Campbell v. Mahoney

Citation2001 MT 146,306 Mont. 45,29 P.3d 1034
Decision Date07 August 2001
Docket NumberNo. 01-247.,01-247.
PartiesLes CAMPBELL, Petitioner, v. Mike MAHONEY, Warden, Montana State Prison; Janet Cox, Supervisor, Records Department, Montana State Prison, Respondent.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Montana
OPINION AND ORDER

TRIEWEILER, Justice.

¶ 1 This matter comes before the Court on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner, Les Campbell (Campbell), a prisoner at the Montana State Prison, argues that the Department of Corrections has improperly denied him good time credits for time he spent in the prison's boot camp program (Boot Camp). He contends that he has a right to these credits and, when they are deducted from his sentence, he is entitled to immediate release. We deny the petition, concluding that Campbell voluntarily relinquished his interest in the opportunity to earn good time credits when he entered the program.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 Campbell was charged by information with one count of deliberate homicide or, in the alternative, one count of negligent homicide. After pleading guilty to the negligent homicide charge, the Second Judicial District Court sentenced Campbell to five years in the Montana State Prison (MSP). Shortly thereafter, he applied for and was admitted to Boot Camp.

¶ 3 Boot Camp is a legislative program designed to provide an alternative means of rehabilitating young felony offenders. See §§ 53-30-401 to -403, MCA (1993). It uses physical activity, military style discipline and intensive counseling to "correct criminal and other maladaptive thought processes and behavior patterns and to instill self-discipline and self-motivation." Section 53-30-403(3)(b), MCA (1993). The program is voluntary, and inmates who successfully complete it are eligible to have their sentences reduced or converted to probation. Section 53-30-402, MCA (1993).

¶ 4 The Department of Corrections (Department) runs the program and is authorized to make rules for its administration. Section 53-30-403(5), MCA (1993). Pursuant to this authority, the Department determined that good time credits, normally granted to inmates simply for staying out of trouble, would conflict with the program's emphasis on positive achievement, earned rewards and the possibility of sentence reductions for successful completion. The prohibition on the award of good time credits was also designed to weed out unmotivated applicants by providing a consequence for failing to complete the program.

¶ 5 By statute, all applicants must read and sign a detailed, clearly written explanation of program goals, objectives, rules and criteria before being allowed to enter the program. Section 53-30-403(3)(c), MCA (1993). Campbell signed such a statement, acknowledged that he would be ineligible for good time credits and certified that his decision to enter the program was fully informed and voluntary. He ultimately spent nearly three months in Boot Camp but, owing to a series of infractions, did not complete the program. As a consequence, he earned neither a sentence reduction nor the good time credits he might have earned had he stayed in the MSP.

¶ 6 Campbell now claims that he has a right to good time credits for the time he spent in the Boot Camp program. He argues that the Department's refusal to award him these credits deprives him of liberty without due process of law. In addition, based on his belief that he is entitled to these credits, Campbell claims that he is being held beyond the lawful term of his sentence. He contends that such confinement constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment and Article II, Section 22, of the Montana Constitution.

DISCUSSION
I. The Due Process Claim

¶ 7 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits states from depriving any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law. Application of this constitutional protection to Campbell's claim requires a three-part analysis. First we determine if Campbell has a protected liberty interest at stake. If so, we must determine whether the State has deprived him of that interest. Finally, we ask whether the deprivation occurred without due process.

A. Liberty Interest in Good Time Credits

¶ 8 The Constitution does not, itself, create a protected liberty interest in good time credits. Wolff v. McDonnell (1974), 418 U.S. 539, 557, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 935, 951. However, under certain circumstances, states may create liberty interests that are protected by the Due Process Clause. Sandin v. Conner (1995), 515 U.S. 472, 483-84, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 2300, 132 L.Ed.2d 418, 429. Campbell claims that Montana's good time allowance statute created such a liberty interest in the opportunity to earn good time credits.

¶ 9 Campbell committed his offense on or about January 5, 1993. The good time allowance statute in effect at the time was § 53-30-105, MCA (1991). It provides that:

The department of corrections and human services shall adopt rules providing for the granting of good time allowance for inmates employed in any prison work or activity. The good time allowance shall operate as a credit on his sentence as imposed by the court, conditioned upon the inmate's good behavior and compliance with the rules made by the department or the warden.

