Campbell v. Skinner Mfg. Co.

• Decision Date: 09 April 1907
• Citation: 53 Fla. 632,43 So. 874
• Parties: CAMPBELL et al. v. SKINNER MFG. CO.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

43 So. 874

53 Fla. 632

CAMPBELL et al. v. SKINNER MFG. CO.

Florida Supreme Court, Division A.

April 9, 1907

Error to Circuit Court, Santa Rosa County; Francis B. Carter Judge.

Action by the Skinner Manufacturing Company against Wash Campbell and others. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendants bring error. Affirmed.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

Chapter 5162, p. 97, of the Laws of 1903, entitled 'an act making copies of records evidence in re-establishment proceedings,' is not in conflict with section 16 of article 3, or with section 21 of article 16, of the state Constitution of 1885.

A liberal rule of construction should be applied when the constitutionalty of legislative enactments is questioned, and every reasonable doubt should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of the act assailed. The courts are bound to uphold a statute, unless it is clearly made to appear beyond a reasonable doubt that it is unconstitutional.

If the title of the act fairly gives notice of the subject of the act, so as reasonably to lead to an inquiry into the body thereof, it is all that is necessary. The title need not be an index to the contents of the act. The title to an act may be general, and so long as the generality of the subject therein expressed is not employed as a guise to conceal the real object thereof, or some provision therein, it will not be objectionable.

A right to have one's controversies determined by existing rules of evidence is not a vested right, and the Legislature within constitutional restrictions, has the power to change the rules of evidence.

Section 21 of article 16 of the state Constitution of 1885 is not a limitation upon the power of the Legislature, so as to prohibit it from changing the rule of evidence as to the introduction in evidence of copies of deeds and mortgages, so long as it did not undertake to render inadmissible the class of instruments enumerated in such section of the Constitution.

While the proof of the contents, or the substance of the contents of the operative parts of lost instruments, in re-establishment proceedings, should be clear and satisfactory, to require the principles of evidence to be applied with technical nicety in such cases would often-times not only work great hardship, but would defeat the ends of justice. Obviously, from the very nature of things, after the lapse of many years, primary evidence or strict proof could not well be obtained concerning such ancient matters.

COUNSEL

Blount & Blount, for plaintiffs in error.

Ernest Amos, for defendant in error.

OPINION

SHACKLEFORD C.J.

This is a proceeding instituted by the defendant in error against the plaintiffs in error in the circuit court for Santa Rosa county for the re-establishment of certain described papers, consisting of a judgment alleged to have been recovered by Christian Campbell, now deceased, against Neill Campbell, also now deceased, in the circuit court for Santa Rosa county, for the sum of $3,000, in the year 1859, an alias execution alleged to have been issued out of said court on said judgment in the year 1867, a sheriff's deed from A. B. Dixon, sheriff of Santa Rosa county, to Christian Campbell and George G. McWhorter, based upon such judgment and execution, alleged to have been executed on the 6th day of December, 1867, and a deed of conveyance from Christian Campbell and George G. McWhorter to William V. Jernigan, alleged to have been executed on the 24th day of April, 1871. It is further alleged in the petition of defendant in error that substantial copies of all of the instruments so sought to be re-established are attached as exhibits to the petition; that on the 13th day of July, 1869, the courthouse of Santa Rosa county, with the records of the county, including the judgment and original and alias execution, were all destroyed by fire; that the two deeds in question have been lost or destroyed, and are not in the custody or control of petitioner, but the time and manner of such loss or destruction are unknown to petitioner.

To this petition Wash Campbell and Neill Campbell, two of the defendants, filed an answer in which they denied all the material allegations of the petition, and an examiner was appointed to take testimony therein. The petition was originally brought against the adult defendants, but subsequently, by leave of court, the infant defendants were made parties thereto, by whom, through their guardian ad litem, an answer was filed, also denying the material allegations of the petition, and the same examiner was appointed 'to take the testimony in said cause only in so far as the interests of said minors may be affected.'

