Campbell v. Sullins

• Decision Date: 19 June 2003
• Docket Number: Docket No. 243248.,Docket No. 236575
• Citation: 257 Mich. App. 179,667 N.W.2d 887
• Parties: Christopher J. CAMPBELL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Paul SULLINS and Patricia Sullins, Defendant-Appellees. Christopher J. Campbell, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Paul Sullins, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

667 N.W.2d 887

257 Mich. App. 179

Christopher J. CAMPBELL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Paul SULLINS and Patricia Sullins, Defendant-Appellees.

Christopher J. Campbell, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Paul Sullins, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket Nos. 236575, 243248.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

June 19, 2003.

Submitted June 11, 2003, at Detroit.

Decided June 19, 2003, at 9:00 a.m.

Released for Publication August 11, 2003.

Alexander V. Lyzohub, Livonia, for the plaintiff.

David L. Smith, China Township, for the defendant.

Before GRIFFIN, P.J., and MURPHY and JANSEN, JJ.

MURPHY, J.

In Docket No. 236575, plaintiff Christopher J. Campbell appeals as of right the trial court's order dismissing, pursuant to a directed verdict, his claims of violations of the Motor Vehicle Service and Repair Act (MVSRA), M.C.L. § 257.1301 et seq., and statutory conversion, M.C.L. § 600.2919a. Plaintiff also challenges a jury verdict of no cause of action with respect to his claims of breach of contract and fraud.¹ In Docket No. 243248, plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court's order awarding defendant Paul Sullins case-evaluation sanctions pursuant to MCR 2.403(O). We affirm.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL OVERVIEW

In 1996, plaintiff, a collector of vintage "muscle" cars, asked defendant, a self-described car "nut," to rebuild a "monstrous" engine for plaintiff's 1962 Chevrolet Bel-Air. The parties came to know each other several years earlier through attendance at car shows and through mutual friends who were also automobile enthusiasts. Defendant had previously performed tuneup and engine work on other vehicles owned by plaintiff without having any problems develop between the parties over the quality of his work.

Defendant agreed to rebuild the engine of the Bel-Air as requested by plaintiff, and the work was performed on evenings and weekends around defendant's full-time job. Defendant performed some of the work on the engine in the garage of his home. The parties communicated by phone, and plaintiff paid defendant throughout the project whenever defendant told plaintiff he needed money. After defendant finished rebuilding the engine, plaintiff drove the vehicle; however, the Bel-Air failed to operate properly. Defendant made a couple of attempts to repair the engine without success. Defendant asserted that the engine problems were the result of improper use of the Bel-Air by plaintiff, and plaintiff alleged that the engine problems were caused by defendant's failure to properly rebuild the engine and defendant's use of old and inferior parts.

In an effort to resolve the dispute between the parties regarding the problems with the Bel-Air, defendant agreed to replace the engine with another engine (replacement engine) that he had recently rebuilt and had planned to put into another vehicle. Defendant prepared and signed a document guaranteeing that the replacement engine was completely rebuilt and "fresh" with "zero miles." Plaintiff had the replacement engine inspected, and on the basis of this inspection, it was concluded that the engine was not properly rebuilt and that old and damaged parts had been used. Some work was completed on the replacement engine by a mechanic other than defendant, and the engine was placed in the Bel-Air. However, further engine problems developed with the Bel-Air. Defendant maintained that he had properly rebuilt the first engine and the replacement engine, and that he was forthright and honest throughout his dealings with plaintiff. Defendant kept and then disposed of the first engine; the parties disputed whether defendant had the right to do so.

The parts and machining for the work defendant performed on the vehicle totaled approximately $18,500, and defendant was paid $23,665 for his work. Defendant worked over two-hundred hours on the entire project. Defendant characterized the work he performed for plaintiff as a "favor."

Defendant was not a licensed mechanic at the time the work was performed for plaintiff, and, according to defendant, he did not own a facility registered with the state for motor-vehicle repair. Defendant maintained that he did not undertake the repairs as a business activity.

