Campbell v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.

Citation272 F.Supp.2d 1276
Decision Date21 July 2003
Docket NumberNo. 01-CV-866-H(J).,01-CV-866-H(J).
PartiesPhyllis CAMPBELL, Plaintiff, v. WAL-MART STORES, INC., and Wanda Nixon Defendants.
CourtUnited States District Courts. 10th Circuit. Northern District of Oklahoma

Marthanda J Beckworth, Gregory D Nellis, Atkinson Haskins Nellis Holeman, Phipps Brittingham & Gladd, Tulsa, OK, for Phyllis Campbell, plaintiff.

Thomas Dunn Robertson, Karen Marie Grundy, John Edward Harper, Jr, Catherine W Hoopert, Nichols Wolfe Stamper Nally & Fallis Inc, Tulsa, OK, for Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., a foreign corporation, Wanda Nixon, an individual, defendants.

ORDER

HOLMES, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on the Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge Sam A. Joyner (Docket No. 70), which recommends that the Court deny Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 39). On July 10, 2003, Defendants filed Defendants' Motion To Set Aside Report and Recommendation Of Magistrate, And To Grant Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment (Docket No. 76), which the Court construes as an objection to the report and recommendation pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b).1 Plaintiff submitted a brief in support of the report and recommendation (Docket No. 76).2

When a party objects to the report and recommendation of a Magistrate Judge, Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in pertinent part that:

[t]he district judge to whom the case is assigned shall make a de novo determination upon the record, or after additional evidence, of any portion of the magistrate judge's disposition to which specific written objection has been made in accordance with this rule. The district judge may accept, reject, or modify the recommendation decision, receive further evidence, or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b).

The Court has carefully reviewed the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, the objection by the Defendants, and the record. The Court finds that the Report and Recommendation denying Defendants' motion for summary judgment should be, and is hereby, adopted. Accordingly, the Motion For Summary Judgment of Defendants Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. and Wanda Nixon (Docket No. 39) is hereby denied, and Defendant's objection to the Report and Recommendation (Docket No. 76) is hereby overruled.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

                TABLE OF CONTENTS
                I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY ...................................................1281
                 II. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS ...........................................1282
                     A. STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT .....................................1282
                     B. AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT ("ADA") ...........................1283
                III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND ...................................................1283
                 IV. DISPUTE IN REGARD TO MATERIAL FACTS IN THIS CASE
                PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT ..........................................1285
                     A. THE ARGUMENTS AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND ..............................1285
                        1. CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANT WAL-MART FOR UNLAWFUL
                DISCRIMINATION AND WRONGFUL TERMINATION
                UNDER THE ADA .................................................1285
                         (A) REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION .....................................1286
                             (1) REFUSAL OR FAILURE TO PROVIDE REASONABLE
                ACCOMMODATION ...........................................1286
                             (2) FAILURE OF PLAINTIFF TO REQUEST A REASONABLE
                ACCOMMODATION AS A DEFENSE ..............................1287
                             (3) NO REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION REQUIRED
                DEFENSE .................................................1290
                         (B) HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT .....................................1292
                         (C) TERMINATION OF PLAINTIFF DUE TO HER
                DISABILITY ..................................................1294
                             (1) LEGITIMATE REASON FOR TERMINATION
                DEFENSE VERSUS PRETEXT ..................................1294
                             (2) DEFENDANT'S ALLEGATION THAT PLAINTIFF IS
                ATTEMPTING TO CREATE A "SHAM" ISSUE OF
                MATERIAL FACT ...........................................1300
                         2. SUPPLEMENTAL STATE LAW CLAIMS AGAINST
                DEFENDANT NIXON .............................................1302
                            (A) INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS ..............1302
                            (B) NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS ................1303
                  V. RECOMMENDATION .......................................................1303
                  VI. OBJECTIONS ..........................................................1304
                
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

JOYNER, United States Magistrate Judge.

Defendants, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. ("Wal-Mart") and Wanda Nixon ("Nixon"), filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and Brief in Support on March 10, 2003. [Doc. No. 39]. In response to Defendants' Motion, Plaintiff Phyllis Campbell ("Campbell" or "Plaintiff") filed Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on April 9, 2003. [Doc. No. 47]. Defendants subsequently submitted their Summary Judgment Reply Brief on April 21, 2003. [Doc. No. 50]. Defendants also filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority May 1, 2003. [Doc. No. 55]. By minute order dated April 18, 2003, the District Court referred the Motion for Summary Judgment to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for Report and Recommendation. [Doc. No. 59]. The undersigned held a hearing on the motion on June 24, 2003. Plaintiff appears by and through her attorneys Marthanda J. Beckworth and Gregory D. Nellis. Defendants appear by and through their attorneys Thomas D. Robertson and Karen Grundy.

In considering a motion for summary judgment, the United States Magistrate Judge will construe the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, which is the Plaintiff. Having heard the arguments of counsel, having reviewed the pleadings in the case, and having reviewed the parties' briefs and exhibits, the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge recommends that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment be DENIED. [Doc. No. 39]. The undersigned additionally finds Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's claim against Wanda Nixon for negligent infliction of emotional distress MOOT based on the representation of Plaintiff's counsel at the hearing on June 24, 2003 that this claim is withdrawn.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff filed a Complaint on November 27, 2001. [Doc. No. 1]. Plaintiff subsequently filed an Amended Complaint January 10, 2002, asserting claims against Defendant Wal-Mart for unlawful discrimination and wrongful termination, pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), and supplemental state law claims, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, against Defendant Nixon for intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress.1 [Doc. No. 4]. Defendant Wal-Mart filed its Answer on February 19, 2002. [Doc. No. 10]. Defendant Nixon separately filed her Answer February 19, 2002. [Doc. No. 11]. On March 10, 2003. Defendants Wal-Mart and Nixon filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. [Doc. No. 39]. Plaintiff filed her Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment April 9, 2003. [Doc. No. 47]. Defendants thereafter submitted their Summary Judgment Reply Brief April 21, 2003. [Doc. No. 50]. Defendants filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority May 1, 2003. [Doc. No. 55]. The Motion for Summary Judgment was referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for Report and Recommendation by minute order dated April 18, 2003. [Doc. No. 59].

II. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS
A. STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 56 is appropriate where "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Windon Third Oil & Gas v. FDIC, 805 F.2d 342 (10th Cir.1986); Concrete Works of Colo., Inc. v. City & County of Denver, 36 F.3d 1513, 1517 (10th Cir.1994).

The plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548. "[T]he burden on the moving party may be discharged by `showing' — that is, pointing out to the district court — that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case." Id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548. See also Comm. for the First Amendment v. Campbell, 962 F.2d 1517 (10th Cir.1992).

To survive a motion for summary judgment, the nonmovant "must establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact...." Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). "By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The substantive law determines which facts are material. Id. The nonmovant "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus., 475 U.S. at 585, 106 S.Ct. 1348. Unless the moving party can demonstrate entitlement to summary judgment, it must be denied. Norton v. Liddel, 620 F.2d 1375, 1381 (10th Cir.1980).

In Comm. for the First Amendment v. Campbell, 962 F.2d 1517 (10th Cir.1992), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals summarized the standard for summary judgment, stating:

Summary judgment is appropriate if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party...

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