Campise v. Hamilton

Decision Date09 August 1974
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 72-H-239.
Citation382 F. Supp. 172
PartiesVincin CAMPISE v. J. W. HAMILTON, Sheriff, Brazos County, et al.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

R. Earl Lord, Houston, Tex., for plaintiff.

Steven C. Oaks, Houston, Tex., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

SINGLETON, District Judge.

This is a civil rights suit brought by a state prisoner against his jailor under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff seeks damages upon the claim that defendant, under color of law, deprived him of his constitutionally protected right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment. This court has jurisdiction under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1343. When originally filed,1 the suit was treated as a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Plaintiff then filed an amended complaint in which he asserted two causes of action. The first is the cause of action presently before the court. The second cause of action sought release from his present confinement in the Texas Department of Corrections upon a writ of habeas corpus.

By memorandum and order dated October 3, 1972, the habeas corpus action was dismissed on the ground that his state remedies had not been exhausted, plaintiff's pending motion to enjoin defendants from censoring mail between plaintiff and his attorney was granted, and the civil Rights portion of the complaint was set for trial.

In the meantime plaintiff, following the procedure set out in Article 11.07, Vernon's Ann.C.C.P., filed his application for writ of habeas corpus in the state convicting court. Before the trial was had in this court on the civil rights claim, the state court held an evidentiary hearing on the habeas claim. The attorneys for both sides stipulated that the testimony that would be offered in this court would for the most part duplicate that already adduced in the state habeas hearing. The statement of facts in the habeas hearing was introduced into evidence in this trial. Therefore, in addition to the evidence produced at the civil rights trial, the findings and conclusions of this court are based on the admissions of the parties and the testimony adduced at the state habeas hearing.

FACTS

Plaintiff was arrested on February 14, 1970, on the felony charge of murder. He was placed in the custody of defendant, J. W. Hamilton, then sheriff of Brazos County. Plaintiff remained in the custody of Sheriff Hamilton and in the Brazos County jail until the date of his trial on July 29, 1970. On at least one occasion plaintiff was placed in the solitary cell of the Brazos County jail for a period of at least three days.2

Plaintiff contends that his solitary confinement as administered by the Brazos County jail constituted cruel and unusual punishment as forbidden by the eighth amendment. For the reasons that follow, this court determines that the conditions of plaintiff's solitary confinement were so violative of basic concepts of decency as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment.

THE SOLITARY CELL

The physical conditions of the cell are for the most part uncontroverted. The cell is made completely of concrete. It measures six feet by six feet with a ceiling eight feet high. There are two small windows in the one door. There is one light, controlled from the outside. There is no commode, no washbasin, no bed, no chairs, no running water. There is nothing in the cell but a small drain in the middle of the floor through which body waste can be flushed with the aid of a water hose which is operated by trusties. The prisoner is made to sleep on the concrete floor. If requested, he may be supplied a blanket.

As far as personal hygiene is concerned, the prisoner is given no soap, no towel, no toilet paper. Neither is he given toothbrush, toothpaste, or comb. There are no facilities for shaving. There are no facilities for cleaning either himself or his cell. According to the testimony of the sheriff and his two deputies, the body-waste hole in the cell was flushed out with the aid of a water hose "when needed." Although the person confined in the cell did not have access to the water hose, he could request that a trusty flush the hole. Asked how often the cell was washed, Deputy Sheriff Yeager answered that as a general practice "it depended upon the individual who was in there. If the sanitary condition got bad, in a deteriorated state, it was washed up."3 Plaintiff testified that the cell was never cleaned while he was confined there, that the floor was filthy, and that he had to lay around and smell his own waste. Two other inmates of the jail, one who spent twenty-nine consecutive days in solitary and the other who spent three, testified that the solitary cell was never cleaned while they were confined there.

