Campbell v. Pa. Sch. Boards Ass'n
| Decision Date | 19 June 2018 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 18-892 |
| Parties | SIMON CAMPBELL, and PENNSYLVANIANS FOR UNION REFORM, Plaintiffs, v. PENNSYLVANIA SCHOOL BOARDS ASSOCIATION, MICHAEL FACCINETTO, DAVID HUTCHINSON, OTTO W. VOIT, III, KATHY SWOPE, LAWRENCE FEINBERG, ERIC WOLFGANG, DANIEL O'KEEFE, DARRYL SCHAFER, THOMAS KEREK, and LYNN FOLTZ, in their individual capacities, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
MEMORANDUM
In this suit arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiffs allege that a tort suit filed by defendants in Pennsylvania state court retaliates against plaintiffs' exercise of their First Amendment rights of free expression and to petition the government. Presently before the Court is defendants' Motion[s] to Dismiss Complaint and/or Strike Impertinent and Scandalous Language ("Motions"). The Court concludes that plaintiff's Verified Complaint states claims against defendants under § 1983 for First Amendment retaliation and that nothing in that Complaint warrants striking. Accordingly, defendants' Motions are denied.
The facts below are drawn from plaintiffs' Verified Complaint. The Court construes that complaint in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, as it must in a motion to dismiss. The facts set forth in the Verified Complaint may be summarized as follows:
Plaintiffs Simon Campbell and Pennsylvanians for Union Reform ("PFUR") are, respectively, a political activist and a non-profit "affiliated" with Campbell. Verif. Compl. ¶ 2. Defendants are the Pennsylvania School Boards Association ("PSBA") and the ten voting members of PSBA's Governing Board ("individual defendants"), all of whom were elected school board officials at all times relevant to this case. Id. ¶ 4.
"Nominally organized as a not-for-profit corporation," PSBA is a voluntary association of Pennsylvania's public school districts and "other statutorily-created public education entities," each of which is represented in the PSBA by its respective school board members. Verif. Compl. ¶¶ 4, 64, 75, 77-78. Each school board votes as a bloc on issues before the PSBA, including the election of the members of PSBA's Governing Board, all of whom are required by PSBA's bylaws "to be elected government officials of one of PSBA's government entity members." Id. ¶¶ 76, 78. PSBA provides its members with a variety of services including, but not limited to, "training for new school directors," "development of school policies" and administrative regulations, assistance in hiring school leadership, legislative advocacy, and "represent[ing] its government entity members' legal interests in court proceedings." Id. ¶ 83.
This case centers on "petitioning activities," Verif. Compl. ¶ 3, by plaintiffs related to the PSBA. In March 2017, Campbell and PFUR sent a request under Pennsylvania's Right to Know Law ("RTKL request"), 65 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 701-16, to most public schools in Pennsylvania,including those that have elected not to join PSBA.1 Id. ¶¶ 31-32. In May 2017, plaintiffs submitted a second RTKL request to PSBA's member school districts for information regarding PSBA's use of funding it receives from its member school districts. Id. ¶ 36. Upon learning of plaintiffs' RTKL requests, PSBA attorneys advised its member school districts to require plaintiffs to travel to each district to collect the requested documents. Id. ¶ 32.
After Campbell learned that PSBA was instructing its members to require him to travel to each school district to collect the requested documents, he posted an image "lampoon[ing]" PSBA's Executive Director, Nathan Mains, to a website he maintained with "criticism directed at PSBA." Verif. Compl. ¶ 39. That image depicted Mains as stating, "Now **** off, and drive to the school district if you want public records." Id. ¶ 50 (alteration in original). Campbell later replaced Mains's image with PSBA's logo, but with similar text, after he received a cease and desist letter from PSBA's outside counsel, Michael Levin.2 Id. ¶¶ 39-41. Campbell also sent emails regarding his RTKL requests directly to school districts, in which he "lobbied" the districts "to terminate the taxpayers' forced relationship with PSBA." Id. ¶ 38.
Based on the above conduct, PSBA's Governing Board, whose voting members are the individual defendants in this case, voted on July 17, 2017, to file a suit against Campbell and PFUR in the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County ("state suit"). Verif. Compl. ¶¶ 44-46. The state suit set forth claims for defamation, abuse of process, and tortious interference with contract. Id. ¶¶49-52. In an email "blast" to PSBA's member school districts announcing the suit, PSBA Executive Directors Mains described the suit as defending PSBA's reputation and the "contractual relationship [between] PSBA and its members." Id. ¶ 54.
Plaintiffs filed suit in this Court on February 28, 2018, alleging that PSBA's state suit, as well as the announcement of that suit, the issuance of a litigation hold notice, and subsequent amendments to its state complaint were in retaliation for plaintiffs' exercise of their First Amendment rights of free expression and to petition the government for redress. Id. ¶¶ 53-59. Plaintiff's Verified Complaint states two counts of First Amendment retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the first for injunctive relief and the second for compensatory and punitive damages. On April 27, 2018, defendants filed the Motion[s] to Dismiss and/or Strike pending before the Court. Defendants' Motions are ripe for decision.
"The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is to test the legal sufficiency of a complaint." Nelson v. Temple Univ., 920 F. Supp. 633, 674 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 1996). To survive a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs must allege "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). "A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. at 663. In assessing the plausibility of the plaintiffs' claims, a district court first identifies those allegations that constitute nothing more than "legal conclusions" or "naked assertions." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555, 557 (2007). Such allegations are "not entitled to the assumption of truth" and must be disregarded. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. The court then assesses "the 'nub' of the plaintiffs' complaint—the well-pleaded, nonconclusory factual allegation[s]"—to determine whether it states a plausible claim for relief. Id. In assessing the "nub" of the complaint, the Court"accept[s] all factual allegations as true [and] construe[s] the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008).
Defendants have also moved to strike language in the Verified Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f). Rule 12(f) provides a "court may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." "Because of the drastic nature of the remedy . . . motions to strike are usually viewed with disfavor and will generally be denied unless the allegations have no possible relation to the controversy and may cause prejudice to one of the parties, or if the allegations confuse the issues.'" Garlanger v. Verbeke, 223 F. Supp. 2d 596, 609 (D.N.J. 2002). The moving party bears the burden on a motion to strike, and "[p]leadings will not be stricken absent clear immateriality or prejudice to the moving party." Berke v. Presstek, Inc., 188 F.R.D. 179, 180 (D.N.H. 1998). "Any doubt as to the striking of matter in a pleading should be resolved in favor of the pleading." Hanley v. Volpe, 305 F. Supp. 977, 980 (E.D. Wis. 1969).
Plaintiffs' Verified Complaint sets forth two claims for First Amendment retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 provides that "[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress." 42 U.S.C. § 1983; accord Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999). By the terms of § 1983, Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980).
Plaintiffs allege they were deprived of a federal right when defendants retaliated against them for exercising their First Amendment rights. "In order to plead a retaliation claim under the First Amendment, a plaintiff must allege: (1) constitutionally protected conduct, (2) retaliatory action sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional rights, and (3) a causal link between the constitutionally protected conduct and the retaliatory action." Thomas v. Indep. Twp., 463 F.3d 285, 296 (3d Cir. 2006). In addition to the above elements, a First Amendment claim requires the defendant to be a state actor, which satisfies the requirement under § 1983 that the defendant act under color of state law. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Ath. Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295, 121 S. Ct. 924, 930 n.2 (2001). It is under this law that the Court considers defendants' Motions.
In their Motion to Dismiss, defendants raise five arguments:...
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