Campbell v. State
| Decision Date | 17 July 1972 |
| Docket Number | No. 772S96,772S96 |
| Citation | 284 N.E.2d 733,259 Ind. 55 |
| Parties | Dewain CAMPBELL et al., Appellants, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee. Harry F. KNOTTS, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee. |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
J. Conrad Maugans, Bayliff, Harrigan, Cord & Maugans, Kokomo, for appellants Campbell.
William A. Freihofer, James A. Schmidt, Indianapolis, for appellant Harry F. Knotts.
Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Thomas C. Mills, Mark Peden, Deputy Attys. Gen., for appellee Campbell.
Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Smith, Indianapolis, for appellee Knotts.
Thomas J. Young, Young & Young, Indianapolis, Le Roy K. Schultess, La Grange, Winslow Van Horne, Van Horne & Van Horne, Auburn, amicus curiae.
These cases were consolidated for the purposes of appeal. The facts in the two cases are somewhat different, but the outcome of both is dependent on the same question of law. The cases were decided separately in the Court of Appeals and were consolidated upon transfer to the Supreme Court. See opinions of the Appellant Court reported in 269 N.E.2d 765 and 274 N.E.2d 400.
In the Campbell case the appellants sustained personal injuries as a result of a head-on collision with an automobile traveling in appellant's lane of traffic upon a state-maintained highway. In their complaint appellants alleged negligence on the part of the state in that, after repaving the highway, it failed to: (a) mark with a yellow line the aforesaid State Road 221 where it is unsafe to pass; and (b) carelessly and negligently failed to install no passing signs along Road 221 or any other signs indicating to the traveling public that the public highway was unsafe for passing. Appellants also contended that the road as maintained constituted a nuisance.
In the Knotts case, the appellant sued the City of Indianapolis and the State of Indiana complaining that he sustained $100,000 in damages because of personal injuries incurred as the result of a fall on a crosswalk in Indianapolis. Appellant alleged that the injuries were the result of the negligent state of repair of the crosswalk. The fall occurred on the crosswalk at the intersection of Market Street and Monument Circle in Indianapolis. Monument Circle is a part of the state highway system and as such, the State of Indiana is responsible for its care and maintenance. In both Campbell and Knotts the state filed a motion to dismiss in the trial court alleging that there was no basis upon which relief could be granted premised upon the doctrine of sovereign immunity. In both cases the trial court sustained the motion and the Court of Appeals affirmed the rulings. Thereafter, both appellants petitioned this court for transfer to resolve the status of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in Indiana.
Both the Campbell and Knotts briefs raise the issue of whether the State of Indiana still recognizes the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity. The doctrine in its present form is a far cry from the original common law principle which exempted the sovereign from liability in court on the basis that 'the king could do no wrong.' The doctrine has been amended and eroded until the most that remains is an abstract and confusing principle which finds literally no continuity between jurisdictions. The purpose for which the doctrine was created has long since vanished and it is now time to finally reexamine the basis of the rule.
The original adoption of the doctrine in America following the Revolutionary War was founded on the premise that the new government was not financially secure enough to face claims of negligence in its governmental activities. Therefore, the English Common Law was adopted and the same immunity which protected the King from liability was adopted to protect the states. The first inroad in Indiana to limit the doctrine occurred in the case of City of Goshen v. Myers (1889), 119 Ind. 196, 21 N.E. 657, where the court held that:
Out of early forms of municipal liability grew the current governmental-proprietary standard which has been applied to the state and its subdivisions. This is in essence a court-made distinction as to the types of activities which governmental bodies perform, created to ameliorate the harshness of total governmental immunity. It is generally held that if a governmental body is negligent in performing a proprietary function, it will be liable for its negligence; while, if its activity is classified as governmental, the defense of sovereign immunity shall apply.
Exactly what constitutes a proprietary function as opposed to a governmental function has never been clearly enunciated by the courts, and this failure to establish a criteria has led to the generally confused state of the bench and bar in the application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Deciding on useful guidelines between rather obscure, whimsical notions enunciated by the appellate courts throughout the country has caused enormous conflicts in the courts in the past decade. However, the fact that the doctrine is beyond the scope of explicit definition has not halted its application. In the case of Flowers v. Board of Commissioners of County of Vanderburgh (1960), 240 Ind. 668, 168 N.E.2d 224; this court held, in regard to appellant recovering for injuries sustained in a skating rink operated by the county and for use of which admission was charged:
(I)t is the well-settled general rule throughout the United States that while a county is not liable, in the absence of statute for torts committed by it in the exercise of its governmental functions, it is nevertheless liable for torts committed in a proprietary capacity. Id. at 671, 168 N.E.2d 225.
As to civil cities, there is numerous authority in this state distinguishing governmental functions from proprietary functions and holding civil cities liable for torts occurring in the performance of proprietary functions. Id.
(W)e see no valid reason why the wellsettled rule holding civil cities liable for damages for torts occurring in the performance of their proprietary functions should not be applied to counties. Id. at 672, 168 N.E.2d 225.
Further erosion of the doctrine followed in the case of Brinkman v. City of Indianapolis (1967), 141 Ind.App. 662, 231 N.E.2d 169 transfer denied; in which the appellate court abolished the right of a city to claim the defense of sovereign immunity regardless of whether the nature of the act was governmental or proprietary. The court reasoned:
The governmental-proprietary rule, however, often produces legalistic distinctions that are only remotely related to the fundamental considerations of municipal tort responsibility. As for example, it does not seem to be good policy to permit the chance that a school building may or may not be producing rental income at the time, determine whether a victim may recover for a fall into a dark and unguarded basement stairway or elevator shaft. Neither does it seem to be good policy to find that a municipal garbage truck is engaged in a nonimmune proprietary function when enroute from a wash rack to the garage while the same truck is engaged in an immune governmental function when enroute to a garbage pickup. Id. at 665, 231 N.E.2d 171. The extent to which a municipal corporation should be held liable for torts committed by its officers or employees in the course of the employment is a perplexing problem that has been the subject of litigation on many occasions. There has been a general apprehension that fraud and excessive litigation would result in unbearable cost to the public in the event municipal corporations were treated as ordinary persons for purposes of tort liability. On the other hand the unfairness to the innocent victim of a principle of complete tort immunity and the social desirability of spreading the...
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