Campbell v. Shelton

Decision Date03 May 2000
Docket NumberNo. 10A04-9904-CV-171.,10A04-9904-CV-171.
Citation727 N.E.2d 495
PartiesJeff CAMPBELL, M.D. and Physicians Primary Care Service, Appellants-Defendants, v. John SHELTON, Pam Shelton, and John Shelton, Sr., Appellees-Plaintiffs.
CourtIndiana Appellate Court

Douglas B. Bates, Stites & Harbison, Jeffersonville, Indiana, Attorney for Appellants.

Derrick H. Wilson, Mattox & Mattox, New Albany, Indiana, Attorney for Appellees.

OPINION

FRIEDLANDER, Judge.

John and Pam Shelton and their son, John Shelton, Jr., filed a medical malpractice action against, among others, Jeff Campbell and Physicians Primary Care Service (PPCS). Following a trial, the jury found against Campbell and PPCS, and awarded damages to the Sheltons in the amount of $3,961,360.76. Campbell and PPCS appeal from that judgment, presenting the following restated issues for review:

1. Did the trial court commit reversible error in stating, in the jury's presence, that it would recognize one of the Sheltons' witnesses as an expert in his field?

2. Did the trial court err in allowing the Sheltons to introduce into evidence an excerpt from a medical dictionary?

We affirm.

The facts favorable to the judgment are that on September 19, 1992, Shelton, Jr. was playing in a high school football game. He was running with the ball when he was tackled out of bounds and struck his head on a concrete track that encircled the football field. He immediately saw stars. When he returned home after the game, he told his mother that he had a headache. For the next three days, Shelton, Jr. continued to complain of a headache and backache. After football practice on September 22, he told his coach that he had a headache. The coach informed Shelton, Jr. that he would not be permitted to play football again until a doctor had cleared him to play. Later that evening, John and Pam took Shelton, Jr. to the emergency room, where Shelton, Jr. informed hospital personnel about hitting his head on September 19 and his subsequent headaches and backaches. His vision was tested and was determined to be 20/25. Prior to that time, Shelton, Jr. had not worn glasses or contacts or complained about his vision. He was diagnosed with a closed head injury and did not attend school for the next two days.

On September 25, Shelton, Jr. was taken to the Humana Clinic in Clarksville, Indiana, where he was examined by Dr. Cheryl Adams. Dr. Adams administered another vision test. This time, Shelton, Jr.'s vision was determined to be 20/40. After the examination, Dr. Adams prescribed medication. She directed Shelton, Jr. to see Dr. Waterfill in a follow-up visit ten days hence. Dr. Waterfill placed a note in Shelton, Jr.'s chart to that effect. Finally, Dr. Adams informed Shelton, Jr. that he was not to play football for three weeks. Shelton, Jr. developed a fever and did not attend school again until September 29. When he returned, he did not participate in football or physical education classes.

On October 7, Pam took Shelton, Jr. back to the Humana Clinic, where he was examined by Campbell. Campbell did not consult with Dr. Waterfill, nor did he instruct the Sheltons to do so. During a four-minute examination, Campbell examined Shelton, Jr.'s throat or ears. He also asked whether Shelton, Jr. had a headache at that time. He then wrote on a prescription pad that Shelton, Jr. was cleared to resume playing football.

On October 10, Shelton, Jr. collapsed during a football game and lapsed into a coma. He was transported to the University of Louisville Hospital Emergency Room, where doctors determined that he should undergo surgery to remove a blood clot from his brain. The surgery revealed that Shelton, Jr. had a large acute subdural hematoma with an old, chronic component. The chronic component was the result of a previous injury from which Shelton, Jr. had not completely recovered. After surgery, Shelton, Jr. received inpatient treatment from October 10, 1992 through January 25, 1993. He attended an outpatient rehabilitation program from January 26, 1993 through March 29, 1993. Through the end of 1994, Shelton, Jr.'s medical expenses totaled $221,470.26. Despite the extensive treatment he received, Shelton, Jr. suffered permanent brain damage and will never be able to live independently or maintain gainful employment.

On May 11, 1994, the Sheltons filed a medical malpractice action against Campbell and PPCS, alleging that they breached the standard of care in rendering medical treatment for Shelton, Jr. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the Sheltons, as set out previously. Campbell and PPCS appeal that decision.

1.

The Sheltons presented several expert witnesses who testified regarding the applicable standard of care and Dr. Campbell's performance relative to that standard. The first such witness was Dr. Robert F. Sexton, a neurosurgeon. Campbell contends that the trial court committed reversible error in comments it made while admitting Dr. Sexton as an expert witness.

We conclude that Campbell waived any error in this regard. In Fabian v. Goldstone, 123 Ind.App. 49, 103 N.E.2d 920, 921 (1952), the trial court stated in the jury's presence:

I am going to overrule the objection on the theory that the witness has stated his degree of knowledge which would make it appear as of some value, and let the jury determine what the testimony is worth; although I think that the better rule may be that this type of a witness should be a member of the profession in all respects at the time he gained the knowledge to which he testified.

