Campbell v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, CIVIL 15–1189CCC
Decision Date | 02 May 2018 |
Docket Number | CIVIL 15–1189CCC |
Citation | 311 F.Supp.3d 462 |
Parties | Lynn R. RIOS CAMPBELL, Plaintiff v. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE; Hon. Penny S. Pritzker, Secretary of Commerce, in her official capacity, Defendants |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
Israel Roldan–Gonzalez, Aguadilla, PR, for Plaintiff.
Fidel A. Sevillano–Del–Rio, United States Attorneys Office, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.
STATEMENT OF REASONS IN SUPPORT OF AMENDED ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO RULE 12 (B)(6) (D.E. 45) AND AMENDED JUDGMENT (D.E. 46)
After defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (d.e. 19) was considered as a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a plausible claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the Court entered on March 29, 2018 its Order (d.e. 42)1 dismissing the Second Amended Complaint. Judgment was entered that same date (d.e. 43).2 The Court noted that a Statement of Reasons would follow. This is said Statement of Reasons.
We briefly reiterate the standard applicable when reviewing motions to dismiss. To survive such a motion, a complaint must comport with the minimal requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Although Rule 8(a)(2) requires only "a short plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," Iqbal requires "factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949, commonly referred to as an inference of liability. This involves a two-step process. First, conclusory statements must be disregarded, and, second, the remaining factual assertions must, when read together, make a plausible, not merely possible, case for relief. Id. at 1949–50. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, will not suffice. Id. The complaint must be dismissed "where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct ...." Id. at 1950.
The Second Amended Complaint filed by plaintiff Lynn R. Ríos Campbell on December 23, 2015 (d.e. 15–1) invokes the provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. It alleges that plaintiff was subjected to a hostile work environment on the basis of his national origin or that he was subjected to retaliatory harassment (Second Amended Complaint, paragraphs 1 and 2). Rios–Campbell seeks compensatory damages arising from the national origin discrimination to which he was allegedly subjected. Although not included as defendants in the caption of the Second Amended Complaint, the thrust of plaintiff's allegations are aimed at his first-level supervisor, defendant Harold Radonski and his second-level supervisor, co-defendant Tracy Dunn, at the Southeast Enforcement Division of the Office of Legal Enforcement of the National Marine Fisheries (NMFS) in Puerto Rico. Both Radonski and Dunn are identified at paragraphs 14 and 15 of the Second Amended Complaint being as defendants of "American national origin."
The list of general allegations at paragraph 18(a) through (u)1 is devoid of any factual contents. The following are examples of allegations which do not point to actions by any specific defendant that could even be taken as intimating misconduct on their part based on a discriminatory animus:
Paragraph 19 purportedly provides specific instances of discrimination and harassment which one would expect would fill the factual vacuum of the preceding paragraph 18(A) through (U) allegations. The specific instances of discrimination and harassment announced in paragraph 19 are described at paragraphs 20 through 111, pages 6 though 26.
Having reviewed these, the Court finds that plaintiff Ríos Campbell contrived a log of gripes and disjointed events, spanning six (6) years, mostly based on emails exchanged at the workplace. At best, they point to disagreements, brushes or tensions in Ríos Campbell's relationship with supervisors Radonski and Dunn and with non-party agent Kenneth Henline at the Office of Legal Enforcement (OLE) of the National Marine Fisheries (NMF) in Puerto Rico. These are scattered and fragmented allegations of actions or inactions imputed to plaintiff's two supervisors. Despite their numerosity, none furnish a factual basis that would allow the Court to draw a reasonable inference that defendants discriminated against plaintiff because of his national origin: Puerto Rican.
The following are samples of such instances of alleged discrimination and harassment due to national origin set forth in allegations 19 thru 111 of his Second Amended Complaint (d.e. 15–1):
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