Campbell v. Motion Picture Machine Operators' Union of Minneapolis, Local 219, 22,200

CourtSupreme Court of Minnesota (US)
Writing for the CourtLEES, C.
Citation186 N.W. 781,151 Minn. 220
PartiesJOHN J. CAMPBELL v. MOTION PICTURE MACHINE OPERATORS' UNION OF MINNEAPOLIS, LOCAL 219, AND OTHERS
Docket Number22,200
Decision Date27 January 1922

186 N.W. 781

151 Minn. 220

JOHN J. CAMPBELL
v.

MOTION PICTURE MACHINE OPERATORS' UNION OF MINNEAPOLIS, LOCAL 219, AND OTHERS

No. 22,200

Supreme Court of Minnesota

January 27, 1922


Action in the district court for Hennepin county to recover $1,100 and to restrain Motion Picture Machine Operators Union of Minneapolis, Local 219, International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employes of the United States and Canada, a trade union, also Trades and Labor Assembly of Minneapolis and Hennepin county, and others, from conspiring to restrain the patronage and trade of plaintiff's Wonderland Theater by picketing or otherwise or publishing that plaintiff theatre was unfair to organized labor and should not be patronized. The case was tried before Bardwell, J., who made findings and ordered judgment in favor of plaintiff. From the judgment and decree, defendants appealed. Affirmed.

SYLLABUS

Private person may enjoin violation of anti-trust act.

1. A private party may maintain a suit for injunction to restrain a violation of section 8973, G.S. 1913, if necessary to prevent irreparable injury to property for which there is no adequate remedy at law.

Even when the invasion of his right constitutes a crime.

2. The fact that a threatened invasion of a person's rights may constitute a criminal offense is no bar to relief by an injunction to which such person would otherwise be entitled.

Conducting a motion picture theatre within the boycotting act.

3. The business of conducting a motion picture theatre falls within the purview of section 8973, G.S. 1913, and a combination to boycott such a theatre is one in restraint of trade and forbidden by the terms of the statute.

Meaning of word "trade" in anti-trust law.

4. The word "trade" is used in the statute in its broad sense and is not restricted to trade involving useful commodities.

Constitution -- freedom of speech not violated by injunction granted.

5. The publication of the statement that plaintiff was unfair to organized labor or portended injury to plaintiff's business under the facts found, and the judgment enjoining the continued publication of the statement was not too broad and did not deprive defendants of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the Constitution.

George B. Leonard, Thomas E. Latimer, Robert M. Works and Fred Berglund, for appellants.

The granting of an injunction to restrain the publication of the fact that defendant is "unfair" and that he was placed on the "We do not patronize list," is in violation of the constitutional guarantee of free speech and free press under section 3, art. 1, of the state Constitution. These particular guarantees are the necessary props of constitutional government itself and the abridgment of these rights tends to undermine the foundations upon which such government rests to a greater degree than the violation of any other right similarly guaranteed by the Constitution. Forms of property may change, the administrative, legislative and judicial departments of the government and their respective powers may alter, but before such changes can inure to the benefit of all the people for whom government is established and maintained, the expression of the will of the people by means of free speech and a free press must remain inviolate and unrestrained. The only remedy which a person aggrieved by a publication is entitled to is by an action at law for damages, and the government to a criminal prosecution. This is the import of the words, "being responsible for the abuse of such right." Certainly a person cannot be responsible for the abuse of such right in advance of such publication. There is nothing in the constitutional provision from which the power to restrain the abuse of such right can be spelled out. Cooley, Const. Lim. (7th ed.) 603, 612, 614; State v. Pioneer Press Co. 100 Minn. 173, 110 N.W. 867, 9 L.R.A. (N.S.) 480, 117 Am. St. 684, 10 Ann. Cas. 351.

So carefully have been the rights of the people of this state guarded against encroachments upon their liberty of speech and press, that even in construing criminal acts, for the punishment of the abuse of these rights, the powers of the legislature have been limited to publications which are blasphemous, obscene, seditious or scandalous in character, or "tend to excite the public mind," and thereby become a public offense, and such as by the falsehoods and malice, injuriously affect the standing, reputation or pecuniary interests of individuals. State v. Pioneer Press Co. 100 Minn. 173, 110 N.W. 867, 9 L.R.A. (N.S.) 480, 117 Am. St. 684, 10 Ann. Cas. 351.

And so no injunctive relief will be granted to restrain the publication of a mere libel where there is no breach of a trust or contract, for the reason that such injunction would restrain the freedom of press guaranteed by the Constitution. Howell v. Bee Pub. Co. 100 Neb. 39, 159 N.W. 358, L.R.A. 1917A, 160, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 655; Francis v. Flinn, 118 U.S. 385, 6 S.Ct. 1148, 30 L.Ed. 165; State ex rel. Liversey v. Judge of Civil District Court, 34 La. Ann. 741, 745; Raymond v. Russell, 143 Mass. 295, 9 N.E. 544, 58 Am. Rep. 137; Finnish T.S. v. Raivaaja Pub. Co. 219 Mass. 28, 106 N.E. 561, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 1087; Manger v. Dick, 55 How. Pr. (N.Y.) 132; Marlin Firearms Co. v. Shields, 171 N.Y. 384, 64 N.E. 163, 59 L.R.A. 310; Butterick Pub. Co. v. Typographical Union No. 6, 50 Misc. 1, 100 N.Y.S. 292.