As a general practice, a person in solitary in the Brazos County jail at the time of the plaintiff's confinement was placed on a restricted diet of but one meal a day, at noon, and a plastic gallon jug of water. Plaintiff's once-a-day meal consisted of a baloney sandwich.4

Plaintiff alleges he suffered a severe weight loss as a result of his "starvation diet." He alleges that he weighed approximately 160 pounds when he was placed in the county jail and that he weighed 130 pounds when transferred to the Texas Department of Corrections. Although two pictures of plaintiff that were introduced into evidence (one of which was taken thirty days prior to his confinement, but is only a bust picture) appear to corroborate his allegation, the evidence is insufficient in light of an "identification card" maintained by the sheriff that reflected plaintiff weighed but 120 pounds upon admission to the county jail.

There is no question whether the sheriff had actual knowledge of the deplorable conditions of the solitary cell. There is an abundance of evidence from which to conclude that he did and that he personally directed his deputies to place plaintiff in the cell.5

Sheriff Hamilton testified that plaintiff was placed in solitary confinement as a disciplinary action for possession of hacksaw blades and for banging on the bars of his cell with a tin cup. The sheriff received a verbal report of the jail infraction from one of his deputies and directed that plaintiff be placed in solitary confinement for three days.

To be sure, jail officials have the duty to maintain discipline among inmates and to that end may impose reasonable sanctions as punishment. And, it appears that the present pulse of society condones solitary confinement as a mode of punishment and the courts hold that solitary confinement is not per se cruel and unusual. E. G., Novak v. Beto, 453 F.2d 661, 665 (5th Cir. 1971). Solitary confinement may, however, result in cruel and unusual punishment if carried out in a manner that is "inhuman" and "violative of the basic concepts of human decency." Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 78 S.Ct. 590, 2 L. Ed.2d 630 (1958).

The eighth amendment prohibits "cruel and unusual punishment."6 Since Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 82 S.Ct. 1417, 8 L.Ed.2d 758 (1962), the amendment's prohibition is applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. An intended purpose of the Civil Rights Act was to enforce the provisions of the fourteenth amendment. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492, 496 (1961). 42 U.S.C. 19837 gives a remedy — an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding — to people deprived of constitutional rights, privileges, and immunities by an official's abuse of his position.

Although the framers of the Constitution gave no precise definition to the phrase "cruel and unusual punishment," it has been said that "ordinarily the terms imply something inhuman and barbarous, — torture and the like." Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 368, 30 S.Ct. 544, 549, 54 L.Ed. 793 (1910). The basic concept underlying the eighth amendment has been articulated as "nothing less than the dignity of man. While the State has the power to punish, the Amendment stands to assure that this power be exercised within the limits of civilized standards." Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100, 78 S.Ct. 590, 597, 2 L.Ed.2d 630, 642 (1958). Noting that a "principle, to be vital, must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth," the Court held that the eighth amendment "is not fastened to the obsolete, but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice." Weems v. United States, supra, 217 U.S. at 373, 378, 30 S.Ct. at 551, 553.

In Novak v. Beto, 453 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1971), Judge Thornberry, cautious not to "run the risk of imposing our own personal moral code on a perhaps unready society," 453 F.2d at 665, carefully examined the cases which had previously concluded that certain prison conditions were so "base, inhuman and barbaric" that they violated the eighth amendment's prohibition.8 His analysis led him to the recognition that "there is a common thread that runs through all these cases," that thread being "the deprivation of basic elements of hygiene." 453 F.2d at 665. Basic elements of hygiene were nonexistent in the solitary cell at the Brazos County jail at the time of plaintiff's confinement.9

As a legal conclusion, this court finds that during the period of time that plaintiff was confined in the solitary cell in the Brazos County jail the general conditions of the cell and treatment of plaintiff were collectively so inhumane as to violate the plaintiff's eighth amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. The court finds the evidence insufficient, however, to prove that plaintiff was denied access to counsel, that he was denied an opportunity to post bond, or that he was denied adequate medical assistance.

Defendant moved for an instructed verdict regarding liability arguing first that since the basis of this suit involves "internal discipline" the federal court should not inquire into...

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