Campbell v. State

• Citation: 999 P.2d 649,2000 WY 48
• Decision Date: 16 March 2000
• Docket Number: No. 98-199.,98-199.
• Parties: Casey CAMPBELL, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Wyoming

999 P.2d 649

2000 WY 48

Casey CAMPBELL, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).

No. 98-199.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

March 16, 2000.

Representing Appellant: Sylvia Lee Hackl, State Public Defender; Donna Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Diane Courselle, Director, Wyoming Defender Aid Program; and Katina Francis and Leslie Scalley, Student Interns, Wyoming Defender Aid Program. Argument by Ms. Francis and Ms. Scalley.

Representing Appellee: Gay Woodhouse, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Hugh Kenny, Senior Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Mr. Kenny.

Before LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and HILL, JJ.

GOLDEN, Justice.

Appellant Casey Campbell appeals her conviction for felony child endangerment contending that constitutional and evidentiary errors require reversal.

We affirm the order of judgment and sentence.

ISSUES

Campbell presents these issues:

1. Whether the five-hundred thirty-six day delay from Casey Campbell's arrest until her trial, during which she was subjected to four preliminary hearings, violated Casey Campbell's right to a speedy trial.

2. Whether Wyoming's child endangerment statute is void for vagueness facially and as applied to the facts in the case because it provides no standard of conduct or notice of forbidden conduct and it allows for arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.

3. Whether the trial court deprived Casey Campbell of the opportunity to put on a defense in refusing an instruction on coercion and duress when it was a proper statement of the defense theory and it was supported by sufficient evidence at trial.

4. Whether the trial court denied Casey Campbell statutory rights and due process of law by having conferences off the record with two prospective jurors in the absence of Ms. Campbell.

5. Whether Casey Campbell was deprived of a fair trial when the prosecutor (1) elicited two witnesses' opinions that Casey Campbell was guilty, (2) introduced inflammatory and irrelevant photographs of [HC's] burns, (3) engaged in a variety of other improper and inflammatory tactics such as appealing to racial bias, shifting the burden of proving Floid's abuse to Casey Campbell, and otherwise irrelevant and prejudicial tactics.

The State rephrases the issues as:

I. Are delays due to appellant's insistence on creation of a meaningless record sufficient to establish a speedy trial violation?

II. Has appellant carried her burden of showing that Wyo. Stat. § 6-4-403(a)(ii) fails to establish any standards of conduct and is thus unconstitutionally vague?

III. Did the trial court err when it rejected appellant's coercion defense as unsupported by the evidence?

IV. Does the record support appellant's claim of "exclusion" from voir dire sufficient to make out a claim of denial of due process?

V. Was appellant denied a fair trial?

FACTS

In 1992, Casey Campbell's eight-month-old daughter, HC, suffered severe injuries at the hands of Campbell's live-in boyfriend, Floid Boyer. The Department of Family Services (DFS) removed HC from Campbell's custody and placed her in foster care. Campbell was convicted of misdemeanor child endangerment. HC was returned to her mother's care on September 16, 1994. Campbell still lived with Boyer and her two other children that he had fathered since HC was removed. On June 27, 1995, while left alone with Boyer, HC received second and third degree burns over eighteen percent of her body. The burns were on the left side of her body from below her shoulders, extending down her left side, thigh and leg.

Boyer admitted causing the burns but claimed the burns were inflicted when he tripped and spilled coffee on the child sometime during the day. Shortly after 7:00 p.m. that evening, Campbell arrived home from work with a friend and the friend's fourteen-year-old daughter who planned to babysit Campbell's children that evening. The three observed the burns and at least one large blister. The friend recommended that Campbell take HC to the doctor. Campbell and Boyer decided not to follow that advice and, without providing medications for the babysitter, left to play darts at a local bar. The babysitter observed that HC was in pain that evening and dressed her in a large t-shirt. The babysitter confirmed that photographs taken of HC's burns hours later at the hospital accurately reflected the appearance of the burns at 7:00 p.m. that evening. Campbell and Boyer returned home at midnight. By 2:00 a.m., HC's pain was severe, and Campbell decided the burns were serious and required that she take HC to the hospital. Campbell wrapped the child, placed her in a stroller, and walked the few blocks to the hospital.

