Campione v. Soden

Decision Date09 July 1997
Citation695 A.2d 1364,150 N.J. 163
PartiesFrank A. CAMPIONE, Plaintiff-Respondent and Cross-Appellant, v. Linda J. SODEN and Marcia Sacknowitz, Defendants, and Eric M. Jensen and Handex of New Jersey, Defendants-Appellants and Cross-Respondents.
CourtNew Jersey Supreme Court

Richard S. Hyland, Cherry Hill, argued the cause for appellants and cross-respondents (Montgomery, McCracken, Walker & Rhoads, attorneys; Mr. Hyland and Thomas J. Kenney, III, Mount Laurel, of counsel).

Michael D. Schottland, Freehold, argued the cause for respondent and cross-appellant (Schottland, Manning & Rosen, attorneys).

The opinion of the Court was delivered by

STEIN, J.

This appeal primarily concerns the allocation of fault and damages under the Comparative Negligence Act for injuries caused by successive automobile accidents, and the collateral issue whether a trial court that omitted, without objection by either party, one or more critical fact issues from the special verdict form submitted to the jury pursuant to Rule 4:39-1, may make factfindings concerning such omitted issues on the basis that the parties' right to a jury trial thereof has been waived.

I

This is a double-impact motor vehicle accident case. On June 15, 1989, at approximately 11:15 p.m., plaintiff Frank Campione was a passenger in an automobile owned and operated by Linda Soden. The pair was traveling south on Route 9 in Sayreville. It had been a rainy day; the roads were wet.

Soden stopped at a red light. Her car was in the far left lane. Several cars were stopped in front of Soden's vehicle. Almost immediately after the light turned green, Soden's vehicle was rear-ended by a light-duty pickup truck. The truck, driven by Eric Jensen, was owned by Jensen's employer, Handex of New Jersey.

Jensen testified that a car in front of Soden had stopped suddenly, causing Soden to brake abruptly. Soden denied Jensen's allegation. The police report of the accident, however, indicated that Soden told the police that a car had stopped short in front of her vehicle, causing her to brake quickly. Soden testified that the reporting officer had not written what she told him.

After the accident, neither Soden nor Jensen moved their car from the left lane. Instead, they activated their emergency flashers and left their vehicles in the roadway. Jensen, Soden, and Campione all exited the vehicles to inspect for damage. Campione was standing between the Jensen and Soden vehicles when Jensen's truck was rear-ended by a car owned and operated by Marcia Sacknowitz. Both Campione and Soden estimated the time between the two collisions to be less than a minute.

The force of the impact propelled Jensen's truck into Soden's vehicle. Campione's legs were crushed between the two bumpers and he was launched several feet into the air. He landed on his back and head in the middle lane of the highway. Campione was diagnosed with fractures of both legs, a cervical sprain, a lumbar sprain, a concussion, and a broken tooth, which became infected. He was hospitalized for thirty-one days. After his release, he returned to live with his parents, who cared for him during his rehabilitation. Campione participated in physical therapy to regain the full use of his legs, and received psychiatric treatment.

Campione filed suit against Soden, Jensen, Handex, and Sacknowitz. Soden filed an answer and a crossclaim for contribution and indemnification. Jensen and Handex (Jensen/Handex) filed an answer and crossclaims. Sacknowitz filed only an answer.

At trial, Campione's psychiatrist testified that Campione suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder, secondary depression, and chronic pain. His symptoms included insomnia, nightmares, and sexual dysfunction. The psychiatrist also testified that Campione's injuries, and the resultant limitations on his physical abilities, deprived him of self-esteem. Although Campione had been "a real bon vivant " prior to the accident, his post-accident activities and relationships were markedly restricted.

The psychiatrist also testified that Campione's loss of income had contributed to his psychiatric difficulties. Campione testified that his once-busy labor relations firm, Campione Associates, had become practically "nonexistent" after the accident. In response, Jensen/Handex sought to introduce Campione's tax returns to refute a perceived inference that Campione Associates had been a successful venture. Rejecting Jensen/Handex's argument, the trial court noted that Campione had neither attempted to value the business nor sought to assert a lost earnings or lost wage claim.

The accident reconstruction expert hired by Jensen/Handex established that Sacknowitz had an unobstructed line of vision for 255 feet from the stopped vehicles. The expert's unrefuted testimony also indicated that Sacknowitz's vehicle was traveling at approximately 18.5 miles per hour at the time of impact. Sacknowitz testified that she did not see the stopped Jensen/Handex vehicle until she was fifty feet away. She claimed that she was traveling forty-five miles per hour when she hit the brakes, causing her vehicle to slide into Jensen/Handex's truck.

Concerning Campione's physical injuries, it was conceded at trial that Campione's leg fractures were exclusively attributable to the second impact between Sacknowitz and Jensen/Handex. Although the cause of Campione's leg injuries was undisputed, the source of his back, neck, periodontal, and psychological injuries was vigorously contested. Jensen/Handex argued that all of those injuries were caused by the second impact, while Campione contended that the injuries could not be apportioned between the two accidents. Campione produced medical testimony from a psychiatrist, an orthopedic surgeon, and a dentist, none of whom could pinpoint the source of Campione's injuries. The psychiatrist testified that the psychological injuries could have been caused by the first impact, the second impact, or a combination of both. The orthopedic surgeon and the dentist opined that Campione's substantial neck, back, and dental injuries, respectively, could have been caused by either the first or the second collision. Counsel for Jensen/Handex argued that the first impact was mild; that both Soden and Campione had testified that neither the Jensen/Handex vehicle nor the Soden vehicle had suffered damage due to the first impact; and that immediately after the first accident Campione stated that he was not in pain. Counsel also highlighted testimony from Campione's medical experts that suggested that Campione's injuries were caused by the second, more serious impact.

