Campbell v. State

• Citation: 3 N.E.3d 1034
• Decision Date: 28 January 2014
• Docket Number: No. 13A05–1304–PC–201.,13A05–1304–PC–201.
• Parties: Wayne CAMPBELL, Appellant–Petitioner, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Respondent.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Indiana

3 N.E.3d 1034

Wayne CAMPBELL, Appellant–Petitioner,

v.STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Respondent.

No. 13A05–1304–PC–201.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

Jan. 28, 2014.

Wayne Campbell, Pendleton, IN, Appellant pro se.

Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Justin F. Roebel, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

OPINION

BARNES, Judge.

Case Summary

Wayne Campbell appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief (“PCR petition”), which challenged his convictions for two counts of attempted murder and one count of Class B felony burglary. We affirm.

Issues

The issues before us are:

I. whether Campbell's trial counsel was ineffective in the manner in which he conducted voir dire; and

II. whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to a supplemental instruction given to the jury during its deliberations.

Facts

On direct appeal, we described the evidence most favorable to Campbell's convictions as follows:

On November 15, 1991, Campbell purchased approximately twenty-two acres in Crawford County, and used the land primarily for hunting and camping. To access his property, Campbell used a private road that passed through the properties of his neighbors, Jean and Alva Kincaid (collectively, the Kincaids), and Don Mattox. This easement ran directly between the Kincaids' house and garage.

Sometime in January 2000, Campbell moved into a trailer on the land. Almost from the beginning, various altercations occurred among the Kincaids, Mattox and Campbell regarding the use of the easement. For instance, on one occasion, Alva installed metal speed bumps across the easement, claiming that Campbell had been speeding across his property. Alva and Mattox also began running ATVs down the easement, placing ruts in the road. At some point, Alva allegedly blocked the road to Campbell's residence with a truck and a tractor. The situation worsened to the point that Alva and Campbell sought—and obtained—protective orders against one another.

On November 7, 2001, Campbell hunted on his property and went into town to have supper at a restaurant. When Campbell returned, he noticed that several rocks were lying in the road. Upon closer examination, Campbell observed that shards of glass had been attached to the rocks. Campbell then picked up a rock and threw it at the Kincaids' garage. Alva told Jean to call the police, whereupon Alva picked up his gun, went outside, and confronted Campbell. Campbell then grabbed his shotgun and fired into the air.

At some point, Campbell pointed his gun at Alva and ordered him to drop his weapon. Instead, Alva tried to grab Campbell's gun. However, Campbell immediately hit Alva several times in the head with the barrel of the shotgun. During the altercation, Campbell bent the barrel of the shotgun and also broke the stock. As a result of the attack, Alva's skull was fractured, causing major brain damage. Alva is currently unable to talk and is in need of constant medical care.

Immediately after striking Alva, Campbell proceeded to the Kincaids' house where he kicked in the door and encountered Jean. At that time, she was talking with a State Police officer on the telephone. Campbell grabbed the telephone and tossed it to the ground. Jean then ran to the porch and Campbell followed. He hit Jean in the face with the shotgun and struck her four or five more times while she was on the porch, rendering her unconscious. Jean's injuries included two broken facial bones, a puncture wound, bruises, swelling and broken teeth. Campbell then fled the scene in his vehicle.

Shortly thereafter, Jean regained consciousness and walked to the garage where she observed Alva laying on the floor in a pool of blood. Jean then drove to a neighbor's house, where she reported that Alva was dying.

Hours later, Campbell returned to the Kincaids' house armed with three guns that he had retrieved from his parents' house, where he encountered several police officers. At that time, the officers suspected Campbell was involved in the altercation with the Kincaids. One of the officers yelled that Campbell was armed and all drew their guns on Campbell and ordered him to drop his weapon. Throughout a standoff that lasted nearly thirty minutes, Campbell never fully complied with the officers' commands. To be sure, Campbell refused to submit to a pat down search, and he continued shouting and being uncooperative.

At some point, while several officers were pointing their guns at Campbell, Detective Philip Stowers of the Indiana State Police Department asked, “what is going on?” Campbell then described the events, whereupon he inquired into the Kincaids' condition. Campbell commented that he must have “really f* * * *d them up,” that he wished he had raped Jean, and that it was his hope that both of the Kincaids would die. Eventually, the officers rushed Campbell where they were able to subdue and handcuff him.

Campbell was initially charged with two counts of attempted murder on November 9, 2001. A jury trial commenced on July 30, 2002, but, on August 5, 2002, the jury informed the trial court that it was unable to reach a verdict, and a mistrial was declared. Thereafter, on August 29, 2002, the State refiled the charges, adding two additional counts: Burglary Resulting in Bodily Injury, a class A felony, and Battery, a class C felony. However, the State dismissed the battery charge and filed an amendment to the Burglary Resulting in Serious Bodily Injury charge.

Then, on January 27, 2003, the State charged Campbell with Battery, a class C felony, and Aggravated Battery as a class B felony under different cause numbers. Trial by jury was held under the various cause numbers from June 2, 2003, through June 10, 2003. The State did, however, dismiss one of the battery counts on the first day of trial.

In the end, Campbell was convicted of two counts of attempted murder, burglary resulting in bodily injury, a class A felony, aggravated battery, a class B felony, and battery as a class C felony. At the sentencing hearing that was conducted on July 10, 2003, Campbell was sentenced to forty-five year consecutive sentences on each count of attempted murder with five years of each sentence suspended. Campbell was also ordered to serve a forty-year sentence for burglary resulting in serious bodily injury to be served concurrently with the attempted murder sentences. The trial court then merged the battery and aggravated battery convictions with the attempted murder convictions, thus sentencing Campbell to an aggregate term of ninety years with ten of those years suspended.

Campbell v. State, 820 N.E.2d 711, 715–17 (Ind.Ct.App.2005).

On direct appeal, we held that double jeopardy principles required Campbell's conviction for Class A felony burglary resulting in bodily injury to be reduced to a Class B felony. Id. at 719. We rejected Campbell's arguments regarding an alleged Miranda violation, the sufficiency of the evidence, and the appropriateness of his sentence. Our supreme court granted transfer for the limited purpose of revising Campbell's aggregate sentence to seventy years via an unpublished order, and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.

Campbell subsequently filed a pro se PCR petition, which was amended four times. Among other claims, Campbell asserted that trial counsel was ineffective in two respects: (1) by engaging in improper voir dire during jury selection; and (2) by failing to object to a jury instruction regarding the definition of “intentionally” that was given during deliberations in response to a jury question requesting “the definition of intent.” Trial Tr. p. 993. The post-conviction court denied Campbell's petition, and he now appeals pro se.¹

Analysis

PCR proceedings are civil in nature, and a defendant bears the burden of establishing his or her claims by a preponderance of the evidence. Smith v. State, 822 N.E.2d 193, 198 (Ind.Ct.App.2005), trans. denied. A defendant appealing the denial of a PCR petition is challenging a negative judgment. Ward v. State, 969 N.E.2d 46, 51 (Ind.2012). Thus, to the extent this appeal turns on factual issues, Campbell must convince this court that the evidence as a whole leads unerringly and unmistakably to a decision opposite that reached by the PCR court. See id. “In other words, the defendant must convince this court that there is no way within the law that the court below could have reached the decision it did.” Smith, 822 N.E.2d at 198. We will not defer to the PCR court's legal conclusions, but we do accept its factual findings unless they are “clearly erroneous.” Id.

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must demonstrate both that his or her counsel's performance was deficient and that the petitioner was prejudiced by the deficient performance. Ward, 969 N.E.2d at 51 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). An attorney's performance is deficient if it falls below an objective standard of reasonableness based on prevailing professional norms. Id. Trial counsel is given considerable discretion in choosing strategy and tactics, and we accord deference to such decisions. Id. There is a strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance and exercised reasonable professional judgment in making all significant decisions. Id.

To meet the appropriate test for prejudice, the petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. Failure to satisfy either the performance or prejudice prong of Strickland will cause the claim to fail. Grinstead v. State, 845 N.E.2d 1027, 1031 (Ind.2006).

I. Voir Dire

Campbell contends trial counsel demonstrated ineffectiveness...