Campbell v. Forest Pres. Dist. of Cook Cnty.

• Decision Date: 20 June 2014
• Docket Number: No. 13–3147.,13–3147.
• Parties: David CAMPBELL, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. FOREST PRESERVE DISTRICT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS, Defendant–Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

752 F.3d 665

David CAMPBELL, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.FOREST PRESERVE DISTRICT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS, Defendant–Appellee.

No. 13–3147.

United States Court of Appeals,Seventh Circuit.

Argued April 8, 2014.

Decided May 15, 2014.

Rehearing En Banc Denied June 20, 2014.^*

Anthony J. Peraica, Attorney, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff–Appellant.

Hubert O. Thompson, Attorney, Brothers & Thompson, Chicago, IL, for Defendant–Appellee.

Before POSNER and TINDER, Circuit Judges, and LAWRENCE, District Judge.^**

TINDER, Circuit Judge.

David Campbell appeals the dismissal of a race-discrimination claim he brought against his former employer, the Forest Preserve District of Cook County (FPD), under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The district court dismissed his claim on the ground that § 1981 does not create a private right of action against state actors. We agree; therefore, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Campbell formerly worked as a laborer at the Cermak Family Aquatic Center in Lyons, Illinois, a facility operated by the FPD. In September 2010, however, a security camera recorded him having sex with a coworker in the office of the Aquatic Center. A few weeks later, the FPD fired him. In February 2013, nearly two and a half years later, Campbell sued the FPD in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.

In his original complaint, Campbell brought two constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and one statutory claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. His § 1983 claims alleged that he was denied progressive discipline in violation of his right to due process and that he was fired because of his race in violation of his right to equal protection of the laws. His § 1981 claim alleged that his termination violated that statute's prohibition on racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts.

The FPD moved for summary judgment on Campbell's § 1983 claims, arguing that they were time-barred because they were governed by Illinois's two-year statute of limitations for personal-injury torts. The FPD also argued that Campbell's § 1981 claim was barred by the same statute of limitations, given the Supreme Court's holding that § 1983 “provides the exclusive federal damages remedy for the violation of the rights guaranteed by § 1981 when the claim is pressed against a state actor.” Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 735, 109 S.Ct. 2702, 105 L.Ed.2d 598 (1989). Apparently conceding that his § 1983 claims were time-barred, but believing that his § 1981 claim was not, Campbell sought leave to amend his complaint to bring a single claim under § 1981, and the district court allowed him to do so.

The FPD moved to dismiss Campbell's amended complaint, reasserting its argument that under Jett,§ 1983 provides the exclusive remedy for violations of § 1981 committed by state actors. The district court agreed and dismissed Campbell's § 1981 claim. In addition, although he did not request leave to file a second amended complaint, the district court held that Campbell would not be “permitted to replead under § 1983 because he has already done that once in his original complaint and such a claim would be barred by the statute of limitations.”

On appeal, Campbell argues that Jett was superseded by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and that as a result, § 1981 provides a remedy against state actors independent of § 1983. He further argues that if we were to allow his claim to proceed directly under § 1981, it would be timely because it would be governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1658's four-year statute of limitations, rather than the two-year statute of limitations governing § 1983 claims brought in Illinois.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“We review de novo a district court's ruling on a motion to dismiss, accepting as true all factual assertions in the complaint.” Seitz v. City of Elgin, 719 F.3d 654, 655–56 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 692, 187 L.Ed.2d 551 (2013). Ordinarily, we would review a district court's decision whether to allow a party to file a second amended complaint for abuse of discretion. St. John's United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago, 502 F.3d 616, 625 (7th Cir.2007). However, in this case, Campbell did not request leave to file a second amended complaint in the district court, nor does he challenge the district court's decision to deny him leave to replead under § 1983. Therefore, we consider only whether the district court correctly dismissed his claim under § 1981.

III. DISCUSSION

Under Jett, § 1981 itself provides a remedy for violations committed by private actors, but an injured party must resort to § 1983 to obtain relief for violations committed by state actors. 491 U.S. at 731–35, 109 S.Ct. 2702. Campbell urges us to hold that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 changed all of that. He wants to bring his claim against the FPD (a state actor) under § 1981 rather than § 1983 because he believes that his claim would be timely under the former but not the latter.

Prior to 1990, Congress had not adopted a statute of limitations for federal claims. Thus, courts were instructed to borrow the most analogous state statutes of limitations, both for § 1983 claims against state actors, Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of the State of N.Y. v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 483–86, 100 S.Ct. 1790, 64 L.Ed.2d 440 (1980), and for § 1981 claims against private actors, Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 462–66, 95 S.Ct. 1716, 44 L.Ed.2d 295 (1975). Later, the Supreme Court clarified that such claims were governed by the forum state's personal-injury statute of limitations. Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 660–62, 107 S.Ct. 2617, 96 L.Ed.2d 572 (1987) (§ 1981 claims); Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276–79, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985) (§ 1983 claims). In Illinois, that statute of limitations is two years. 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/13–202.

On December 1, 1990, Congress adopted a four-year statute of limitations for federal claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1658. However, this applies only to civil actions “arising under an Act of Congress enacted after the date of the enactment of this section.” Id. The Supreme Court has interpreted § 1658 to apply only “if the plaintiff's claim against the defendant was made possible by a post–1990 enactment,” and to leave “in place the ‘borrowed’ limitations periods for pre-existing causes of action.” Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 382, 124 S.Ct. 1836, 158 L.Ed.2d 645 (2004).

As discussed more fully below, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 amended § 1981, making possible some new types of claims. In particular, claims based on conduct that occurred after the formation of a contract, such as wrongful-termination claims, were made possible by the addition of § 1981(b); thus, when such a claim is brought against a private employer under § 1981, it is governed by § 1658's four-year statute of limitations. Id. at 383, 124 S.Ct. 1836. If we were to hold that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 also superseded Jett and created a § 1981 remedy against state actors, the same statute of limitations would necessarily apply to wrongful-termination claims brought against public employers, such as the FPD.

In contrast, the only post–1990 amendment to § 1983 came in 1996, when Congress limited the relief available against judicial officers. This did not make possible any new causes of action. Thus, in general, § 1983 actions continue to be governed by the forum state's personal-injury statute of limitations, rather than § 1658's four-year statute of limitations.

This is why Campbell wants to avoid § 1983 and why we must decide whether he can proceed directly under § 1981. Of course, even if § 1983 provides the exclusive remedy, his claim is still based on a violation of § 1981 that could not have occurred before the Civil Rights Act of 1991 amended that statute. Thus, one might argue that § 1658's four-year statute of limitations should apply regardless. However, Campbell has disavowed any reliance on § 1983; therefore, we express no opinion on that issue, and we turn to whether he may proceed directly under § 1981.

The statute now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 evolved from § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Jones, 541 U.S. at 372, 124 S.Ct. 1836. “It was amended in minor respects in 1870 and recodified in 1874, but its basic coverage did not change prior to 1991.” Id. (citation omitted). Until then, it provided as follows:

All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and no other.

42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988).

By 1976, it was well established that § 1981 prohibits racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of private as well as public contracts. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168, 96 S.Ct. 2586, 49 L.Ed.2d 415 (1976). In addition, the Supreme Court had held that “ § 1981 affords a federal remedy against discrimination in private employment on the basis of race.” Id. at 172, 96 S.Ct. 2586 (quoting Johnson, 421 U.S. at 459–60, 95 S.Ct. 1716).

However, in the late 1980s, the Court limited the scope of § 1981 in the context of private employment. In Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989), the Court was confronted with the question whether racial harassment in the workplace was actionable under § 1981. In addition, after oral argument, the Court asked the parties to brief the question whether Runyon 's interpretation of § 1981 (i.e., that it applies to private contracts)should be reconsidered. Id. at 171, 96 S.Ct. 2586.

Ultimately, the Court declined to overrule Runyon, leaving intact its holding that § 1981 prohibits racial discrimination in the making and...