Campbell v. S. Health Partners, Inc., CIVIL ACTION NO. 10-62-HRW-CJS
| Decision Date | 15 August 2012 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 10-62-HRW-CJS |
| Parties | MICHAEL CAMPBELL PLAINTIFF v. SOUTHERN HEALTH PARTNERS, INC. DEFENDANT |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Kentucky |
On June 25, 2010, Plaintiff Michael Campbell filed suit against Defendants Boyd County Kentucky, Joseph "Joe" Burchett, David Salisbury, Marvin Meredith, Carl Tolliver, William Stevens, and twenty-five John/Jane Does for alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.1 (R. 1). On December 6, 2010, in a First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff added Defendant Southern Health Partners, Inc. as a party and asserted § 1983 and medical negligence claims against it. (R. 13).
Now pending before the Court is Defendant Southern Health Partners' Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 93). This Motion has been referred to the undersigned for preparation of a Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). (R. 104).2 Having received Plaintiff's Response (R. 98) and Defendant's Reply (R. 101), the Summary Judgment Motion is ripe forreview.3 For the reasons that follow, it is recommended that Defendant's dispositive motion be granted, because Plaintiff's remaining medical negligence claims are time barred.
Plaintiff Michael Campbell (hereafter "Campbell" or Plaintiff) was incarcerated at the Boyd County Detention Center from July 2 to July 13, 2009, on DUI and drug trafficking charges. (R. 93-1, at 1). At the time of his incarceration, Defendant Southern Health Partners (hereinafter "SHP" or Defendant) provided medical services to inmates at the Boyd County Detention Center. (R. 13, at 20). Campbell had a history of Bipolar Disorder, for which he was prescribed medication. (R. 98, at 4; R. 13, at ¶¶ 34-36). During this July 2009 incarceration, Campbell was placed in a holding cell at the Boyd County Detention Center, and was not provided prescribed medication for his Bipolar Disorder. As a result of the denial of his prescribed medication, as well as his likely withdrawal from non-prescribed pain medication, Plaintiff alleges he became disoriented and lost control of his bodily functions. (R. 98, at 5).
Campbell's condition deteriorated; he alleges that he was left lying on his side on the concrete floor of his jail cell in the same position for several days in his own excrement and urine, unable to eat or drink. (R. 1, at 12). Plaintiff further alleges that staff at the Boyd County Detention Center observed him in his poor condition over the course of several days, and failed to adequately respond. (Id.). During Plaintiff's incarceration, his mother, Jerry Lynn Stephens, contacted the Boyd County Detention Center several times to inform those in custody of her son that he had several physical and mental issues for which he required medication. (Id. at 9-10).
On July 13, 2009, Plaintiff was taken to King's Daughters Hospital. (R. 93, at 2; R. 98, at 11). The Emergency Room nurse indicated that Campbell was dehydrated and covered in feces. (R. 93, at 2; R. 98, at 5). Upon admittance to the hospital, Plaintiff also had blisters on his chest, abdomen, and right hand. (R. 93, at 2). As a result of his mistreatment at the Boyd County Detention Center, Plaintiff alleges that he suffered rhabdomyleosis and permanent nerve damage. (R. 98, at 5). He spent approximately three weeks in the King's Daughters Hospital. (R. 93, at 2).
On June 25, 2010, Plaintiff brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Americans with Disabilities Act against Boyd County, Kentucky, Joseph "Joe" Burchett, David Salisbury, Marvin Meredith, Carl Tolliver, William Stevens, and twenty-five John/Jane Does. (R. 1). On December 6, 2010, pursuant to an Agreed Order between the then-named parties (R. 12), Campbell filed an Amended Complaint in which, for the first time, he named SHP as a Defendant. (R. 13). On June 30, 2011, Plaintiff dismissed his claims against Defendants Joseph "Joe" Burchett, David Salisbury, Marvin Meredith, Carl Tolliver, William Stevens, and Boyd County, Kentucky. (R. 43). At the time he dismissed his claims against these Defendants, Campbell specifically reserved the right to prosecute the claims in the Amended Complaint against Defendant SHP. (Id.).4
On December 19, 2011, SHP filed the pending Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 93), arguing that Campbell's remaining claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations or, inthe alternative, that it is entitled to official qualified immunity from these claims under Kentucky law. Plaintiff disputes both of these arguments in his Response (R. 98).5
As noted, the parties have since also filed other motions that are currently pending. On April 19, 2012, SHP filed a Motion to Exclude Plaintiff's expert Dr. Thomas P. vonUnRug's supplemental opinions, arguing the doctor's physical examination of Plaintiff was untimely since it was not completed before the expert reporting deadline. (R. 109). Plaintiff filed a Response in opposition to this Motion, claiming that Dr. vonUnRug's opinions are not new, but are only confirmed by his examination findings. (R. 116). On April 26, 2012, SHP filed a Motion to Strike or, in the Alternative, to Allow the Filing of Rebuttal. (R. 112). In this Motion, SHP argues that Campbell misused the Court's grant of an opportunity for each party to file a supplement to their summary judgment filings based on any information learned from additional discovery related to Jerry Stephens's status as power of attorney for Plaintiff. (Id.). Plaintiff, in his Response to the Motion to Strike, explained that in his supplement he combined newly discovered information with information previously known, in order to provide the Court with a context to understand the new information as it relates to Defendant's statute of limitations defense. (R. 114).
On May 7, 2012, Campbell filed a Motion for Sanctions for intentional spoliation and destruction of material evidence based on the deletion of documents from the computer of SHP's former Vice President of Operations. (R. 115). In its Response (R. 120), SHP indicated that the documents deleted from the former Vice President's computer were not relevant to the instant litigation, or those that were relevant were previously provided to Campbell.
Under the federal rules, summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The purpose of summary judgment "is not to resolve factual issues, but to determine if there are genuine issues of fact to be tried." Wilson v. Karnes, No. 2:06-cv-392, 2009 WL 467566, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 24, 2009) (citing Lashlee v. Sumner, 570 F.2d 107, 111 (6th Cir. 1978)). In reviewing motions for summary judgment, the Court must view all facts and draw all reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1986); Dominguez v. Corr. Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009). However, the nonmoving party must provide more than a "mere scintilla of evidence"; there must be sufficient evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the nonmoving party. Dominguez, 555 F.3d at 549. Also, the trial court is not required to "search the entire record to establish that it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact." Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479-80 (6th Cir. 1989).
Campbell acknowledges that his only remaining claims against SHP are for medical negligence. (See R. 98, at 4). SHP argues that these claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations, and therefore summary judgment must be granted. (R. 93).
The parties agree that the applicable statute of limitations for these remaining claims against SHP requires that "[a]n action for an injury to the person of the plaintiff . . . shall be commenced within one (1) year after the cause of action accrued." K.R.S. § 413.140(1)(a). In general, the statute requires that a plaintiff file suit within one year of the alleged injury. See Caudill v. Arnett, 481 S.W.2d 668, 669 (Ky. 1972). However, under Kentucky's "discovery rule," "a cause of action will not accrue until the plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, not only that he has been injured but also that his injury may have been caused by the defendant's conduct." Louisville Trust Co. v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 580 S.W.2d 497, 501 (Ky. 1979) (quoting Raymond v. Eli Lilly & Co., 371 A.2d 170, 174 (N.H. 1977)). See also Whalen v. Stryker Corp., 783 F. Supp.2d 977 (E.D. Ky. 2011); Johnson v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 24 F. App'x 533, 536 (6th Cir. 2001).
In the instant case, Campbell does not argue that the action against SHP was filed within one year from the date on which his injury occurred, nor does he argue that the amended complaint "relates back." Rather, he argues that the action against SHP did not accrue until sometime later due to the operation of the "discovery rule." (R. 98). In support of this argument, Plaintiff claims that SHP concealed the fact it had a role in causing Plaintiff's injuries, and therefore the cause of action did not accrue until Plaintiff was made aware of SHP's alleged wrongdoing. (Id.). Plaintiff claims that he was not aware of SHP's potential liability until the depositions of several SHP nurses, specifically the deposition of Nurse Belinda Moore, which took place on October 6, 2010. (Id. at 13). Campbell characterizes Nurse Moore's deposition as the "defining moment" in the case that gave him notice that SHP should be named a defendant in the action. (Id.). Therefore, it...
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