Camper v. United States
| Decision Date | 01 October 2021 |
| Docket Number | 13-cr-378 (AJN),19-cv-2000 (AJN) |
| Parties | Louis Camper, a/ka/ Gauneem Abdullah, Petitioner, v. United States of America, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
On July 29, 2014, Louis Camper, [1] following a guilty plea, was sentenced to 188 months' imprisonment for a conspiracy to distribute heroin and cocaine and a conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(b)(1)(B) and 18 U.S.C. § 1951. The Second Circuit affirmed his conviction and sentence on direct appeal. Mr Camper on February 27, 2019, filed a petition to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. While that petition was pending, the Court on September 4, 2020, granted Mr Camper's motion for compassionate release in light of the extraordinary and compelling circumstances presented by the COVID-19 pandemic. Mr. Camper is presently serving a 48-month term of supervised release.
For the reasons that follow, the Court DENIES Mr. Camper's petition.
In April 2013, federal agents arrested Mr. Camper and four others in a sting operation at the site of a planned robbery of drug dealers. Presentence Report (“PSR”) ¶¶ 12-18, 23-25. Mr. Camper's role was to plan the robbery, while others were to physically carry it out. PSR ¶¶ 18, 22-27; Sentencing Tr. at 27-28, Dkt. No. 98. The Government charged Mr. Camper and his co-defendants with conspiracy to distribute cocaine and heroin, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)-(b), 846 (Count One), conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (Count Two), and use of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, i.e., the Hobbs Act robbery conspiracy, Id. § 924(c) (Count Three). Dkt. No. 13.[2] Mr. Camper pled guilty to conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery and conspiracy to distribute cocaine and heroin pursuant to a plea agreement. Plea Tr., Dkt. No. 60. That plea agreement included a provision waiving Mr. Camper's right to appeal his conviction and any custodial sentence “that is 235 months or below.” Id. at 18; see also Plea Agreement at 7 (). In return, the Government dismissed Count Three of the indictment, violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Sentencing Tr. at 33. The Court sentenced Mr. Camper on July 29, 2014, to 188 months' imprisonment, the bottom of the Sentencing Guidelines range. Id. at 30; Judgment, Dkt. No. 97.
Notwithstanding his plea agreement, Mr. Camper, acting pro se, noticed an appeal of his sentence on August 12, 2014. Dkt. Nos. 101, 104. The Second Circuit, having appointed Mr. Camper counsel, granted counsel's motion to withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), dismissed the appeal, and summarily affirmed Mr. Camper's conviction. Dkt. No. 121.
On February 27, 2019, Mr. Camper, acting pro se, filed a motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Petition, Dkt. No. 158; Pet'r Br., Dkt. No. 159. The Government filed an answer on May 31, 2019. Gov't Br., No. 19-CV-2000, Dkt. No. 6. Mr. Camper then filed a reply. Reply Br., No. 19-CV-2000, Dkt. No. 7. On October 18, 2019, Mr. Camper filed a motion to withdraw his petition to substitute it with a new motion to vacate his sentence under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(a), Dkt. No. 163, which he then filed on October 24, 2019, Dkt. No. 164. The Court on November 1, 2019, denied Mr. Camper's motion to substitute because his Rule 35(a) motion was untimely. Dkt. No. 165 at 1 (). The Court therefore denied Mr. Camper's motion to withdraw his § 2255 motion, subject to Mr. Camper's subsequent request that it be withdrawn. Id. at 2. Mr. Camper did not again request to withdraw his § 2255 motion.
On August 3, 2020, Mr. Camper, with the assistance of counsel, filed a motion for compassionate release. Dkt. No. 178. The Court on September 2, 2020, granted that motion in light of Mr. Camper's particular vulnerability to COVID-19, which the Court found amounted to extraordinary and compelling circumstances for release. Dkt. No. 184. Mr. Camper is now serving a 48-month term of supervised release following the end of his imprisonment. Dkt. No. 186.
