Campbell v. Safeway, Inc.
| Decision Date | 25 August 2004 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 03-324-MO. |
| Citation | 332 F.Supp.2d 1367 |
| Parties | Aprill CAMPBELL, Plaintiff, v. SAFEWAY, INC., a Delaware corporation, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Oregon |
Gene Barry Mechanic, Goldberg Mechanic Stuart & Gibson LLP, Portland, OR, for Plaintiff.
Amy Kathleen Brenner, Barran Liebman, LLP, Lisa C. Brown, Portland, OR, for Defendant.
Defendant Safeway, Inc. accused plaintiff Aprill Campbell, a former Safeway employee, of stealing $800 from its cash registers. While plaintiff signed a confession admitting she took the money, she contends she did not steal any money and Safeway's security guard obtained the confession under duress. Plaintiff brings two state law claims against defendant Safeway, one for false imprisonment and the other for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendant moves for summary judgment against both claims. Because issues of material fact exist, the court DENIES defendant's motion for summary judgment. (Doc. # 77).
The facts, read in favor of nonmovant plaintiff, are as follows. Plaintiff worked at the Springfield, Oregon Safeway store from September 1999 until March 2001. On February 22, 2001, plaintiff worked the night shift as a cashier and person in charge, or "PIC." While Campbell was the last cashier to leave the store that night, other cashiers aside from plaintiff worked at her registers.
The next morning, the store's morning-shift bookkeeper discovered that some money was missing since Paula Frazer, the evening-shift bookkeeper, had last audited the registers the night before. As a result, the bookkeepers and Amanda Carter, the store manager, initiated an investigation. Defendant claims the documents Frazer reviewed showed about $800 was missing; plaintiff, in contrast, argues the documents do not show that $800 was missing.
During the investigation, store personnel discovered that three twenty-dollar bills, which had been placed under the pan in plaintiff's register the night before, were missing. Plaintiff's register's tape showed the three bills had not been paid out to customers. Carter also personally reviewed all the transactions from the night before and concluded the three bills had not been paid out to customers. Plaintiff, therefore, became a suspect.
Almost two weeks later, on March 5, 2001, Carter called plaintiff into her office so store security personnel could interview her. Plaintiff did not know why she was called into the office until after Carter closed the office door behind them. Dave Curtis, a Safeway security guard, conducted the interview. During the interview, the parties were arranged thusly: security guard Curtis sat behind the desk facing two chairs. Plaintiff sat in one of the chairs while Carter sat in the other chair which was situated behind plaintiff's chair and near the door.
When plaintiff realized Curtis believed she had stolen from the store, she turned longingly to look at the door. At which point, Carter shuffled her chair directly in front of the door, blocking the office's only exit.
In response to Curtis's initial questions regarding whether plaintiff had acted in such a way as to affect adversely Safeway's assets, plaintiff insisted she did not know what Curtis was talking about or what he wanted to hear. When it became abundantly clear Curtis was accusing plaintiff of theft, she repeatedly denied the allegation. While plaintiff concedes Curtis never yelled at her, she describes Curtis's tone as harsh and aggressive. Indeed, at one point, in response to plaintiff's denials of wrongdoing, Curtis warned her if she did not lose her "cocky attitude," he was "going to take her outside and kick her ass." Curtis further suggested to plaintiff that if she denied knowing anything she would go to jail, because he is not one "to waste time." He also explained to plaintiff, at least twice, that when an employee accused of theft asks to "see proof" that employee is "automatically taken to jail." As further warning, Curtis told plaintiff he had never been sued, so she should not "even consider" suing him.
Exasperated, plaintiff finally asked Curtis, "What do you want me to say?" Curtis responded that if she would sign a confession she would not be taken to jail, everything would be handled internally, and she would be able to get home to see her children. Plaintiff, therefore, agreed to sign a confession, which Curtis dictated to her. Curtis asked plaintiff how much the confession should state she took; plaintiff responded, "I don't know, $20, let's say $20, I just want to go home." Curtis told plaintiff "to get real" and ultimately settled on a much higher figure; the confession, in pertinent part, stated: Plaintiff signed the dictated confession and a promissory note agreeing to pay the store $800, even though plaintiff testified she had no idea where Curtis came up with the $800 figure. Carter, in fact, testified she had "no idea" how the $800 figure was derived. As part of the confession, plaintiff also agreed to pay $150 in so-called investigation costs.