During the trial, the trial court informed counsel of its intention to require the jury to return a special verdict pursuant to Rule 4:39-1, and submitted to counsel a draft of the special verdict form containing the proposed written questions to be answered by the jury. That draft was discussed by the court and counsel at a charge conference at the close of trial. Jensen/Handex's counsel asserts that at the charge conference counsel expressed concern about ambiguities in the draft special verdict form, which the trial court agreed to address. The final version of the special verdict form prepared by the trial court was apparently submitted to counsel only after the court began charging the jury. The court interrupted its charge midway to hear exceptions to the charge and to review the verdict sheet with counsel. Counsel for both Campione and Jensen/Handex suggested changes to the jury interrogatories. After counsel's commentary, the court gave clarifying instructions concerning specific interrogatories on the verdict form and then concluded its charge.

At the close of evidence, the trial court found as a matter of law that Jensen/Handex was solely responsible for the first impact, dismissing the claims against Soden. At the conclusion of the eleven-day trial, the jury found: (1) Jensen's negligence was a proximate cause of Campione's injuries from the first impact; (2) the first impact was a proximate cause of the second impact; (3) Soden and Jensen were not negligent for failing to remove their vehicles from the roadway; (4) Sacknowitz was 95% responsible for the second impact, and Campione was 5% responsible for his injuries sustained as a result of that impact; (5) no losses occurred exclusively as a result of the first impact; (6) $300,000 in damages occurred exclusively as a result of the second impact; and (7) $450,000 in damages could not be allocated as between the first and second impacts. Notably, the jury interrogatory specifically permitted the jury not to allocate damages between the two impacts.

After the jury was dismissed, counsel and the court noticed two omissions from the final jury verdict form. The verdict form failed to inquire about the percentage of fault attributable to the negligence of Jensen/Handex as a proximate cause of the second impact. Additionally, the form did not adequately inform the jury of its responsibility to attempt to allocate all damages between the two accidents.

The court requested briefs from the parties on how to mold the verdict to accommodate those omissions. As a result of the omitted interrogatories, the trial court, pursuant to Rule 4:39-1 made findings of fact in respect of the omitted issues. The trial court observed that the first impact, for which it had already determined Jensen/Handex to be 100% responsible, was the primary cause of the second impact, noting that the second impact would not have occurred were it not for Jensen/Handex's negligence in striking the rear of the Soden vehicle. Accordingly, the court set aside the jury's findings with regard to the second impact and replaced them with its own, holding Jensen/Handex 60%, Sacknowitz 35%, and Campione 5% responsible for the second collision. The court also allocated 70% of the unallocated damages to Jensen/Handex and 30% to...

To continue reading

Request your trial
15 cases
  • In the matter of Curriden, Case No. 05-38352/JHW (Bankr.N.J. 9/6/2007)
    • United States
    • U.S. Bankruptcy Court — District of New Jersey
    • September 6, 2007
    ...compare the fault of all parties whose negligence was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries.'" Id. (quoting Campione v. Soden, 150 N.J. 163, 177, 695 A.2d 1364 (1997)). In Gennari, the New Jersey Supreme Court applied the Comparative Negligence Act to a recovery under the Consumer F......
  • Bowers v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey
    • March 6, 2002
    ...Where apportionment is not possible, the percentage contribution must be divided equally among all defendants. See Campione v. Soden, 150 N.J. 163, 184, 695 A.2d 1364 (1997). At common law, however, co-conspirators or other defendants who acted in concert to commit the same harm were each j......
  • Glassman v. Friedel
    • United States
    • New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division
    • December 3, 2020
    ...of negligence").The Court has acknowledged the relevance of the CNA's principles to situations involving successive tortfeasors. In Campione v. Soden, the plaintiff was a passenger in a car rear-ended by one driven by the defendant Jensen. 150 N.J. 163, 168, 695 A.2d 1364 (1997). While the ......
  • New Gold Equities Corp. v. Jaffe Spindler Co.
    • United States
    • New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division
    • February 28, 2018
    ...was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries." LaBracio, 340 N.J. Super. at 164, 773 A.2d 1209 (citing Campione v. Soden, 150 N.J. 163, 177, 695 A.2d 1364 (1997) ). Then, "the trier of fact" must find "[t]he extent, in the form of a percentage, of each party's negligence or fault[ ]" w......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles
  • Restatement for Joint and Several Liability Under CERCLA After Burlington Northern
    • United States
    • Environmental Law Reporter No. 39-11, November 2009
    • November 1, 2009
    ...on available evidence, even if that evidence is not of the same quality that would ordinarily be required. See also Campione v. Soden, 695 A.2d 1364 (N.J. 1997); Reed v. Chrysler Corp. 494 N.W.2d 224, 228 (Iowa 1992); Hillrichs v. Avco, 478 N.W.2d 70, 75 (Iowa 1991). Restatement (Third) of ......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT