Campbell v. Pierce County, Ga. By and Through Bd. of Com'rs of Pierce County, 83-8731

• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (11th Circuit)
• Writing for the Court: Before KRAVITCH and JOHNSON; JOHNSON
• Citation: 741 F.2d 1342
• Parties: 117 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3163, 1 Indiv.Empl.Rts.Cas. 1797 Latrelle CAMPBELL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PIERCE COUNTY, GEORGIA, By and Through the BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF PIERCE COUNTY, Troy Mattox, Foy Kimbrell, and Larry Thomas, Defendants-Appellees.
• Docket Number: No. 83-8731,83-8731
• Decision Date: 18 September 1984

Page 1342

741 F.2d 1342 117 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3163, 1 Indiv.Empl.Rts.Cas. 1797 Latrelle CAMPBELL, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
PIERCE COUNTY, GEORGIA, By and Through the BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS OF PIERCE COUNTY, Troy Mattox, Foy
Kimbrell, and Larry Thomas, Defendants-Appellees. No. 83-8731. United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit. Sept. 18, 1984.

Page 1343

Eugene Highsmith, Brunswick, Ga., for plaintiff-appellant.

Wallace E. Harrell, Brunswick, Ga., for defendants-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia.

Before KRAVITCH and JOHNSON, Circuit Judges, and ALLGOOD ^*, District Judge.

JOHNSON, Circuit Judge:

This is an action brought under 28 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1343(3) and 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1983 for alleged deprivations of constitutional rights arising from termination of public employment. The former employee, Latrelle Campbell, appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia granting the county's motion for summary judgment. Because there is no material issue of fact as to whether the appellant was given the constitutionally required opportunity to clear her name in connection with her termination, we affirm.

I. Factual Background

Appellant Campbell was employed as Assistant Clerk to the Board of Commissioners of Pierce County until January 5, 1982. On that date, a meeting of the Board of Commissioners voted to dismiss her from employment. At the conclusion of the session, appellant received both oral and written notification of the decision and the reasons which led to it. The reasons cited were insubordination, disrespect and misappropriation of county funds. The personnel action taken against appellant Campbell and the reasons for her dismissal were reported in the minutes of the Commissioners' meeting and thus became available to the public. Subsequently, local newspapers and radio stations began a series of reports publicizing her termination and the charges of insubordination and mishandling of county funds.

On the 8th of January, appellant received correspondence from the appellees, reiterating the reasons for her dismissal and setting a date for the hearing that appellant

Page 1344

had previously requested. On January 21, 1982, a hearing was held at which the county presented witnesses who testified as to the circumstances which led to appellant's dismissal. Appellant was afforded the opportunity to cross-examine such witnesses and to present evidence on her behalf. After hearing all of the relevant testimony, the Board of Commissioners affirmed its previous decision.

On January 3, 1983, appellant filed her complaint under 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1983, alleging that her termination and the subsequent news coverage of the reasons for it had damaged her reputation and impaired her ability to secure future employment. She claimed that this damage, which allegedly deprived her of liberty without due process, was not cured by the subsequent hearing, which she claimed was inadequate and constitutionally infirm. She sought relief, in the form of damages, from the county. On September 30, 1983, the district court granted the county's motion for summary judgment, holding that the January 21, 1982, hearing provided appellant with the "fair opportunity to clear her name" which was constitutionally required in cases involving reputational or liberty interests. From this order Campbell appeals.

Appellant claims that the district court erred in holding as a matter of law that she was not entitled to a pre-termination hearing, that the post-termination hearing provided was not constitutionally inadequate, and that she was not entitled to a damages remedy. In evaluating appellant's claims, we will consider first the nature of the deprivation alleged, and then appellant's contentions concerning the adequacy of the process provided.

II. Nature of the Deprivation

One issue with respect to which the parties agree in this case is the nature of the deprivation claimed. Appellant admits that, as an at-will employee, she possessed no property interest in her continued employment with Pierce County. The harm suffered by the appellant was damage to reputation caused by the adverse publicity arising from the legally-sanctioned publication of the Commissioner's meeting at which she was dismissed. While damage to reputation, standing alone, does not provide the basis for an action under Section 1983, Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976), when such damage is sustained in connection with a termination of employment, as occurred in the instant case, it may give rise to a claim for deprivation of liberty actionable under Section 1983. Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 97 S.Ct. 882, 51 L.Ed.2d 92 (1977); Paul v. Davis, supra; Roth v. Board of Regents, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972); In Re Selcraig, 705 F.2d 789 (5th Cir.1983); White v. Thomas, 660 F.2d 680 (5th Cir.1981).

Yet while appellant concedes that she possesses only a liberty interest in connection with her termination, she demands a type of process which is virtually...