Campbell v. State
| Decision Date | 14 July 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 82A01-0001-CR-37.,82A01-0001-CR-37. |
| Citation | 732 N.E.2d 197 |
| Parties | David John CAMPBELL, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Bernard G. Reisz, Evansville, Indiana, Attorney for Appellant.
Karen M. Freeman-Wilson, Attorney General of Indiana, Janet Brown Mallett, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorneys for Appellee.
David John Campbell appeals his convictions for burglary, a class B felony; theft, a class D felony; and contempt. We affirm.
Campbell presents five issues for our review, which we restate as follows:
1. whether the trial court improperly refused to conduct a hearing into his competency to stand trial in accordance with Ind.Code § 35-36-3-1;
2. whether the trial court improperly denied a request by him to proceed pro se;
3. whether the trial court erred by excluding him from the courtroom on two separate occasions during the trial;
4. whether certain testimony presented by Lisa Saubier, a witness for the State, was so inherently unbelievable, improbable, and incredibly dubious as to require reversal of the convictions; and
5. whether he was entitled to have the jury instructed on and provided verdict forms for residential entry as a lesser-included offense of burglary, and conversion as a lesser-included offense of theft.
The facts most favorable to the jury's verdicts reveal that between July 2 and 13, 1998, Campbell and two companions decided to burglarize the residence of Frank Saubier while the latter was on vacation. Campbell agreed to go to the house after having heard that others had already been there and removed property, as it sounded "good" to him and he was "trying to get ahead like the next man." Record at pg. 130. Upon arriving at the house, Campbell sat on a couch near a door where he and his companions had entered, while the others went through the house; Campbell was apparently asked to serve as a look out. When his companions found some guns and a camcorder, they did not give them to Campbell, who stated that he felt "used," Record at pg. 131, complaining that the "mother f* * *er wouldn't even give me" a gun. Record at pg. 133. Later, one of his companions from the burglary gave some gold coins to Campbell, which he believed came from the Saubier residence and which he pawned for $100.
The record reflects that Campbell's brief trial was eventful. On the first day, out of the presence of the jury, Campbell entered into a heated conversation with the trial judge regarding letters Campbell claimed to have addressed to the court but which were not received; during this conversation the trial judge indicated he would not permit Campbell to represent himself. This conversation prompted Campbell's attorney to request a psychiatric exam of Campbell to determine his competency to stand trial. Pursuant to this request, the trial court allowed Campbell's attorney to present two witnesses, a bailiff and Campbell's mother, to testify with respect to Campbell's competence. After hearing this evidence, the psychiatric evaluation motion was denied. Before recalling the jury, the trial judge asked Campbell if he wished to remain in the courtroom; Campbell said he did not and was removed. The State then played for the jury a taped statement Campbell gave to a police detective.
On the second day of trial, Campbell took the stand and testified that he had been coerced into giving his statement to the police and that he had never entered the Saubier residence but rather had remained in a car outside. He also stated that he knew Lisa Saubier, Frank Saubier's daughter, and that she had given permission to Campbell's companions to burglarize the residence. In rebuttal, the State called Lisa Saubier, who denied knowing Campbell and denied giving permission for others to burglarize her father's residence. In response to this testimony, Campbell had another violent outburst outside of the jury's presence, which resulted in Campbell's removal from the courtroom on the trial court's order and a finding that Campbell was in contempt. Over the objections of Campbell's attorney, the jury was instructed on the offenses of burglary and theft, but not on residential entry and conversion. The jury returned guilty verdicts on both counts and Campbell was convicted and sentenced accordingly for burglary, theft, and contempt.
