Camper v. Manning
| Decision Date | 27 June 2011 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 2:11cv157 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
| Parties | JOHN C. CAMPER, et al, Plaintiffs, v. CELESTE C. MANNING, et al, Defendants. |
Before the Court is Defendant Celeste C. Manning's, individually and as Attorney-in-Fact for Donald Clarke, Deceased ("Attorney-in-Fact"), Motion to Dismiss Count I of the Complaint, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6); and Defendant Celeste C. Manning's, individually and as Executrix for the Estate of Donald Clarke ("Executrix"), Motion to Dismiss Count II of the Complaint, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). These matters have been fully briefed and are now ripe for judicial determination. For the reasons stated herein, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Count I of the Complaint pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part and Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Count II of the Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is DENIED.
This case involves a dispute over the management and execution of assets of the estate of Donald Clarke ("Mr. Clarke"). On June 14, 2004, Mr. Clarke established a revocable inter vivostrust, entitled The Donald Clarke Family Trust, and executed his Last Will and Testament. See Compl. Exs. B, C. The trust instrument for The Donald Clarke Family Trust identified the beneficiaries of the trust as Mr. Clarke's deceased wife Claudine S. Camper's ("Mrs. Camper") daughter, Celeste C. Manning ("Defendant"), and the children of Mrs. Camper's two deceased children, Jennifer C. Smith and Thomas B. Camper. The children of Mrs. Camper's deceased children comprise the Plaintiffs in this case. The trust instrument also listed Defendant as Trustee and directed Defendant to accumulate the income and retain the principal of the trust during Mr. Clarke's lifetime. Compl. Ex. C Art. 2. Mr. Clarke's Last Will and Testament listed Defendant as Executrix of Mr. Clarke's estate and directed that all the rest and residue of Mr. Clarke's estate be poured over into The Donald Clarke Family Trust and disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the trust instrument. Compl. Ex. B, at 2. Under the trust instrument, upon Mr. Clarke's death, the Trustee was to distribute the remaining principal, along with any accumulated income as follows: two thirds (2/3) to Defendant; and one third (1/3) to Plaintiffs in equal shares. Compl. Ex. C Art. 3 § A.1.
On August 1,2005, Mr. Clarke executed a Durable Power of Attorney (the "DPOA") under Section 32A-8 of the North Carolina General Statutes, listing Defendant as his Attorney-in-Fact and giving her the power to act in his name, place and stead in any way in which Mr. Clarke, himself, could act. Compl. Ex. H Art. 1, Art. II § B. Among other powers, the DPOA granted Defendant the power to make gifts of Mr. Clarke's real or personal property or interest in such property to the living issue of Ms. Camper and their spouses, "in amounts not to exceed the annual exclusion for federal gift tax purposes at the time the gifts are made." Compl. Ex. H Art. 1 § B.10. According to Plaintiffs, Defendant Attorney-in-Fact made gifts to herself from Mr.Clarke's estate totaling $11,000, $297,000, $192,000, $192,000, $192,000, and $208,000, in 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009, respectively. Compl. ¶¶ 51-56. However, the annual exclusion amount for federal gift taxes was only $11,000, $11,000, $12,000, $12,000, $12,000, and $13,000, for 2004, 2005, 2006,2007, 2008, and 2009, respectively. Compl. ¶¶ 51-56. Accordingly, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant, acting as Attorney-in-Fact, breached her fiduciary duty to adhere to the express terms of the DPOA and Plaintiffs seek for the Court to order Defendant to pay to The Donald Clarke Family Trust, the full value of the excess gifts, plus pre and post-judgment interest. Compl. ¶¶ 60-61. Plaintiffs also allege that Defendant, as Executrix, had a fiduciary duty to recover all debts due to the estate, including the value of the excess gifts. Compl. ¶ 63. Accordingly, Plaintiffs request that Defendant be ordered to pay the estate of Donald Clarke the value of the excess gifts, plus pre and post-judgment interest, to be distributed to The Donald Clarke Family Trust. Compl. ¶ 65.
