Campbell v. Kelly
| Decision Date | 31 August 2011 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:09-cv-435 |
| Parties | NATHAN B. CAMPBELL. Plaintiff, v. SHERIFF GENE A. KELLY, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
This case derives from Plaintiff's employment with Defendant Clark County Sheriff's Office ("Sheriff's Office") as a deputy sheriff and lone member of the K-9 Unit. Following a car accident and serious injury, and after years of service in the K-9 Unit, Plaintiff was stripped of his K-9 Unit duties. Plaintiff subsequently initiated this seven count complaint, alleging violations of both federal and state law. Defendants1 now seek summary judgment as to each count, which motion Plaintiff opposes.
Plaintiff began his employment with Defendant Sheriff's Office in 1988. (Doc. 39, Art. 1 at 14). After working initially on an uncompensated special commission basis. Plaintiff was hired on a part-time and later a full-time basis at the jail, with duties similar to those of a corrections officer, mainly working the third shift. (Id. at 16-18). Approximately two years later, Plaintiff began a 20-plus year career on road patrol, generally working the second shift. (Id. at 18-23).
In 1998, Plaintiff personally purchased a dog, a German Shepherd named Apollo, and paid to certify the canine to search for narcotics. (Doc. 39, Art. 2, Ex. A at 2, 4). In 1999, Plaintiff submitted a proposal to Defendant Sheriff Kelly to create a K-9 Unit within the Sheriff's Office using Apollo. . While the proposal emphasized that there would be no cost to the Sheriff's Office to create the unit and administer to Apollo, the proposal also references the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") and "compensation issues." (Id. at 2. 13).
Plaintiff maintains that Sheriff Kelly declined his proposal. (Doc. 46 at 6; Doc. 47 at 1). Defendants essentially elide this issue, but the K-9 Unit was not created until 2001, when it was staffed by Plaintiff and Apollo. (Doc. 39, Art. 1 at 34-37). Plaintiff testified in his deposition that he was given time off to have Apollo certified (Id. at 35), that theSheriff's Office paid for some of Apollo's veterinarian bills (Id. at 61-62), that he discussed reimbursement with Defendants (Id. at 40-42, 51-53), and that he was told by Sheriff's Office officials that he would not receive reimbursement for dog food costs unless and until it obtained funds for the K-9 account (Id. at 53).
Apollo worked as the Sheriff's Office K-9 from 2001 to 2004, when, tragically, the dog was forced to retire due to work related injuries. (Id. at 59). Plaintiff purchased a second dog, Etzel, also a German Shepherd, put him through the requisite training, and initiated the new dog into the K-9 Unit. (Id. at 58-61, 85-88). Throughout Etzel's career, Plaintiff alleges he spent his time and money caring for and training the dog, but was never compensated for this off-duty, overtime work, and he was rarely reimbursed for his monetary outlays for Etzel. (Id. at 366-367).
Plaintiff worked under two essentially identical collective bargaining agreements, although he asserts that they are silent regarding issues related to the K-9 Unit. (Doc. 39, Art. 2 at Exs. L, M). The agreements did prescribe a procedure for submitting overtime request forms, which Defendants maintain Plaintiff used repeatedly yet never for time spent training and caring for the police dog. Plaintiff alleges that he attempted to do so and was either rebuffed or discovered that Defendants were misplacing them. (Doc. 39, Art. 1 at 40-42, 165-171). He also asserts that he kept detailed records of his work with the dog, but that they were destroyed under disputed circumstances. (Doc. 39, Att. 1 at 107-116, 121-122). The agreements also dictate the grievance process, which Plaintiff admittedly never used to challenge his allegedly insufficient compensation. (Doc. 40, p. 4 at ¶ 11; Doc. 46, p. 4 at ¶ 11).
On November 26, 2008, Plaintiff and Etzel were injured in a car accident -Plaintiff severely so - while Plaintiff was on duty. (Id. at 63). Plaintiff's injuries required him to take a paid medical leave from this position for some ten months, through September of 2009. (Id.). Shortly before Plaintiff was to return from medical leave, Defendants informed him that they were restructuring the K-9 Unit and that he would no longer work in it. (Doc. 46 at 9; Doc. 37 at 3). Ultimately, the restructuring did not take place and Defendants never sought to nor did fill the position previously held by Plaintiff. (Doc. 39, Art. 1 at 145-146).
Plaintiff was placed on road patrol upon his return to work, the same position he held while in the K-9 Unit, with the same rate of pay and similar benefits. (Id. at 63). He retired in April 2011 from post-traumatic stress disorder related to the accident. (Id. at 14, 90, 146, 190-191).
Summary judgment is appropriate when "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter fo law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party has the initial burden of showing, by identifying specific evidence in the record, "including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials," that there exists no genuine dispute of material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P.56(c)(1)(A); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, All U.S. 317, 323 (1986). When the movant meets its burden, it is then the opposing party's duty to "set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine [dispute] for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,250 (1986); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
The requirement that the dispute be "genuine" is imperative. "By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48. Therefore, "[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-moving party's] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-movant]." Id. at 252. Furthermore, the non-moving party may not merely rely on its pleadings, but must "produce evidence that results in a conflict of material fact to be solved by a jury." Cox v. Kentucky Dep't of Transp., 53 F.3d 146, 149 (6th Cir. 1995).
"Weighing of the evidence or making credibility determinations are prohibited at summary judgment - rather, all facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Keweenaw Bay Indian Comm. v. Rising, 477 F.3d 881, 886 (6th Cir. 2007); citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). This Court's obligation at the summary judgment stage is to determine "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52.
Defendants request summary judgment on all seven of Plaintiff's causes of action for substantive reasons. Additionally, Defendants seek summary judgment for procedural reasons on all claims against the Sheriff's Office and any FLSA claims against Defendants Kelly, Garman, and Lucas in their individual capacities. Each issue will be addressed in turn.
Defendants argue for dismissal of all claims against the Clark County Sheriff's Office because it is non sui juris -- that is, it lacks the capacity to be sued. (Doc. 37 at 4). To be subject to suit, the Sheriff's Office must be a real party in interest under Rule 17 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 17(b)(3) states that an entity's capacity to be sued is determined "by the law of the state where the court is located." Under Ohio law, a sheriff's department is not a legal entity capable of being sued. Snyder v. Belmont County Sheriff's Dept., 2009 WL 467022 at *4 (S.D. Ohio 2009); Petty v. County of Franklin, 478 F.3d 341, 347 (6th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff argues that the authorities cited supra are inapposite because they concern 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims, rather than those brought under the FLSA. (Doc. 46 at 35). However, as the Court held in Snyder, because an entity's capacity to be sued is governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 17 applies equally to FLSA cases as it does 1983 actions. Snyder at *4 ().3 Accordingly, summary judgment shall be entered dismissing the Sheriff's Office from this action.
Defendants' next procedural argument pertains to Plaintiff's FLSA claims against Defendants Sheriff Kelly, Major Garman, and Lieutenant Lucas in their individual capacities. Defendants maintain that these claims should be dismissed on summary judgment because the FLSA does not extend liability to public officials in their individual capacities. (Doc. 37 at 4-5). Plaintiff does not address this argument anywhere in his 30-plus page memorandum in opposition.
The FLSA defines employer, in relevant part, as: ". . . any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee and includes a public agency . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). The Sixth Circuit has deemed the "directly or indirectly" language to impose individual liability on private sector employers. Mitchell v. Chapman, 343 F.3d 811, 827 (6th Cir. 2003) ...
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