We have previously held that a later version of this statute, § 53-30-105, MCA (1993), creates a protected liberty interest in the opportunity for inmates to earn good time credits. Orozco v. Day (1997), 281 Mont. 341, 354, 934 P.2d 1009, 1016. The version under which Campbell committed his offense differs only slightly from the 1993 version and would, undoubtedly, fall within the ambit of our due process analysis in Orozco. Therefore, we conclude that Campbell has a protected liberty interest in the opportunity to earn good time credits while participating in Boot Camp.

B. Did the State Deprive Campbell of any Liberty Interest in Good Time Credits

¶ 10 If Campbell had served his entire sentence in the MSP and conformed his behavior to prison rules, he would have received the full amount good time authorized by statute. By applying for but failing to complete the Boot Camp program he ended up with fewer good time credits than he otherwise might have. Campbell claims that he should have received 83 additional days of good time credit for the time he spent in the Boot Camp program. Even taking this assertion as true, however, the question remains whether the difference between what Campbell could have earned and what he actually earned is a deprivation giving rise to due process protection. We conclude that it is not.

¶ 11 The Due Process Clause is phrased as a limitation on the State's power to act. Therefore, when an individual undertakes to voluntarily give up his own liberty there is no due process violation. See Zinermon v. Burch (1990), 494 U.S. 113, 117, n. 3, 110 S.Ct. 975, 979, 108 L.Ed.2d 100, 109. Campbell voluntarily entered the Boot Camp program with the hope of earning a reduced sentence or conversion of his prison term to one of probation. He knew when he entered the program that he would not receive good time credits. Accordingly, we conclude that the State has not deprived Campbell of anything and that his due process claim is without merit. The Due Process Clause does not require a remedy when there has been no "deprivation" of a protected interest. See Davidson v. Cannon (1986), 474 U.S. 344, 348, 106 S.Ct. 668, 670, 88 L.Ed.2d 677, 683.

C. Due Process

¶ 12 Even if we were to conclude that the State committed an affirmative act depriving Campbell of his liberty, we could not conclude that it violated Campbell's constitutional rights when it did so. Deprivation, by state action, of a constitutionally protected liberty interest is not in itself unconstitutional. The Due Process Clause only guarantees that such action cannot be taken without appropriate process.

¶ 13 At its most basic level, the Due Process Clause is intended to prevent oppression and arbitrary use of government power. Davidson, 474 U.S. at 348, 106 S.Ct. at 668, 670, 88 L.Ed.2d at 683; see also Wolff, 418 U.S. at 558, 94 S.Ct. at 2976, 41 L.Ed.2d at 952 (the touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government). Therefore, those seeking the protection of the Due Process Clause are generally entitled only to "those minimum procedures appropriate under the circumstances and required by the Due Process Clause to insure that the state-created right is not arbitrarily abrogated." Wolff, 418 U.S. at 557, 94 S.Ct. at 2975, 41 L.Ed.2d at 951.

¶ 14 The record provides ample evidence that Campbell's state-created liberty interest in good time credits was not arbitrarily abrogated. Campbell does not dispute the Department's rationale for the no good time policy. Nor does he claim that the Department coerced or compelled him to participate in the program. On the contrary, the record indicates that Campbell, himself, sought admission to Boot Camp and that he did so with full understanding of the nature of the program and the consequences of his participation. As required by statute, the Department presented him with a statement that outlined, in twenty separate points, the program's specific conditions and requirements. Campbell read and initialed each point. He certified with his signature that he agreed to enter the program voluntarily. Finally, before entering the program, he signed and dated the following disclosure:

Offenders participating in the Boot Camp Incarceration Program ARE NOT entitled to earn good time credits. Successful completion [is] intended to result in a sentence reduction, as such, it will not be treated as normal incarceration.
I hereby acknowledge that I have been advised I will be ineligible for GOOD TIME upon entering into [the Boot Camp program].

¶ 15 We conclude that Campbell freely chose to relinquish his interest in good time...

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