Campbell v. State

Decision Date07 April 2023
Docket Number123,830
PartiesRobert L. Campbell Jr., Appellant, v. State of Kansas, Appellee.
CourtKansas Court of Appeals

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; Stephen J. Ternes, judge.

Jacob Nowak, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant.

Julie A. Koon, assistant district attorney, Marc Bennett, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.

Before Atcheson, P.J., Schroeder and Gardner, JJ.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Per Curiam

Robert Campbell Jr. appeals the summary denial of his pro se K.S.A 2019 Supp. 60-1507 motion, arguing the district court erred by applying res judicata and by failing to consider the merits of his claim that he was not competent to represent himself at trial. Finding no error in the district court's summary denial of Campbell's 60-1507 motion we affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

In November and December 2011, T.D. received phone calls from Robert Campbell Jr., which made her fear for her safety. T.D reported the calls to the police, and Campbell was later convicted at a bench trial of stalking based on these phone calls. A panel of this court affirmed Campbell's conviction on appeal. See State v. Campbell, No 114,396, 2016 WL 6651311, at *8 (Kan. App. 2016) (unpublished opinion).

In April 2014, T.D. checked her business mailbox and found two letters from Campbell, listing his return address as Larned Correctional Facility. Seeing Campbell's name on the envelopes made T.D. nervous because Campbell had been ordered not to contact her. So T.D. contacted the police again.

One of the letters included only a short message telling T.D. to have a "wonderful year." T.D. feared that this message implied that she would see Campbell the next year. The other letter told T.D., "It will be very wise to take care of me while I'm in here. This is not a threat. It's not a demand. I'm asking you for a wise decision." Latent print examination of the letters showed a fingerprint on the first page of one of the letters, and the print examiner determined that the fingerprint was Campbell's.

The State then charged Campbell with one count of stalking under K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 21-5427(a)(2), (b)(2)(B). At his preliminary hearing, Campbell said he wanted to represent himself. In response, the district court extensively advised Campbell of his rights regarding self-representation and the "numerous dangers and disadvantages" of invoking such rights. The court told Campbell to discuss the decision with his attorney and to think about it over the weekend. The court told Campbell that it would revisit the issue the next Monday.

The district court also considered Campbell's pro se motion to remove his appointed counsel (Jama Mitchell). Campbell's motion claimed that Mitchell had a personal relationship with the victim's family. But Mitchell denied the allegation, and the district court denied the motion.

The following Monday, Campbell requested a competency evaluation for himself. The court granted the motion and briefly addressed Campbell's pending request to represent himself. It explained that Campbell's competency needed to be determined before it could rule on Campbell's self-representation motion: "I know [Campbell has] had . . . some competency issues in the past, so I think it probably is appropriate to make sure that we're okay with regard to that before we do much else."

COMCARE conducted Campbell's initial evaluation. The evaluator noted in his report that Campbell had had a brain tumor removed when he was six years old and had been prescribed medication for a seizure disorder since that surgery. Campbell was later diagnosed with epilepsy, received disability funds for it, and was never employed. But Campbell refused to comply with the test requirements, so the examiner found that he could not adequately determine Campbell's competency to stand trial.

The district court then ordered another competency evaluation at Larned State Hospital. The examiner there noted, "Campbell has an extensive psychiatric history that generally has been presented in actions that have led to arrest and incarceration." Campbell had been diagnosed with schizophrenia, causing auditory and visual hallucinations, and was taking at least six medications.

The evaluator diagnosed Campbell with: (1) "Schizophrenia, Multiple Episodes, Currently in Partial Remission"; (2) "Antisocial Personality Disorder with Borderline Features"; and (3) "Unspecified Paraphilic Disorder." The Larned evaluation also noted that Campbell refused to fully participate in the evaluation. Still, the evaluator concluded that Campbell was competent to stand trial based on a combination of Campbell's past evaluations, his current presentation in his therapy assignments, and his conduct with hospital staff.

The district court held a hearing after the evaluation and found Campbell competent to stand trial, without objection.

A couple of days later, the district court addressed Campbell's request to represent himself. At this hearing, the district court thoroughly discussed the matter with Campbell, explaining the risks of self-representation. The district court discouraged Campbell from representing himself but told Campbell that he could waive his right to self-representation and have counsel appointed at any time. But the court clarified that if such a request came in the middle of trial, it would likely appoint counsel but would not delay trial. Campbell responded to several questions and made comments of his own during the court's explanation of his rights. By the end of that conversation, Campbell remained adamant that he wanted to represent himself. He also asked the court to remove Mitchell and not to appoint Mitchell as standby counsel. The court granted Campbell's request to represent himself without standby counsel.

Ten days later, Campbell asked the court to appoint standby counsel. Campbell told the district court that he still wanted to represent himself but wanted standby counsel to ensure an attorney would be ready to take over his case if he changed his mind about representing himself. The court explained that the decision to appoint standby counsel was discretionary and that such counsel would not represent him or "be working for [him]," so Campbell could not direct his attorney. The court also explained that it would likely choose Mitchell if it granted Campbell's request. Campbell objected to Mitchell's appointment, claiming he had sent a complaint letter to the disciplinary administrator about Mitchell's representation. The court responded that it would check with the judge who presided over the previous hearing before deciding.

At a pretrial hearing in April 2015, Campbell requested standby counsel again, arguing a right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The district court denied Campbell's request, finding that the Sixth Amendment contains no right to standby counsel.

This case was tried in April 2015. In the middle of Campbell's cross-examination of T.D., and right after losing more than one evidentiary motion, Campbell made yet another request for standby counsel. He added that he wanted "to waive [his] right to self-representation and request . . . counsel in [his] defense." While arguing his position, Campbell reminded the court of his mental diagnoses, claimed that he had not been given his medication while incarcerated, and said that he had been confused when he decided to represent himself.

The district court denied Campbell's request for several reasons. It found the effect of midtrial appointment of counsel would "disrupt and vitiate the trial" and could thus result in a mistrial. The district court also explained that the timing of Campbell's request was suspect:

"None of these matters were raised by Mr. Campbell in the pretrial motions. None of these issues have been raised, the competency issues, by Mr. Campbell until after his request for appointed counsel is denied, until after his request for admission and being able to question on Exhibit H has now been denied. The timing of his making the request for a competency evaluation only after those matters have been adversely decided against him is extremely suspect and probably more than coincidental."

The district court also found that Campbell had received several warnings about the risks of self-representation and had repeatedly chosen to represent himself. It then found that Campbell's conduct before and during trial showed he was competent to represent himself.

After finding that Campbell had been conducting himself on an acceptable level as a pro se litigant, the court denied his motion for a competency evaluation, found he understood the charge against him, and was more than able to assist and to make his own defense. Campbell clarified that he was not requesting a competency evaluation but was requesting counsel because of his mental disorders. The district court then denied Campbell's request for appointment of counsel and resumed trial.

Trial Testimony and Verdict

The State presented testimony from T.D. and fingerprint examiners. This testimony showed that T.D. had not invited Campbell to write or contact her, that Campbell was legally prohibited from contacting T.D., and that Campbell's fingerprint had been found on one of the letters sent to T.D.

Campbell testified in his defense, denying that he had written the letters T.D. received. Campbell's theory of defense was that a fellow inmate, "Big Charlie," had written the letters and had told him that when T.D. sent the money the letters demanded, Campbell needed to give the money to him. Campbell also suggested that the State had failed to establish that the letters were in his...

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