Campbell v. Green

• Decision Date: 20 October 2021
• Docket Number: 5:20-CV-508-REW-HAI
• Parties: AARON CAMPBELL, Petitioner, v. DAVID GREEN, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Kentucky

AARON CAMPBELL, Petitioner, v. DAVID GREEN, Respondent.

No. 5:20-CV-508-REW-HAI

United States District Court, E.D. Kentucky, Central Division, Lexington

October 20, 2021

RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION

Hanly A. Ingram, Judge

On December 21, 2020, state prisoner Aaron Rashad Campbell filed a pro se petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, accompanied by a memorandum. D.E 1. The undersigned recommends that it be denied.

I.

Campbell was indicted in two separate state cases for two separate robberies involving the same victim. The Kentucky Supreme Court described the background as follows:

In August 2009, intruders entered David Norris's home tied him up, hit him in the head, and robbed him of $70,000. A police investigation failed to produce any suspects for over a year.

Norris was robbed at home again in October 2010. This time two men entered his home, tied him up, and made off with his credit card. Police began another investigation, aided in this instance by surveillance videos of individuals using credit cards at local stores and by Crimestoppers. Within a short time, Michael Washington emerged as a suspect.

Washington eventually confessed to the crime and implicated Campbell, his cousin, as the other participant. After arresting Campbell, police questioned him about the robbery multiple times. Ultimately, Campbell confessed to being involved. In light of the information gained from Campbell's statement, police became suspicious that Washington and Campbell were involved in the earlier robbery of Norris's home. Forensic evidence verified this suspicion. Campbell eventually confessed to the second robbery, as well.

Campbell was separately indicted for each robbery of Norris's home. Before trial, Campbell filed a motion to suppress both of his confessions on grounds that police made promises of leniency and coerced him into confessing. The trial court denied Campbell's motions following a hearing. As a result, Campbell entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the trial court's decision. For the 2010 robbery, Campbell pleaded guilty to second-degree robbery and was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment. And for the 2009 robbery, Campbell pleaded guilty to first-degree robbery and being a second-degree Persistent Felony Offender (PFO 2) and, accordingly, was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment. Campbell's sentences were ordered to run consecutively.

Campbell v. Comm. (“Campbell I”), No. 2014-SC-140-MR, 2015 WL 5652016, at *1 (Ky. Sept. 24, 2015).

Campbell appealed to the Kentucky Supreme Court, challenging the pretrial denial of his motion to suppress his confessions. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed, finding that “[b]ecause Campbell's will was not overborne during his various discussions with police, the trial court did not err in denying Campbell's motion to suppress.” Campbell I, at *5. Campbell did not seek certiorari with the United States Supreme Court.

Campbell then filed a postconviction motion, arguing ineffective assistance of trial counsel (“IAC”). A public attorney was appointed to represent Campbell. But that lawyer withdrew under KRS § 31.110(2)(c) after determining the proceeding was not one “that a reasonable person with adequate means would be willing to bring at his or her own expense.” Campbell v. Comm (“Campbell II”), No. 2016-CA-1666-MR, 2018 WL 297262, at *2 (Ky. Ct. App. Jan. 5, 2018). Campbell proceeded with the motion pro se. The Kentucky Court of Appeals ultimately upheld the trial court's denial of relief. Id. The Kentucky Supreme Court denied discretionary review.

Finally, Campbell then filed a second postconviction motion. He argued that a witness at the suppression hearing had committed perjury and that the courts had made a factual error in his prior postconviction proceedings. The Kentucky Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's denial of relief. Campbell v. Comm. (“Campbell III”), No. 2018-CA-1884-MR, 2020 WL 507620, at *4 (Ky. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2020). The Kentucky Supreme Court denied discretionary review.

Campbell now raises six grounds for relief, challenging some of the state courts' determinations concerning his direct appeal, his first postconviction motion brought under Ky. R. Crim. P. 11.42, and his second postconviction motion brought under Ky. R. Civ. P. 60.02. The Warden has responded in opposition to the motion (D.E. 14) and attached filings from the state court record, as well as videos from state court hearings (D.E. 19). Campbell filed a reply. D.E. 22.