Mr. Clarke died as a resident of Greensboro, North Carolina on March 12, 2009, at which time The Donald Clarke Family Trust terminated and its assets became distributable. Compl. ¶¶ 12, 32; Ex. C Art. 3 § A. 1. On March 11, 2011, Plaintiffs filed this suit against Defendant, Celeste C. Manning, individually and in her capacity as Attorney-in-Fact for Donald Clarke, Deceased, alleging a cause of action for Breach of Contract and Fiduciary Duty; and against Defendant, Celeste C. Manning, individually and in her capacity as Executrix for the Estate of Donald Clarke, alleging a cause of action for Breach of Fiduciary Duty. On May 2, 2011, Defendant filed the instant Motion to Dismiss Count I of the Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), and for failure to state a claim, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6); and the instant Motion to Dismiss Count II of the Complaint for failure to state a claim, pursuantto Rule 12(b)(6). Plaintiffs filed an Opposition to Defendant's Motions on May 13,2011. Defendant filed a Reply in Support of her Motions on May 16, 2011 and requested a hearing on these matters on May 23, 2011. The Court dispenses with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the Court and argument would not aid in the decisional process. Accordingly, these matters are now ripe for judicial determination.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) provides for the dismissal of an action if the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Unless a matter involves an area over which federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction,1 a plaintiff may bring suit in federal court only if the matter involves a federal question arising "under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States," 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or if "the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interests and costs, and is between citizens of different States." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). Furthermore, Article III of the United States Constitution limits a federal court's jurisdiction to actual "cases or controversies." U.S. Const, art. III, § 2, cl. 1. The requirement encompasses the doctrine of standing. The standing requirement is met where the following three components are satisfied: "(1) the plaintiff must allege that he or she suffered an actual or threatened injury that is not conjectural or hypothetical, (2) the injury must be fairly traceable to the challenged conduct; and (3) a favorable decision must be likely to redress theinjury." Miller v. Brown, 462 F.3d 312, 316 (4th Cir. 2006) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)). Further, "[t]he party attempting to invoke federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing standing." Id.
The Court assumes that all factual allegations in the complaint are true if it is contended that a complaint simply fails to allege facts upon which subject matter jurisdiction can be based. Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d 1213, 1219 (4th Cir. 1982). However, if the factual basis for jurisdiction is challenged, the plaintiff has the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction. Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991). To determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists, the reviewing court may consider evidence outside the pleadings, such as affidavits or depositions, Adams, 697 F.2d at 1219, or whatever other evidence has been submitted on the issues. GTE South Inc. v. Morrison, 957 F. Supp. 800, 803 (E.D. Va. 1997). A party moving for dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction should prevail only if material jurisdictional facts are not in dispute and moving party is entitled to prevail as matter of law. Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co., 945 F.2d at 768.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of actions that fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. For purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, courts may only rely upon the complaint's allegations and those documents attached as exhibits or incorporated by reference. See Simons v. Montgomery Cnty. Police Officers, 762 F.2d 30, 31 (4th Cir. 1985). Courts will favorably construe the allegations of the complainant and assume that the facts alleged in the complaint are true. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, a court "need not accept the legal conclusions drawn from the facts," nor "accept astrue unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments." Eastern Shore Mkts., Inc., v. J.D. Assocs. Ltd P'ship, 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2000). A complaint need not contain "detailed factual allegations" in order to survive a motion to dismiss, but the complaint must incorporate "enough facts to state a belief that is plausible on its face." See BellAtl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2008). This plausibility standard does not equate to a probability requirement, but it entails more than a mere possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-50 (2009). Accordingly, the plausibility standard requires a plaintiff to articulate facts that, when accepted as true, demonstrate that the plaintiff has stated a claim that makes it plausible he is entitled to relief. Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (...
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