Plaintiff filed suit, alleging, in relevant part, violations of the MVSRA,² conversion, breach of contract, and fraud. As part of case evaluation under MCR 2.403, the action evaluated in favor of plaintiff in the amount of $12,000. The trial court denied plaintiff's motion for summary disposition with respect to the MVSRA claim, finding that reasonable minds could differ regarding whether defendant was operating a business engaged in performing repair services in violation of the MVSRA. During the jury trial, the trial court granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict on the MVSRA claim, ruling that the MVSRA only applies to facilities, and plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case that defendant operated a motor vehicle repair facility as defined in the act. The trial court also granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict in regard to the conversion claim, ruling that the facts did not support a claim of statutory conversion under M.C.L. § 600.2919a. The jury rendered a verdict of no cause of action in regards to the claims of breach of contract and fraud. Defendant moved for case-evaluation sanctions, requesting costs of $7,335 and attorney fees in the amount of $42,775. The trial court subsequently awarded defendant $29,767 in attorney fees and $2,613 in costs. Plaintiff appeals as of right.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Motor Vehicle Service and Repair Act

The first issue on appeal concerns the applicability of the MVSRA under the circumstances of this case. The issue arose below in the context of plaintiff's motion for summary disposition and defendant's motion for a directed verdict. Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in the rulings on both motions.

Statutory construction of the MVSRA presents a question of law that this Court reviews de novo. Crowe v. Detroit, 465 Mich. 1, 6, 631 N.W.2d 293 (2001). A ruling on a motion for summary disposition is also reviewed de novo. Spiek v. Dep't of Transportation, 456 Mich. 331, 337, 572 N.W.2d 201 (1998). In reviewing a ruling granting a directed verdict, we must view the testimony and all legitimate inferences from the testimony in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party to determine whether a prima facie case was established. Wilkinson v. Lee, 463 Mich. 388, 391, 617 N.W.2d 305 (2000). A directed verdict is appropriate only when no factual question exists regarding which reasonable minds could differ. Meagher v. Wayne State Univ., 222 Mich.App. 700, 708, 565 N.W.2d 401 (1997). Only if the evidence failed to establish a claim, as a matter of law, is a directed verdict appropriate. Wilkinson, supra at 391, 617 N.W.2d 305.

Plaintiff sought recovery pursuant to M.C.L. § 257.1331 and M.C.L. § 257.1336. MCL 257.1331 entitles a customer to recover any payments he made to an "unregistered facility" for the repair of a motor vehicle.³ MCL 257.1336 makes a "facility" liable for violations of the MVSRA or for engaging in an unfair or deceptive method, act, or practice.⁴ These two sections create separate and distinct causes of action. Hengartner v. Chet Swanson Sales, Inc., 132 Mich.App. 751, 755, 348 N.W.2d 15 (1984). "A person who directly or indirectly controls a motor vehicle repair facility or its employees, as well a general partner, officer, or director of the facility shall be jointly and severally liable among themselves for a violation of this act...." M.C.L. § 257.1337(2).

"Facility" is defined as a "motor vehicle repair facility." MCL 257.1302a(b). A "motor vehicle repair facility" is defined as "a place of business which engages in the business of performing or employing persons who perform maintenance, diagnosis, vehicle body work, or repair service on a motor vehicle for compensation...." M.C.L. § 257.1302(g). If a statute's language is clear and unambiguous, this Court assumes that the Legislature intended its plain meaning and the statute is enforced as written. Roberts v. Mecosta Co. Gen. Hosp., 466 Mich. 57, 63, 642 N.W.2d 663 (2002). "[W]hen the Legislature defines a term used in the statute, the Court must accept the statutory definition." Arrigo's Fleet Service, Inc. v. Michigan, 125 Mich.App. 790, 792, 337 N.W.2d 26 (1983).

Ultimately, on the basis of the plain language of the MVSRA, and regardless of whether plaintiff is proceeding under §§ 31, 36, or 37, it must be established that defendant was operating a motor vehicle repair facility. Therefore, pursuant to the statutory definition of a motor vehicle repair facility, plaintiff has a cause of action only if defendant was operating a "place of business" engaged in the business of performing automotive repair and maintenance services for compensation. MCL 257.1302(g).

There is no doubt that a person's home can be used as a "place of business," and there is no dispute that defendant used his home in the case at bar to perform the kind of automobile services, i.e., repair, maintenance, and diagnostic services, that the Legislature intended to be covered by the MVSRA. Because the evidence clearly established multiple violations of the MVSRA, assuming its applicability, the overriding question is whether defendant's home was a place of business where defendant was engaged in the business of automobile repair, or, minimally, whether there was a factual issue on the subject that required resolution by the jury. Our ultimate focus, as we see it, is on determining if defendant's actions in servicing plaintiff's Bel-Air was part of a "business" operation controlled by defendant.

We give undefined statutory terms their plain and ordinary meanings and may consult dictionary definitions. Koontz v. Ameritech Services, Inc., 466 Mich. 304, 312, 645 N.W.2d 34 (2002) (citations omitted). "Business" is not statutorily defined, but the dictionary definition is "an occupation,...