Campbell v. Superior Court In and For County of Maricopa, No. 1

• Court: Court of Appeals of Arizona
• Writing for the Court: PATTERSON; GARBARINO; KLEINSCHMIDT
• Citation: 924 P.2d 1045,186 Ariz. 526
• Parties: Donald CAMPBELL, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT of the State of Arizona, In and For the COUNTY OF MARICOPA, The Honorable Christopher Skelly, a judge thereof, Respondent Judge, The PHOENIX CITY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE, Real Party in Interest. 95-0333.
• Docket Number: CA-SA,No. 1
• Decision Date: 10 September 1996

Page 1045

924 P.2d 1045 186 Ariz. 526 Donald CAMPBELL, Petitioner,
v.
SUPERIOR COURT of the State of Arizona, In and For the COUNTY OF MARICOPA, The Honorable Christopher Skelly, a judge thereof, Respondent Judge,
The PHOENIX CITY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE, Real Party in Interest. No. 1 CA-SA 95-0333. Court of Appeals of Arizona,
Division 1, Department D. Sept. 10, 1996.

Page 1046

[186 Ariz. 527] Neal W. Bassett, Phoenix, for Petitioner.

Roderick G. McDougall, Phoenix City Attorney by Gregory L. Hanchett, Asst. City Prosecutor, Phoenix, for Real Party in Interest.

OPINION

PATTERSON, Judge.

This special action presents the question of whether the misdemeanor offense of cruelty to animals is a crime of moral turpitude which entitles Petitioner to a jury trial. We hold that it does not.

I. BACKGROUND

Donald Campbell ("Petitioner") put hot dogs containing rat poison on his front lawn. A neighbor's cat was subsequently poisoned after eating one. Petitioner later acknowledged that he set out the hot dogs because neighbors were allowing their dogs to defecate on his property, which was killing his grass. Petitioner was charged with cruelty to animals, a class 2 misdemeanor ¹. See Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. ("A.R.S.") § 13-2910(A)(1).

On May 10, 1995, Petitioner filed a motion for a jury trial, which the city magistrate denied after oral argument. Petitioner was later found guilty and placed on probation for one year. Petitioner appealed to Maricopa County Superior Court. The Respondent Judge affirmed the magistrate's determination that cruelty to animals is not a jury-eligible offense. This special action followed.

II. DISCUSSION

Special action review is an appropriate means to determine whether there is a right to a jury trial. Mungarro v. Riley, 170 Ariz. 589, 590, 826 P.2d 1215, 1216 (App.1991). We therefore accept jurisdiction.

Under the Sixth Amendment, "there is a category of petty crimes or offenses which is not subject to the ... jury trial provision...." Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 1453, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968). In determining whether one is nevertheless entitled to trial by jury for a particular petty offense, the United States Supreme Court has traditionally focused on "the nature of the offense and on whether it was triable by a jury at common law." Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, Nev., ² 489 U.S. 538, 541, 109 S.Ct. 1289, 1292, 103 L.Ed.2d 550 (1989) (citing District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63, 73, 51 S.Ct. 52, 53, 75 L.Ed. 177 (1930)); see also Schick v.

Page 1047

[186 Ariz. 528] United States, 195 U.S. 65, 24 S.Ct. 826, 49 L.Ed. 99 (1904).

The Arizona Supreme Court, however, has set forth three factors to determine whether an offense is non-petty under the Arizona Constitution, article 2, section 23: 1) whether the defendant is exposed to a severe penalty; 2) whether the act involves moral turpitude; and 3) whether the crime has traditionally merited a jury trial under common law. Rothweiler v. Superior Court of Pima County, 100 Ariz. 37, 42, 410 P.2d 479, 483 (1966). Any one of these factors has been held to warrant a jury trial. State v. Harrison, 164 Ariz. 316, 317, 792 P.2d 779, 780 (App.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1093, 111 S.Ct. 979, 112 L.Ed.2d 1064 (1991).

Petitioner does not argue that the charged offense resulted in severe penalties, or that it is an offense which has traditionally merited a jury trial. We therefore limit our analysis to the moral turpitude factor.

Arizona case law recognizes that "moral turpitude" includes the conduct of a "depraved and inherently base person," O'Neill v. Mangum, 103 Ariz. 484, 485, 445 P.2d 843, 844 (1968), actions which adversely reflect on the "honesty, integrity or personal values" of the actor, State ex rel. Dean v. Dolny, 161 Ariz. 297, 300 n. 3, 778 P.2d 1193, 1196 n. 3 (1989) (citing Ariz.R.S.Ct. 42, Rules of Professional Conduct, E.R. 8.4 (comment)), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1080, 110 S.Ct. 1136, 107 L.Ed.2d 1041 (1990), and conduct indicating a "readiness to do evil, that is, ... conduct which would support an inference of a witness's readiness to lie." Mungarro, 170 Ariz. at 590, 826 P.2d at 1216 (citing People v. Garrett, 195 Cal.App.3d 795, 241 Cal.Rptr. 10 (1987)).

Here, the charged offense does not reflect adversely upon the "honesty, integrity or personal values" of Petitioner. While we...