Campbell's six grounds for relief are:

(1) On direct appeal, the Kentucky Supreme Court erred in finding that his will was not overborne during his November 9, 2010 interrogation. D.E. 1 at 6, 17, 22-24.^[1]

(2) On review of his 11.42 motion, the Kentucky Court of Appeals erred in finding that trial counsel was not ineffective at the suppression hearing in regard to Miranda issues at his November 9, 2010 interrogation. Id. at 8, 17, 25.

(3) On review of his 11.42 motion, the Kentucky Court of Appeals erred in finding that trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to argue that Campbell's November 2010 confession would have been inadmissible as statements made during plea bargaining under Kentucky Rule of Evidence 410. Id. at 9, 17, 25-26.

(4) On review of his 11.42 motion, the Kentucky Court of Appeals erred in finding that trial counsel was not ineffective concerning Campbell's potential penalty upon his guilty plea. Id. at 11, 18, 27-28.

(5) On review of his 60.02 motion, the Kentucky Court of Appeals erred in finding that his argument about a factual error by the courts (about whether Campbell had filed his own pro se sentencing motion) was procedurally barred. Id. at 18-19, 28-20.

(6) On review of his 60.02 motion, the Kentucky Court of Appeals erred in finding that Campbell's argument about a factual error (described as perjury) concerning the Miranda warning card was procedurally barred. Id. at 18-19, 28-20.

II. Standard of Review for State Habeas Cases

A state prisoner has a statutory right to collaterally attack his conviction or sentence. West v. Bell, 242 F.3d 338, 346 (6th Cir. 2001). A state prisoner may seek federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that he is being held in custody in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (“AEDPA”), requires “heightened respect” for factual findings and legal determinations made by state courts. Sinkfield v. Brigano, 487 F.3d 1013, 1016 (6th Cir. 2007).

Section 2254(d), as amended by AEDPA, provides:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim-

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

This is a “highly deferential” standard of review that is “difficult to meet.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011). All the state court's factual findings are presumed to be correct and can be rebutted only by “clear and convincing evidence.” Sinkfield, 487 F.3d at 1016; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Legal conclusions made by state courts also receive substantial deference under AEDPA. “[A] federal habeas court may overturn a state court's application of federal law only if it is so erroneous that there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court's decision conflicts with [the Supreme Court's] precedents.” Nevada v. Jackson, 569 U.S. 505, 508-09 (2013) (per curiam). Also, “circuit precedent does not constitute clearly established Federal law” under AEDPA. Parker v. Matthews, 567 U.S. 37, 48 (2012). In sum, “federal judges are required to afford state courts due respect by overturning their decisions only when there could be no reasonable dispute that they were wrong.” Woods v. Donald, 575 U.S. 312, 316 (2015).

Therefore, the question before this Court is not merely whether the Kentucky courts were incorrect, but whether they were so wrong that their treatment of the law and facts was “unreasonable” under these deferential standards.

III. Ground One - Voluntariness of Confession

Campbell argues that his will was overborne during his November 9, 2010 interrogation: “the police detectives continuously made threats of an increased punishment and promises of leniency to coerce the petitioner into giving a statement.” D.E. 1 at 23. He argues his “will was overborne as can be viewed in the recording as the petitioner consistently questioned the benefits and repercussions of giving a statement until finally [he] gave in.” Id. at 23-24.

Due Process prohibits the admission of coerced confessions procured by means “so offensive to a civilized system of justice that they must be condemned.” Ledbetter v. Edwards, 35 F.3d 1062, 1067 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109 (1985)). A confession is involuntary when: “(i) the police activity was objectively coercive; (ii) the coercion in question was sufficient to overbear the defendant's will; and (iii) the alleged police misconduct was the crucial motivating factor in defendant's decision to offer the statement.” United States v. Mahan, 190 F.3d 416, 422 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing McCall v. Dutton, 863 F.2d 454, 459 (6th Cir. 1988)).

The Kentucky Supreme Court...