Most of Mr. Camper's claims for relief rest on a claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at his plea proceedings, during sentencing, and on direct appeal. The Sixth Amendment entitles criminal defendants to effective assistance from an attorney at critical stages of their case, including guilty pleas and sentencing. Gonzalez v. United States, 722 F.3d 118, 130 (2d Cir. 2013). To make an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, “a defendant must show:
(1) that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” United States v. Brown, 623 F.3d 104, 112 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). That is, a petitioner must show that “[t]he likelihood of a different result [was] substantial, not just conceivable.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 112 (2011). These two requirements are the reasonableness and prejudice prongs respectively.
In evaluating the reasonableness of counsel's representation, the Court is “mindful of the diversity of the bar and the variety of approaches effective attorneys might employ when dealing with a particular set of facts.” Parisi v. United States, 529 F.3d 134, 141 (2d Cir. 2008). As a result, the Court is “highly deferential” and applies a “strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Simple disagreement with counsel's chosen strategy, especially with the benefit of hindsight, is insufficient to support an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See United States v. Sanchez, 790 F.2d 245, 253 (2d Cir. 1986) (“A defendant . . . may not claim ineffective assistance of counsel merely because in hindsight he thinks counsel's trial strategy was inadequate.”).
Mr. Camper's petition raises three claims. First, Mr. Camper argues that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that, despite the appeal waiver, Mr. Camper retained the right to challenge the statutes of his conviction as unconstitutional. Pet'r Br. at 4-8. Specifically, Mr. Camper asked his counsel to argue that his conviction under the Hobbs Act violated the Due Process Clause. Id. at 6. Second, making the argument that his appellate counsel did not make on appeal, Mr. Camper contends that his conviction for conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery was unconstitutional, citing Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S.Ct. 1204 (2018), and Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015). Pet'r Br. at 8-14. Third, Mr. Camper argues that he was improperly designated as a career offender under the Sentencing Guidelines. Id. at 14-15. Mr. Camper contends that this designation was erroneous at least in part because his Hobbs Act conviction was not a crime of violence. Id. at 18.
In his reply brief, Mr. Camper raised two new claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, arguing that counsel was constitutionally deficient during plea negotiations and in arguing his Sentencing Guidelines range. Reply Br. at 3-7.
Because the first and third claims in Mr. Camper's petition rely in large part on the merits of his second claim, the Court addresses that claim first. The Court next addresses Mr. Camper's sentencing claims, and then Mr. Camper's remaining ineffective-assistance claims. The Court concludes that none of Mr. Camper's claims justify vacating his sentence.[3]
Mr. Camper's due-process claim rests upon 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), which criminalizes the use or possession of a firearm “in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). A crime of violence is defined as a felony that either “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another, ” Id. § 924(c)(3)(A), or “that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense, ” Id. § 924(c)(3)(B). The first definition is referred to as the “elements clause” and the second definition is the “residual clause.” United States v. Davis, 139 S.Ct. 2319, 2324 (2019). In Davis, the Supreme Court held that § 924(c)(3)(B), the residual clause, is unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 2336. Following Davis, the Second Circuit held that conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery is no longer a “crime of violence” for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). United States v. Barrett, 937 F.3d 126, 127 (2d Cir. 2019).
Neither the Court's holding in Davis, which followed similar holdings in Johnson, 576 U.S. at 606, and Dimaya, 138 S.Ct. at 1223, nor the Second Circuit's holding in Barrett, provide any support for Mr Camper's petition. Simply put, Mr. Camper was not convicted for, or sentenced under, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). As explained, that count of the indictment was dismissed as part of Mr. Camper's plea agreement. As a consequence, Mr. Camper's sentence reflects only his plea for conspiracy to distribute cocaine and heroin and conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery. Judgment at 1. The fact that conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery is no longer a crime of violence under § 924(c) is irrelevant to Mr. Camper-it...
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