Campbell first contends that the trial court should have appointed mental health professionals to evaluate him and that it should have conducted a hearing into his competence to stand trial pursuant to I.C. § 35-36-3-1. The trial and conviction of one without adequate competence is a denial of federal due process and a denial of a state statutory right as well. Brewer v. State, 646 N.E.2d 1382, 1384 (Ind.1995). However, as Campbell recognizes, the right to a competency hearing pursuant to Ind.Code § 35-36-3-1 is not absolute.1 Such a hearing is required only when a trial judge is confronted with evidence creating a reasonable or bona fide doubt as to a defendant's competency, which is defined as whether a defendant currently possesses the ability to consult rationally with counsel and factually comprehend the proceedings against him. Id. Whether reasonable grounds exist to order evaluation of competency is a decision that will be reversed only if we find that the trial court abused its discretion. Anthony v. State, 540 N.E.2d 602, 606 (Ind.1989), reh'g denied. A trial judge's observations of a defendant in court are an adequate basis for determining whether a competency hearing is necessary; such a determination will not be lightly disturbed. Culpepper v. State, 662 N.E.2d 670, 674 (Ind.Ct.App. 1996), reh'g denied, trans. denied. Furthermore, predictable stress from facing one's own felony trial does not warrant a competency hearing. Collins v. State, 643 N.E.2d 375, 379 (Ind.Ct.App.1994), trans. denied. Finally, when the circumstances do not indicate that a trial court should sua sponte order a competency hearing, the defendant has the burden of establishing that reasonable grounds for such a hearing exist. Brown v. State, 485 N.E.2d 108, 110 (Ind. 1985).
Campbell presents two main contentions to support his argument that a competency hearing was required at his trial. First, he alleges that his numerous outbursts in and out of the courtroom, which led to his removal first at his own request and later per the trial court's order, constituted irrational behavior demonstrating impairment of his ability to understand the factual nature of the proceedings against him. Second, Campbell points to testimony given by his mother, in which she stated that Campbell has had "emotional problems since the day he was born," was "mentally incompetent and [was] a lot lower functioning than he appears to be," and that he had been treated by a psychiatrist while attending school in New Jersey. Record at pp. 111-112.
With respect to the first contention, the record is not clear that Campbell's profanity-laced tirades were indicative of incompetence. Rather, the evidence demonstrates that Campbell's outbursts were most likely related to the stress of the trial, his unhappiness with its progression, and his violent disagreement with testimony presented against him.
Second, the testimony of Campbell's mother, regarding her belief that he was incompetent and that a psychiatrist had treated him several years earlier while he was in school, did not require the trial court to order a professional evaluation of Campbell. See Dudley v. State, 480 N.E.2d 881, 894-95 (Ind.1985), habeas corpus granted on other grounds, 854 F.2d 967 (7th Cir.1988) (). Campbell cites no authority for the proposition that a layperson's contention that an individual is incompetent should be conclusive and binding upon a trial court with respect to holding a competency hearing under I.C. § 35-36-3-1. Moreover, Campbell's mother was unable to state that any court had ever adjudged him incompetent.
We note that, in addition to Campbell's claimed indicators of incompetency that the trial court rejected, there is substantial evidence in the record that he was able to comprehend and assist in the proceedings without difficulty. Among other things, he testified on his own behalf after asking for clarification about how much of his past criminal record could thus be brought in by the State, and it appears that Campbell's testimony was rational and lucid. See Duffitt v. State, 519 N.E.2d 216, 222 (Ind.Ct.App.1988),
aff'd on other grounds, (allegation that trial court improperly denied competency hearing rejected where defendant testified on his own behalf and testimony revealed factual comprehension of the proceedings).
We see no basis for reversing the trial court's determination that there was no reasonable or bona fide doubt as to Campbell's competency. The presence of evidence requiring a trial court to conduct a competency hearing under I.C. § 35-36-3-1 must be determined according to the facts of each case. Feggins v. State, 272 Ind. 585, 587, 400 N.E.2d 164, 166 (1980).
Next, Campbell asserts that the trial court erred by not allowing him to proceed pro se. A criminal defendant has the right to waive counsel and proceed pro se if it is shown that he does so of his own free will, knowing and understanding his constitutional right to be represented by counsel. Olson v. State, 563 N.E.2d 565, 570 (Ind.1990). However, Campbell's argument before this Court fails for two reasons.
First, a defendant must clearly and unequivocally assert the right to self-representation. Id. While Campbell...
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