Despite the confession, plaintiff denies she ever took any money from the store. According to plaintiff, she only signed the confession because she was afraid that she would go to jail and that "this man [she] did not know was going to kick [her] ass." She also feared she would not be home when her children returned from school unless she agreed to sign the confession. At that time, plaintiff had two children, ages eight and eleven, one of whom, Cori, was in a "special needs" program at school. As part of the special-needs program, plaintiff had to be home to greet the school bus, because the bus driver would not allow Cori to disembark without plaintiff's assistance.
Curtis testified he knew plaintiff was a single mother. Indeed, at some point during the interview, in the context of discussing possible jail time, Curtis asked plaintiff, "don't [your children] need to come home from school soon?"
Plaintiff testified the interview lasted a total of about three and a half hours, while defendant says it lasted no more than two and a half hours. The parties agree that plaintiff never expressly asked to use the phone, leave the office, or see a union representative.
Defendant fired plaintiff on or about March 6, 2001. Plaintiff was able to secure a new job within a week of defendant's terminating her. Plaintiff, however, alleges she experienced serious emotional distress after the incident involving Curtis. She alleges she could not sleep for the first couple days after the incident. After those couple days, plaintiff says she began sleeping more than usual and stopped eating, causing her to lose weight. She further alleges she did not change clothes for at least a week after the incident.
Plaintiff filed her third amended complaint on May 28, 2004, alleging claims for false imprisonment and intentional infliction of emotional distress. She seeks compensatory damages for her emotional distress as well as punitive damages. On June 1, 2004, defendant moved for summary judgment against plaintiff's claims and request for punitive damages.1
To state a claim for false imprisonment, a plaintiff must show the defendant caused an unlawful confinement of plaintiff. See Roberts v. Coleman, 228 Or. 286, 292-93, 365 P.2d 79 (1961); Walker v. City of Portland, 71 Or.App. 693, 697, 693 P.2d 1349 (1985). The threshold element of confinement may be satisfied by establishing that the defendant did at least one of four things: (1) put up actual or apparent physical barriers to prevent plaintiff's exit, (2) used physical force to prevent exit, (3) used threats of force to prevent exit, or (4) asserted legal authority to prevent exit. See Roberts, 228 Or. at 294, 365 P.2d 79; Buckel v. Nunn, 133 Or.App. 399, 405, 891 P.2d 16 (1995). As long as one of these four methods of showing confinement is met, the confinement "need not be for more than a brief time." Buckel, 133 Or.App. at 405, 891 P.2d 16 (citing Lukas v. J.C. Penney Co., 233 Or. 345, 353, 378 P.2d 717 (1963)).
Of course, the confinement must have been unprivileged to support a claim. See id. Confinement is privileged when it qualifies for protection under the statutory "merchant exception." See ORS 131.655. The contours of the exception are as follows:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a peace officer, merchant or merchant's employee who has probable cause for believing that a person has committed theft of property of a store or other mercantile establishment may detain and interrogate the person in regard thereto in a reasonable manner and for a reasonable time.
ORS 131.655(1). Under Oregon's merchant exception, then, the existence of probable cause does not inherently shield the merchant from tort liability; the confinement also must have been consummated in a "reasonable manner and for a reasonable time." Id.; see, e.g., Buckel, 133 Or.App. at 408, 891 P.2d 16. Whether the confinement was reasonable in manner and time is an issue for the jury unless the court determines that, even "accepting the evidence most favorable to plaintiff, the detention was reasonable." Delp v. Zapp's Drug & Variety Stores, 238 Or. 538, 544, 395 P.2d 137 (1964).
Defendant Safeway argues that plaintiff's false-imprisonment claim fails, as a matter of law, for two reasons: (1) there was no confinement, and (2) any confinement is protected by the merchant exception.
Construing the record in plaintiff's favor, as the court must, defendant's conduct caused confinement. There was no confinement initially because plaintiff voluntarily accompanied Carter to the office. Nor...
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...second element, whether a defendant's conduct is sufficiently outrageous." Id. at 358, 179 P.3d 730 ; see also Camp b ell v. Safeway, Inc. , 332 F.Supp.2d 1367, 1379 (D.Or.2004) ( "In the usual case, evidence which satisfies the extraordinary-transgression element ... will also create a fac......
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...isolation and interrogation during which he feared he was going to be beaten. This is sufficient. See, e.g., Campbell v. Safeway, Inc., 332 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1376 (D. Or. 2004) (Motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress was denied ......