Campbell v. Shipley

• Decision Date: 01 July 1874
• Citation: 41 Md. 81
• Parties: GEORGE L. CAMPBELL, S. CHARLES CARROLL, and ELIZABETH J. CARROLL his Wife v. CHARLES SHIPLEY.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

41 Md. 81

GEORGE L. CAMPBELL, S. CHARLES CARROLL, and ELIZABETH J. CARROLL his Wife v. CHARLES SHIPLEY.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

July 1, 1874

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Baltimore City.

This was an action of ejectment brought by the appellee against the appellants, to recover a lot of ground in the City of Baltimore.

First Exception.--After the introduction of the evidence on the part of the plaintiff, which is stated in the opinion of the Court, the defendants offered in evidence the will of Jacob Sleeper before given in evidence by the plaintiff, as giving them color of title to the property; and then made an offer of proof in the words following:

The will of Jacob Sleeper being offered in evidence by the plaintiff, for the purpose of showing that the said Sleeper thereby devised the leasehold property obtained by said deed from said Henry Peters, and for the purpose of negativing the position of the defendants, that the property in dispute was considered by the said Sleeper as real estate, and for other purposes, and the plaintiff also having offered the letters testamentary, granted to the executrix under said will, the defendants propose now to offer generally, the inventory returned by said executrix, as one of a series of acts showing the manner of dealing with the property by the said Sleeper; the claim his devisees made to it, and the manner in which it was held by the said devisees; which offer was refused by the Court, (DOBBIN, J.,) and the evidence not allowed to be offered. The defendants excepted.

Second Exception.--The defendants having offered evidence to show possession on the part of the Sleepers, and having produced a witness who stated that Jacob Sleeper took possession of the property in about 1808, and lived there till he died, and that the Sleepers lived there until 1840 when the house burned down--then proposed to ask the witness the following questions: Did the Sleepers claim the property as their own absolute property in any conversation with you? Did the Sleepers admit the claim of any other person to the property in conversation with you about it?

The plaintiff objected, unless the defendants were prepared to show that the plaintiff or some one under whom he claimed was present at such conversation. The Court sustained the objection, and refused to permit the question to be put, and the defendant excepted.

Third Exception.--The defendants' counsel then proposed to ask witness the following questions: Do you know whether the possession of the property by the Sleepers was notorious, adverse and exclusive, and accompained by the claim of absolute title? What was the notorious, general reputation in the community as to the Sleepers ownership of this property? Which questions the Court on objection made by the plaintiff refused to permit to be answered, and the defendants excepted.

Fourth Exception.--The defendants' counsel proposed to ask a witness the following question: Did Mrs. Campbell, while in possession of the property, in a conversation with you, claim the property as her own fee-simple absolute property? The Court ruled the question not admissible unless the plaintiff, or those under whom he claims was present at the time of said conversation. The Court also refused to permit the witness to testify as to anything Mrs. Campbell said to witness as to her ownership of the property, and in what manner she claimed it, unless the plaintiff or those under whom he claims was present. The defendants excepted.

Fifth Exception.--The defendants then offered to prove by the books in the Orphans' Court of Baltimore city, the fact that there was no inventory returned by the administrator of any property belonging to John Shroud, which evidence the Court refused to allow to be introduced, and the defendants excepted.

Sixth Exception.--The defendants then proposed to offer the inventory returned to the Orphans' Court of Baltimore city, by the executrix of the said Sleeper, which showed that the only personal estate the said Sleeper possessed was some household furniture and trade implements, and a lot of ground forty feet by sixty feet under a rent of fourteen dollars per annum to Jacob Oliver, no deed or will from Jacob Oliver being any part of the plaintiff's claim; but the Court ruled it inadmissible and refused to permit the same to be offered in evidence, and the defendants excepted.

Seventh Exception.--After the introduction of the evidence in the sixth bill of exceptions, the defendants further proved by George L. Campbell, one of the defendants that he was born in 1832, in the house heretofore mentioned and lived there till the house was burned down in 1840; there never was any demand for rent that he knew of. The defendants then proposed to ask the witness the following question: "Do you know whether the possession of the property by the Sleepers was notorious, adverse, exclusive, and accompanied by the claim of absolute title?"

The plaintiff's counsel objected that the question should not be put without proof that the claim was made in the hearing of the plaintiff or of some one under whom he claimed.

The defendants' counsel said he could not prove that, as there was no evidence in the case that the Sleepers knew of any one having a claim for rent upon any part of the said property possessed by them.

The Court sustained the objection and refused to permit the question to be put; whereupon the defendants excepted.

Eighth Exception.--The plaintiff then prayed the Court to grant the following prayer:

If the jury shall find the execution and delivery of the lease from Lyde Goodwin to John Shroud, offered in evidence, and of the assignment from Sleeper, admr. of Shroud to Peters, and from Peters to Sleeper, and the grant of letters of administration on the estate of said Shroud to said Jacob Sleeper, and shall find that the said Jacob Sleeper died in possession of the property in controversy, having made his last will and testament, and that the same was admitted to probate by the Orphans' Court of Baltimore county, and letters were committed to his widow Hannah Maria Sleeper, and that by the will he devised the property in controversy, or said property together with other, and that the said Hannah and her daughter, Philopena, the mother of the defendants, Geo. L. Campbell, and Mrs. Carroll, wife of S. Charles Carroll, were in possession living with said Jacob before his death, and so remained until the death of said Hannah Maria, and that said Philopena continued in possession with her children, said Geo. L. Campbell and Mrs. Carroll, until her death nineteen years since, and shall further find the execution and delivery of all the other deeds offered in evidence, and the proceedings in equity also offered, and that the lines of the property in such deeds and proceedings mentioned include the lot in controversy, and that more than one year's rent reserved by said lease, was in arrear when the suit was instituted, and that there was not, at the time of the institution of this suit, and for some time before, sufficient distrainable property to countervail the rent due, then they should find for the plaintiff.

And the defendants prayed the Court to grant the following prayers:

1. That if the jury believe that the defendants' ancestors, under whom they claim, were in possession and living upon a tract of ground, of which the present lot is a part, in 1808, claiming it as their own, and that they remained in such possession and occupancy till 1840, when the house burned down, and that there never has been adverse possession of the property to them up to the present time, and that they never have paid any rent for the same, and no demand for the same has ever been made, then their verdict must be for the defendants, although they may believe there was a deed that passed between Jacob Sleeper, administrator of John Shroud, to Henry Peters, and from Henry Peters to Jacob Sleeper, offered in evidence.

2. That if the jury believe there never has been any demand upon the defendants, and those under whom they claim for rent for the said property, or any paid since the said Jacob Sleeper was in possession of the said property in 1808, up to the present time, and that the said Jacob Sleeper, and those under whom the defendants claim, have been in possession ever since, then there is evidence for the jury to presume that the said rent has been extinguished by some act or deed of the party entitled to the same.

3. That if the jury believe the plaintiff has never demanded rent of the defendants, and those under whom they claim, for the said property, from the year 1808 till the present time, and that no rent has ever been paid for the same by the defendants from said year, 1808, till now, then the plaintiff has lost his right of entry upon the said property, and the verdict must be for the defendants.

4. That if Jacob Sleeper was in possession of the property, claiming it as his own, from the year 1808 till he died in 1818, and said property continued in possession of his devisees, and those under whom the defendants claim, up to the present time, claiming it all the time as their own, then their verdict must be for the defendants, although they may find that there was such a deed from Henry Peters to the said Jacob Sleeper, as offered in evidence by the plaintiff.

The Court granted the plaintiff's prayer, and refused all the prayers of the defendants; and the verdict and judgment being against them they appealed.

The cause was argued before STEWART, GRASON, MILLER and ROBINSON, J.

W. H. S. Burgwyn, for the appellants.

There never existed the relation of landlord and tenant as between the appellee and the appellants, and those under whom they respectively claim.

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