclude that the Eleventh Amendment bars these claims from proceeding in a federal court. As to the individual-capacity claims against the prosecutor and deputy court clerk, I principally conclude that these defendants have personal immunity under federal and state law. Accordingly, I will grant the motion to dismiss.
On August 1, 2017, the plaintiff Tacara Campbell asked her friend-Robert Bowens-to take her car in for a repair.[1] But Bowens was arrested on drug charges, and the Waterbury police seized the car.[2] The car was initially transferred to a car storage facility and later transferred to another car storage facility.[3]
In October 2017, the State of Connecticut filed a civil forfeiture action against the car in Connecticut Superior Court.[4] Bowens disclaimed any interest in the vehicle and he filed a motion with the court to release it to Campbell.[5] The state court scheduled an initial hearing for the forfeiture action on November 15, 2017, and Campbell went to court that day to present proof of her ownership of the car, but the car was not released to her.[6]
On September 12, 2018, Bowens was sentenced by a state judge to a term of five years of imprisonment.[7] On that same day Bowens signed a stipulation for the civil forfeiture action.[8]The stipulation stated that Bowens agreed to forfeit $5, 413 in seized currency and further stated that “The Claimant, Robert Bowens / Tacara Campbell” waived any claim to Campbell's car and agreed to “donate” the car to the police department in lieu of storage fees.[9]
This stipulation was counter-signed by Senior Assistant State's Attorney Cynthia Serafini “in my capacity as legal counsel for the State of Connecticut.”[10] The state court entered judgment on the same day in accordance with this stipulation.[11] The forfeiture judgment was amended in October 2018 and then again in February 2020.[12]
According to Campbell, she was not sent notice of the stipulation, the original judgment, or the two later amendments to the judgment.[13] She maintains that she was never presented with or made aware of the stipulation and did not give anyone authority to add her name to the stipulation.[14]
Campbell blames the Deputy Chief Clerk of Court Laura Leigh for failing to notify her about the stipulation or judgments. According to Campbell, Leigh had Campbell's contact information, and it was Leigh's responsibility to ensure that persons with interests in a pending forfeiture matter receive notice at all stages of the proceedings.[15]
On August 3, 2020, Campbell-with the assistance of counsel-filed a motion to open and modify the judgment, seeking to vacate the stipulation and for the car to be returned to her.[16]Four months later, on December 3 2020, she entered into a stipulation with the State providing that the car “shall be returned to Tacara Campbell upon the payment of $500.00 to the tow facility/storage location.”[17] The state court entered a reopened and amended judgment to adopt the stipulation one day later and ordered that the car “shall be returned” to Campbell upon the payment of the $500 storage fee.[18]
But even this did not put an end to Campbell's troubles. According to Campbell, the police have failed to ensure the return of her car, and the storage facility has refused to comply with the court order to accept only $500 for the years it has had the car in storage.[19] The car has sustained significant damage while in storage.[20] Campbell has filed a pending motion for further relief from the state court.[21]
In the meantime, Campbell has also filed this federal lawsuit.[22] As relevant here, she names the State of Connecticut Judicial Branch, the prosecutor Serafini, and the deputy court clerk Leigh as defendants (and whom I will refer to collectively as the ). She also names as defendants the City of Waterbury, various Waterbury police officers, and the two car storage facilities and their individual managers.
As to the State defendants, Campbell alleges a single federal law claim: that they violated her rights under the Takings Clause to the U.S. Constitution (Count One). She also alleges against all three of the State defendants a parallel state law “takings” claim under Article First, § 11 of the Connecticut Constitution (Count One), as well as a state law claim for tortious interference with a business relationship against Serafini and Leigh (Count Two) and for conversion against Serafini (Count Three).[23]
Campbell seeks an award of money damages and attorney's fees.[24] She further seeks declaratory relief with respect to an alleged policy, practice, and custom of the State of Connecticut and City of Waterbury to compel owners of vehicles seized by law enforcement to pay high storage fees and taxes as a condition for the return of their vehicles:
Plaintiff further seeks a Judgment declaring as unconstitutional, the practice, policy, and/or custom of the State and City to compel the owners of vehicles, seized by law enforcement agents and held as evidence or in pursuit of other lawful functions, to pay storage fees of up to Tens of Thousands of Dollars, often exceeding the value of the vehicle, and applicable taxes before said seized vehicle is returned to its rightful owner after the justification for the initial seizure no longer pertains; or, if said fees are not paid, said is disposed of at the sole discretion of the State and/or the Waterbury Police Department or the entity entrusted with the storage of the vehicle.[25]
The State defendants now move to dismiss the complaint on immunity grounds pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and for failure to state a claim against them pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
The standard that governs a motion to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) is well established. A complaint may not survive unless it alleges facts that, taken as true, give rise to plausible grounds to sustain subject-matter jurisdiction and a plaintiff's claims for relief. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Kim v. Kimm, 884 F.3d 98, 103 (2d Cir. 2018); Lapaglia v. Transamerica Cas. Ins. Co., 155 F.Supp.3d 153, 155-56 (D. Conn. 2016).[26] For purposes of a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, a court may consider reliable evidence outside the pleadings. See Carter v. HealthPort Techs., LLC, 822 F.3d 47, 57 (2d Cir. 2016). For purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a court must limit itself to the allegations of the complaint but may also consider documents that are referenced in or integral to the allegations of the complaint. See United States ex rel. Foreman v. AECOM, 19 F.4th 85, 106 (2d Cir. 2021). The parties have submitted numerous documentary exhibits that I may properly consider for purposes of both Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6).[27] The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment guarantees that “private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. Const., Amend. V. This protection applies to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. See 1256 Hertel Ave. Assocs., LLC v. Calloway, 761 F.3d 252, 261 (2d Cir. 2014). Notwithstanding the protections of the Takings Clause, “it has long been settled that if the government acts pursuant to a forfeiture statute, it may seize personal property without compensating the owner.” United States v. Davis, 648 F.3d 84, 97 (2d Cir. 2011).
I will start by addressing Campbell's claims against the State of Connecticut Judicial Branch. Then I will turn to her official-capacity and individual-capacity claims against Serafini and Leigh.
The Connecticut Judicial Branch is an arm of the State of Connecticut. It is well settled that the Eleventh Amendment and related principles of state sovereign immunity generally divest the federal courts of jurisdiction over lawsuits by private citizens against the States, any state government entities, and any state government officials in their official capacities. See generally Lewis v. Clarke 137 S.Ct. 1285, 1290-91 (2017); T.W. v. New York State Bd. of L. Examiners, 996 F.3d 87, 92 (2d Cir. 2021). For this reason, many rulings hold that the Connecticut Judicial Branch has Eleventh Amendment immunity from federal court proceedings. See, e.g., Sargent v. Emons 582 Fed.Appx. 51, 52 (2d Cir. 2014); Villano...
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