Voluminous testimony was taken by the respective parties before the examiner, many objections being interposed by them to different parts thereof, and the matter finally came on to be heard before the court upon the pleadings, the report of the examiner, the evidence taken before him, and the objections interposed thereto. On the 1st day of September, 1906, a final judgment was rendered by the court re-establishing all of the papers in accordance with the prayer of the petition. In this judgment the various objections interposed to the evidence by the respective parties were passed upon; all of the objections interposed by the petitioner being overruled, and some of the objections interposed by defendants sustained, and some overruled.

To this judgment a writ of error was sued out by defendants, returnable to the present term of this court. Twenty-nine errors are assigned, but we do not think it necessary to set them forth or to discuss them in detail.

Certified copies of the sheriff's deed from A. B. Dixon, sheriff, to Christian Campbell and George G. McWhorter, and from said Campbell and McWhorter to W. V. Jernigan, were offered in evidence by petitioner, to the introduction of which defendants interposed various objections. Neither of said deeds was acknowledged or proved for record, but each was spread upon the public records of Santa Rosa county, on the 29th day of September, 1874, by Frank Smith, then clerk of the circuit court of such county. We think the evidence clearly establishes the fact of such record by such clerk and that the record thereof is in his handwriting. Petitioner claims that certified copies of these two deeds are admissible in evidence under chapter 5162, p. 97, Laws of 1903, which is as follows:

'Chapter 5162--(No. 57.)

'An act making copies of records evidence in re-establishment proceedings.

'Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Florida:

'Section 1. That where any deed forming a link in a chain of title to any land in this state has been placed upon the proper record without having been acknowledged or proven for record, has been lost or destroyed, certified copies of the record of such deed as so recorded may be received as evidence in any court of this state in proceedings to re-establish such deed: Provided, such deed has been so recorded for twenty years.

'(Became a law without the approval of the Governor.)'

Defendants contend that this act is unconstitutional for the following reasons:

First. Becuase it does not sufficiently comply with the requirements of section 16 of article 3 of the Constitution of 1885, which is as follows:

'Sec. 16. Each law enacted in the Legislature shall embrace but one subject and matter properly connected therewith, which subject shall be briefly expressed in the title; and no law shall be amended or revised by reference to its title only; but in such case the act, as revised, or section, as amended, shall be re-enacted and published at length.'

Second. Because it is in conflict with section 21 of article 16 of the Constitution of 1885, which is as follows:

'Sec. 21. Deeds and mortgages which have been proved for record and recorded according to law, shall be taken as prima facie evidence in the courts in this state without requiring proof of the execution. A certified copy of the record of any deed or mortgage that has been or shall be duly recorded according to law shall be admitted as prima facie evidence thereof, and of its due execution with like effect as the original duly proved: Provided, it be made to appear that the original is not within the custody or control of the party offering such copy.'

In support of the first ground of unconstitutionality urged against the act, defendants cite State ex rel. Attorney General v. Burns, 38 Fla. 367, 21 So. 290, to the effect 'that the title of bills must not be misleading, or tend to avert inquiry as to the purpose of the act,' and that 'the title of an act should fairly apprise not only the members of the Legislature, but the people to be affected, of the subject of legislation being enacted.' There is no doubt as to the correctness of these propositions. See State ex rel. Attorney General v. Bryan, 50 Fla 293, 39 So. 929, and authorities therein cited; Wade v. Atlantic Lumber Co., 51 Fla. 628, 41 So. 72; Ex parte Knight, 52 Fla. ----, 41 So. 786. But is the title to the act in question misleading, so as to render it obnoxious to the provisions of section 16 of article 3 of the Constitution of 1885? Defendants contend that 'one would suppose from such a title that the Legislature intended to permit the introduction of copies of records which at the time of the passage of the act were recognized by law as proper and sufficient records, and not that it...