The appellate court held that the appellant should have sought immediate relief by requesting that the remarks be stricken and the jury admonished. If the prejudice was so severe that such would not have cured the prejudice, then the appellant should have sought a mistrial. Noting that the appellant had done neither, and did not complain until after the trial was concluded, the court held that the appellant waived the question and took her chances on a favorable verdict.

In the instant case, counsel did not immediately object to the court's comment, or take any other curative measure. Therefore, the issue was waived. Id. Even if it was not waived, however, Campbell is not entitled to reversal on this issue.

We begin by clarifying the issue under consideration. Campbell does not now nor did he at trial challenge Dr. Sexton's qualification as an expert witness. Likewise, he does not challenge the ultimate admissibility of Dr. Sexton's testimony. Rather, he contends that in commenting upon its decision to permit Dr. Sexton to offer expert testimony, the court vouched for Dr. Sexton's credibility.

It is important to consider the exchange upon which Campbell's claim of error is premised. At the outset of Dr. Sexton's testimony upon direct, the Sheltons sought to establish his credentials as an expert in the field of brain injuries. After presenting his curriculum vitae, the Sheltons offered a written summary of Dr. Sexton's credentials into evidence, at which time the following colloquy occurred:

MR. FRANKLIN [SHELTONS' COUNSEL]: Okay sir. Yes sir. I'll put over here [sic]. Your Honor, I offer Dr. Robert Sexton as an expert in the filed of neurosurgery that he is licensed in and practices in.
THE COURT: Mr. Schuster [Campbell's counsel]?
MR. SCHUSTER: May I approach the bench, Your Honor?
THE COURT: Yes sir.
(BENCH CONFERENCE AMONG ALL ATTORNEYS AND JUDGE)
MR. SCHUSTER: Unless there's a different rule in Indiana than there is in federal court, it's not required for the judge to pass his blessing upon the qualifications of a witness, and I object to you being asked to give him your blessing.
MR. FRANKLIN: Well, I didn't want to get thrown out because I didn't make a procedural offering.
THE COURT: Well, I'm not certain to be perfectly honest with you. I've seen it done, and I have seen it where they didn't ask me to qualify, and I'm not sure what the rule Mr. Rule Expert, what's the rule here?
MR. WILSON: There is no rule. The seven hundred series is silent on this issue, your Honor, I think.
THE COURT: I'll recognize him.
DIRECT EXAMINATION CONT'D
THE COURT: We'll recognize Dr. Sexton as an expert in his field.

Record at 1756-57.

With regard to the court's final comment, Campbell contends that it constituted error because: "Clearly, an endorsement by a trial court that a witness is an expert in his or her field places in a juror's mind the idea that the court considers the witness worthy and that the witness's testimony deserves added weight." Appellant's Brief at 11. In support of his argument, Campbell cites three Indiana cases and commentary to Rule 702 of the Indiana Rules of Evidence.

We first consider the cases cited by Campbell. They are cited to support the frankly uncontroversial proposition that it is within the factfinder's sole province to determine what weight should be assigned to an expert's testimony. One of the cases, Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Robbins, 110 Ind.App. 172, 38 N.E.2d 274 (1941), is not factually similar to the instant case and is invoked only to support the boilerplate proposition set out above. Accordingly, we need not dwell upon it. The other two cases, however, involve situations in which a verdict was overturned upon appeal because the trial court impermissibly commented upon the credibility of witnesses.

In Kintner v. State, 45 Ind. 175 (1873), a suit was filed to establish paternity. One witness testified that at about the time that the child in question would have been conceived, he observed the mother and alleged father engaging in sexual intercourse. While the plaintiff was cross-examining the witness, the court stated, within the jury's hearing: "You need not spend any further time with that witness." Id. at 177. The witness was then dismissed, after which the court stated: "I have serious doubts whether that witness ought not to be recognized to answer for perjury." Id. The appellate court concluded that the above remarks,...

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5 cases
  • Belvedere v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • 23 Octubre 2007
    ...applies for another reason. It is the province of the judiciary to determine the admissibility of evidence. See Campbell v. Shelton, 727 N.E.2d 495, 500 (Ind. Ct.App.2000), trans. denied. The exclusionary rule is a rule of evidence and, as such, a statute cannot divest our Supreme Court of ......
  • Richardson v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • 12 Junio 2006
    ...taken away by statute. Finally, it is the province of the judiciary to determine the admissibility of evidence. See Campbell v. Shelton, 727 N.E.2d 495, 500 (Ind.Ct.App.2000) ("The Indiana Rules of Evidence were adopted by the Indiana Supreme Court on August 24, 1993, and became effective o......
  • Mattingly v. Warrick County Drainage Bd.
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    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • 13 Marzo 2001
    ...the drain's status as a regulated drain since 1887. Mattingly cannot predicate error on cumulative evidence. See Campbell v. Shelton, 727 N.E.2d 495, 502 (Ind.Ct. App.2000). In any event, Ind.Code § 36-9-27-29 denominates Irvin "the technical authority" regarding regulated drains. See infra......
  • Stokes v. Com.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky
    • 18 Diciembre 2008
    ...Specifically, judicial notice may be taken of the definitions of medical terms from a medical dictionary, Campbell v. Shelton, 727 N.E.2d 495, 502 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), and those definitions are admissible into evidence in a jury trial, assuming of course that the other requirements of the jud......
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