The treating physician was the same doctor who had cared for HC in 1992. Although Campbell explained that the burns were caused by spilled coffee, the doctor believed the injuries were not consistent with hot liquid as the source. The police were contacted, and a criminal investigation began. Police went to the home and checked the carpet where Boyer alleged that he had spilled the coffee, finding no signs of a spill because the carpet was dry as was the padding underneath, and there was a layer of chalky dust underneath the pad. Boyer agreed to questioning at the police station, and DFS was contacted to care for the two children still in the home. The conditions of the home were deemed deplorable, and DFS decided that Campbell's other two children should be placed in protective custody. Eventually, these two children were placed with Boyer's parents.

Campbell was arrested on charges of child abuse and child endangerment, released on bond, and had a preliminary hearing. The record is not complete on all dates, but both parties agree that recording problems at the preliminary hearing prevented defense counsel from procuring a transcript of the proceedings, and, at defense counsel's request, the trial court remanded for a new preliminary hearing because the first had not been recorded as required by W.R.Cr.P. 55. Recording problems at the new hearing and the next were also faulty. The court determined that the State dismissed the indictment and refiled three times. A fourth preliminary hearing successfully produced a transcript, and Campbell filed a motion to dismiss for speedy trial violation on December 6, 1996, and filed a demand for speedy trial on December 9, 1996. Defense counsel also filed motions to suppress the photographs of the burns and to exclude evidence of HC's previous injuries and Campbell's misdemeanor child endangerment conviction for that incident. Following a hearing on December 11, 1996, the trial court granted the motion with respect to the misdemeanor conviction but allowed evidence of the previous injuries, and denied the motion to suppress the photographs.

On December 16, 1996, shortly before trial began, the State agreed to dismiss the child abuse charge. At that time, the court also reconsidered its ruling prohibiting the State from presenting Campbell's misdemeanor conviction as an element of the offense of felony child endangering. The district court ruled that the previous conviction was not a matter for the jury, but was a matter for the court to decide at sentencing. Also at that time, defense counsel requested a continuance so that it could explore a battered woman's syndrome defense. That continuance was denied, and Campbell went to trial. Before Campbell's trial, Boyer pled guilty to misdemeanor child endangerment.

At trial, the State alleged that Campbell had failed to protect HC from Boyer although she knew Boyer was abusive to the child and failed to get immediate medical care for HC after observing her injuries. The State contended that the unclean condition of Campbell's home required immediate attention because of the risk of infection to a burn victim. In support of its failure to protect claim, the State contended that Campbell knew Boyer was a danger to HC because he disliked HC because he was not her father and because HC was of a different race. In Campbell's defense, Boyer testified that he thought he was HC's father, and had spilled coffee on the child accidentally, causing the burns. He testified that Campbell wanted to take the child to the hospital at 7:00 p.m. that evening, but that he believed the burns were not serious enough to require them to forgo playing darts. He testified that he had been physically abusive to Campbell for years, and he believed that Campbell played darts that night to avoid angering him. Campbell testified that she had been abused by her brother since she was seven years old, by her stepfather since a teenager, and by Boyer since she was sixteen years old, and Boyer had violently assaulted her with knives and guns on past occasions. At the time of HC's injuries, she feared for herself and HC if she defied Boyer that night by refusing to play darts. By 2:00 a.m., she believed that HC's condition had changed because she now had blistered severely, and Boyer and Campbell both testified that they agreed that the child should be taken to the hospital for medical care.

At the jury instruction conference, the defense requested an instruction on the defense of duress and coercion. This instruction was denied by the district court. Campbell was convicted of felony child endangerment and sentenced to prison.

DISCUSSION

Speedy Trial

The State filed charges on June 28, 1995. Campbell was tried on December 16, 1996. During the 536-day delay, Campbell received four preliminary hearings because recording problems left her defense attorneys without a transcript record. Speedy trial violations are reviewed under W.R.Cr.P. 48 and a constitutional balancing test. Both parties agree that Rule 48 was not violated and review is limited to a constitutional analysis of the four factors identified in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972...