While there is a difference of opinion upon the question as to whether the power of the courts to grant injunctions against publications in furtherance of a boycott is restricted by constitutional guarantees for freedom of speech and of press, many courts have held that the complainant is relegated to his remedy at law, and is not entitled to an injunction. Lindsay & Co. v. Montana Federation of Labor, 37 Mont. 264, 96 P. 127, 18 L.R.S. (N.S.) 707, 127 Am. St. 722; Marx & H. Jeans Clothing Co. v. Watson, 168 Mo. 133, 67 S.W. 391, 56 L.R.A. 951, 90 Am. St. 440; In re Heffron, 179 Mo.App. 639, 162 S.W. 652; Empire Theatre Co. v. Cloke, 53 Mont. 183, 163 P. 107, L.R.A. 1917E, 383. Truax v. Bisbee Local No. 380, 19 Ariz. 379, 171 P. 121, 126; Richter Bros. v. Journeymen Tailors Union, 24 Ohio Law J. 189.

Nathan H. Chase, for respondent.

OPINION

[151 Minn. 223] LEES, C.

Plaintiff, who owns and operates a motion picture theatre in the city of Minneapolis, brought this action to enjoin the defendants from continuing in a course of conduct which interfered with his business. The trial resulted in findings in his favor. Judgment was entered thereon and defendants appealed.

The findings are lengthy, but we set them out practically in full in order that there may be a better understanding of the questions presented by the appeal.

The Motion Picture Operators Union of Minneapolis, Local 219, is an unincorporated association having a large membership composed of operators, by trade, of motion picture projecting machines. None of its officers or members is sole or part owner, or manager or proprietor of any theatre or place of amusement.

The Trades & Labor Assembly is an unincorporated association composed of delegates from the local trade and labor unions in the city of Minneapolis, including Local 219. The assembly edited and published a weekly newspaper called "The Minneapolis Labor Review." It was and is the official organ of the Assembly.

Until February 24, 1917, plaintiff employed none but members of Local 219 to operate the projecting machines in his theatre. On February 10, 1917, having decided to reduce his expenses, he gave to his operators the notice called for by his contract with them for termination of employment, and gave similar notice to the Local. [151 Minn. 224] He informed them that, to reduce expenses, he was going to operate his machine himself for the whole or a greater portion of the time, but was willing to employ a member of the local, at the wage scale fixed by it, to relieve him a portion of the time each day. The officers of the local refused to enter into the proposed arrangement. Plaintiff then offered to join the local, but was not taken in because the rules did not allow an owner or proprietor of a theatre to become a member. On February 24, 1917, the employment of plaintiff's machine operators was terminated in accordance with the notice, and from and after that date and [186 N.W. 782] until June 18, 1917, plaintiff operated his machines himself, with part time aid from one Dillon, who was not a member of Local 219.

Subsequent to February 10, 1917, the officers and certain members of Local 219 and the grievance committee of the assembly requested plaintiff to continue the local operators in his employ, but plaintiff refused so to do except upon the terms heretofore stated. Thereupon such officers and members entered into a combination to restrain and injure the trade and business of plaintiff's theatre by causing decrease and loss of patronage thereof, to the end and with the sole intent and purpose of forcing him to accede to such request. Pursuant to such combination, they secured the adoption, at one of the regular meetings of the assembly, of a resolution declaring plaintiff and his theatre to be unfair to organized labor.

The constitution of the assembly provides, among other things, as follows: That the assembly shall maintain a list of names of individuals who are known to be unfair to organized labor, called the "We Do Not Patronize List." This list is absolutely under the control of the assembly, which has power to place names thereon or remove them therefrom.

The editor-manager of The Labor Review is elected by the assembly and is required to edit the paper in conformity with the principles of the Trades & Labor Assembly.

Following the adoption of the "unfair" resolution, and pursuant to and in furtherance of the combination above mentioned, the assembly caused to be published from time to time in The...

To continue reading

Request your trial
1 practice notes
  • Miller v. Minneapolis Underwriters Ass'n, 34606.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Minnesota (US)
    • June 11, 1948
    ...The basic antitrust section, namely, s 623.01, is a criminal statute, and has been so recognized. Campbell v. Motion Picture M.O. Union, 151 Minn. 220, 186 N.W. 781, 27 A.L.R. 631. Here, we have nothing more than a purported violation of a criminal statute. We have no allegation or showing ......
1 cases
  • Miller v. Minneapolis Underwriters Ass'n, 34606.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Minnesota (US)
    • June 11, 1948
    ...The basic antitrust section, namely, s 623.01, is a criminal statute, and has been so recognized. Campbell v. Motion Picture M.O. Union, 151 Minn. 220, 186 N.W. 781, 27 A.L.R. 631. Here, we have nothing more than a purported violation of a criminal statute. We have no allegation or showing ......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT