Campbell v. Rutherford Cnty.
| Decision Date | 23 August 2018 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:17-cv-00797 |
| Parties | DESMOND JABARI CAMPBELL, Plaintiff, v. RUTHERFORD COUNTY, TENNESSEE, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee |
This matter has been referred to the Magistrate Judge to dispose or recommend disposition of any pretrial motions under 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1)(A) and (B). (Doc. No. 10.)
Now before the Court is a motion for leave to amend the complaint filed by Plaintiff Desmond Jabari Campbell (Doc. No. 12) and a motion to dismiss for insufficient process filed by Defendants Rutherford County, Tennessee; Rutherford County Mayor Ernest Burgess; Superintendent Bernard Salandy; the Rutherford County Adult Detention Center (RCADC); and the Rutherford County Correctional Work Center (RCCWC) (Doc. No. 21). Defendants have not responded in opposition to Campbell's motion to amend, nor has Campbell opposed their motion to dismiss. For the reasons offered below, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that Campbell's motion to amend (Doc. No. 12) be DENIED AS MOOT, that Defendants' motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 21) be GRANTED, and that the action be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
Campbell is a Muslim who alleges that he experienced religious discrimination while he was incarcerated at the RCADC and the RCCWC. (Doc. No. 1, PageID# 5; Doc. No. 12-1, PageID# 60-66.) When Campbell arrived at the RCADC on June 16, 2015, he informed "the sheriff's department staff[] that he was a Muslim, and would be participating in Ramadan, ([a] Holy Muslim Month[]), [which] was to begin on June 17, 2015." (Doc. No. 12-1, PageID# 59, ¶ 4.) Campbell also requested a copy of the Quran, a prayer rug, and a traditional kufi cap. (Id. at PageID# 60, ¶ 5.) Campbell claims that the staff of the RCADC responded by denying him an "equal opportunity to exercise his religion of choice freely." (Id. at PageID# 60, ¶ 10.) His request for these "specific religious artifacts" was denied, and he states that he was forced to eat meals in a facility where pork was served, which made it impossible for him to meet his "religious dietary requirements." (Id. at PageID# 60, ¶¶ 5-7.) He also claims that he was deprived of a "clean area outside to pray" and other Muslims to pray with. (Id. at PageID# 60, ¶ 9.)
Campbell claims that his rights continued to be violated after he was transferred to the "Work House" on June 23, 2015, despite having informed "the intake staff of his religious status." (Id. at PageID# 60, ¶ 11.) After meeting with the nurse at the RCCWC, Campbell thought it was understood that he "would not go outside to work until the Holy Month of Ramadan was over" due to his inability "to eat and drink regularly." (Id. at PageID# 61, ¶ 15.) But Campbell was cleared "to go outside and work" and was told that his "[r]eligious status . . . [was] only . . . valid when in detainment." (Id. at PageID# 61, ¶ 17.) RCCWC staff also occasionally prevented Campbell from complying with the Ramadan fast by delivering food to him at times when he was prohibited from eating. (Id. at PageID# 63, ¶ 28.) Campbell's request to celebrate the end of Ramadan with a feast was denied, as was his request for an "easterly coordinate" towards which to face during prayer, "rendering all prayers null and void." (Id. at PageID# 63, ¶ 31.) Campbell was released on November 22, 2015. (Id. at PageID# 64, ¶ 38.)
Campbell filed this lawsuit pro se against Defendants Rutherford County, Murfreesboro Mayor Shane McFarland, the RCADC, the RCCWC, former Sheriff Robert Arnold, Superintendent Salandy, and Rutherford County Mayor Burgess on May 3, 2017, alleging violations of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights; the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA); the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act (RFRA); the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA); 18 U.S.C. §§ 242 and 247; and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. (Doc. No. 1, PageID# 1.) On the same day, Campbell filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No. 2), which the Court rejected as "almost certainly inaccurate." (Doc. No. 4, PageID# 29.) The Court directed Campbell to pay the $400.00 filing fee in full or submit an amended IFP application within thirty days, and warned him that failure to do so could result in dismissal of his action for failure to prosecute. (Id.)
On June 27, 2017, the Court dismissed Campbell's lawsuit without prejudice because thirty days had passed and Campbell had "failed to file the amended application required for the Court to determine his entitlement to proceed with this lawsuit in forma pauperis." (Doc. No. 7, PageID# 46.) However, the order of dismissal was in error—Campbell had, in fact, paid the filing fee. (Doc. No. 10, PageID# 49.) Therefore, on July 17, 2017, the Court vacated the dismissal (Doc. No. 8) and reopened Campbell's case. (Doc. No. 10, PageID# 49.) The Court advised Campbell that, because he is not proceeding in forma pauperis, "he is responsible for effective service of process pursuant to Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." (Id.)
On November 27, 2017, the Court informed Campbell that he had not filed any proof of service as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(l)(1). (Doc. No. 11, PageID# 51.) The Court explained that Rule 4 "requires that a summons and copy of the complaint be served upon each defendant by a person who is at least 18 years of age and not a party to the action" and that,"[w]hen service is not made by the U.S. Marshal or deputy marshal or waived, proof of service must be made to the Court by filing the server's affidavit." (Id.) Prior to the mistaken dismissal of his lawsuit, Campbell had filed a statement saying that "his verified complaint and summonses were served on Defendants Jones, Burgess, and Salandy, the [RCCWC], and Rutherford County, Tennessee," and that his verified complaint "ha[d] been served on City Attorney Craig Tindall and Defendants McFarland, Arnold, and the [RCADC]." (Id. (quoting Doc. No. 6, PageID# 44-45).) The Court warned Campbell that his statement was not "sufficient to meet Rule 4's requirement of proving service to the Court" and ordered him "to file proof of service as required by Rule 4—by the affidavit of a person qualified to serve a summons or complaint or as otherwise permitted—on or before December 27, 2017." (Id. at PageID# 52.) Campbell was advised that "[f]ailure to provide proof that any defendant was served within the time provided for service of process under Rule 4(m) may result in the recommendation that [his] action against the unserved defendant be dismissed without prejudice." (Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m)).)
On December 22, 2017, summonses were issued to all Defendants (Doc. No. 13) and Campbell filed a motion to amend his complaint in order to properly name the RCCWC and correct the "premature . . . language" of the original complaint. (Doc. No. 12, PageID# 53-54.) On January 11, 2018, the summonses were returned executed, and Campbell filed another statement with the Court in an apparent effort to prove service. (Doc. Nos. 14-20.) In a document entitled "Certificate of Service," Campbell offers a signed statement that an unidentified "pleading" was served on Defendants. (Doc. No. 14, PageID# 79.)
Defendants Rutherford County, Rutherford County Mayor Burgess, Superintendent Salandy, the RCADC, and the RCCWC have filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(4) for insufficient process. (Doc. No. 21, PageID# 99.) They argue that the proof of service that Campbellfiled is not an affidavit and is therefore "fatally defective," and that, even if it were not, Campbell still violated the Court's November 27, 2017 order by failing to file proof of service by December 27, 2017. (Doc. No. 22, PageID# 104.) Defendants also argue that, to comply with Rule 4(m), Campbell should have served them with his original complaint within ninety days of its filing in May 2017. (Id.) Campbell has not responded in opposition to the motion to dismiss.
"[T]he requirement of proper service of process 'is not some mindless technicality,'" Friedman v. Estate of Presser, 929 F.2d 1151, 1156 (6th Cir. 1991) (quoting Del Raine v. Carlson, 826 F.2d 698, 704 (7th Cir. 1987)), nor is it "meant to be a game or obstacle course for plaintiffs." Ace Am. Ins. Co. v. Meadowlands Developer Ltd. P'ship, 140 F. Supp. 3d 450, 455 (E.D. Pa. 2015). Rather, it goes to the very heart of a court's ability to hear a case. "[W]ithout proper service of process, consent, waiver, or forfeiture, a court may not exercise personal jurisdiction over a named defendant." King v. Taylor, 694 F.3d 650, 655 (6th Cir. 2012); see also Mann v. Castiel, 681 F.3d 368 (D.C. Cir. 2012) () (quoting Okla. Radio Assocs. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 969 F.2d 940, 943 (10th Cir. 1992)). Without personal jurisdiction being properly established, a court cannot exercise its authority consistent with due process of law. Friedman, 929 F.2d at 1156.
Rule 4(c) provides that "[a] summons must be served with a copy of the complaint" and that such service must occur within the time allowed by Rule 4(m), ninety days from the time the complaint is filed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c), 4(m). However, if the plaintiff can show good cause for failing to effect service within the period allowed by Rule 4(m), the Court "must extend the timefor service for an appropriate period." Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1) (). Even when a plaintiff has not shown good cause, the Court may exercise its discretion to...
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