Campo Machining Co., Inc. v. Local Lodge No. 1926 of Intern. Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers

Decision Date18 May 1976
Docket NumberNo. 75-1284,75-1284
Parties92 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2513, 78 Lab.Cas. P 11,422 CAMPO MACHINING CO., INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LOCAL LODGE NO. 1926 OF the INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF the MACHINISTS AND AEROSPACE WORKERS, and Clyde T. Ozbun, Defendants-Appellants.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

Richard L. Barnes of Kothe, Nichols & Wolfe, Inc., Tulsa, Okl., for plaintiff-appellee.

Catherine C. Harris of Youngdahl & Larrison, Little Rock, Ark., for defendants-appellants.

Before BREITENSTEIN, BARRETT and DOYLE, Circuit Judges.

WILLIAM E. DOYLE, Circuit Judge.

Appellant seeks reversal of a judgment which set aside and refused to enforce the award of an arbitrator in a labor dispute.

On March 14, 1973, the plaintiff-appellee employer, Campo Machining Company, Inc., and the defendant-appellant union, Local 1926 of the Int'l Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, entered into a collective bargaining agreement which in part provided that an employee could be discharged, demoted, or otherwise disciplined only with "good and sufficient cause"; disputes between the union and the company over the existence of "good and sufficient cause" were to be handled through a grievance procedure, the final step of which was submission to "final and binding" arbitration.

The agreement also contained authorization for the company to promulgate "reasonable" shop rules not in conflict with other contract provisions. Pursuant thereto, the company did issue a set of rules prescribing specific "penalty points" for various shop offenses and set forth consequences of accumulating a specific number of points. One of these rules, Rule 26, stated, in effect, that a single incident of leaving the plant during the workshift without permission would be punished by discharge.

The arbitrator's undisputed findings are as follows: The employee, defendant-appellant Clyde Ozbun, who is the central figure in this controversy, had been a machinist for 30 years and an employee of Campo Machining since 1971. Around the time of the incident, Ozbun, rated a "Machinist A" at Campo, had been worried about his superiors' view of his job competency and efficiency. On the morning of Friday, November 9, 1973, Ozbun was working on what he understood to be a "hot" order. Realizing that he needed certain cutters, he approached the plant manager to ask about them. (He had asked to have these sharpened several weeks before.) The plant manager said the cutters had not been sharpened and told Ozbun to look around the plant and find some others to do the job. Ozbun exchanged some words with the plant manager and departed the plant, not to return until the following Monday to find that he had been fired.

The arbitrator found that Ozbun did breach Rule 26 and that the rule was "reasonable." He continued that although "there would be justification for discipline," there was not "good and sufficient cause" for a discharge. He ordered Ozbun reinstated with back pay, subject to the company's right to suspend him for no more than one month from the date of the offense. 1

The company filed a declaratory judgment action in U.S. District Court pursuant to Section 301 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. Section 185, seeking to have the arbitrator's award set aside. The union sought in its answer enforcement of the award. The trial court granted summary judgment for the company, stating that the arbitrator had exceeded his authority under the collective bargaining agreement. Having found Rule 26 reasonable on its face, the court added that the arbitrator had no authority to find that a specific application of the rule would be unreasonable. We disagree with this conclusion.

Our first inquiry is the scope of judicial review of arbitration awards. The Supreme Court, in United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960), has set out guidelines for review. The Court held that so long as the arbitrator interprets and applies the collective bargaining agreement and his award is rooted in the agreement, the arbitrator's decision on the merits is final 2 and not reviewable.

It is the arbitrator's construction which was bargained for; and so far as the arbitrator's decision concerns the construction of the contract, the courts have no business overruling him because their interpretation of the contract is different from his. Id. at 599, 80 S.Ct. at 1362, 4 L.Ed.2d at 1429.

Thus, the scope of review is very narrow. The court is not entitled to judge the award independently. So long as the arbitrator reasons from his factual findings to his conclusion, and limits himself to interpreting and applying the agreement, a court must give great deference to the arbitrator's decision. 3 E. g., Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North America, Local 195 v. Cross Brothers Meat Packers, Inc., 518 F.2d 1113 (3d Cir. 1975); Cannon v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 524 F.2d 290, 294-296 (7th Cir. 1975); Local 103 of the International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers v. RCA Corporation, 516 F.2d 1336 (3d Cir. 1975).

A review of the arbitrator's decision reveals that he did confine himself to interpreting and applying the collective bargaining agreement. Before reaching the merits, the arbitrator considered the status and applicability of the Shop Rules. He found that although they were adopted in conformity with the procedures set out in the agreement and were generally reasonable, he concluded that they were not incorporated into the agreement. He noted further that both the union and employees were aware of the rules and had had an opportunity to contest their reasonableness.

Upon reaching the merits, the arbitrator recognized that Ozbun's leaving was an offense requiring disciplinary action. However, he held that discharge was not warranted under the particular circumstances. He took into account the "tension" between a literal application of Rule 26 and the provision of the agreement that employees be discharged only for "good and sufficient cause" and said:

Even in the face of literal mandates management expects to exercise judgment in given cases after all of the relevant facts are known. This exercise of judgment is subject to the limitations of the Agreement requiring disciplinary and discharge decisions to be for good and sufficient cause. The grievance and arbitration provisions specifically provide that these...

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    ...of the award. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Local 27, 864 F.2d 940, 944 (1st Cir.1988); Campo Machining Co., Inc. v. Local Lodge No. 1926, 536 F.2d 330, 332 (Okla.1976). 'The fundamental purpose of arbitration is to preclude court intervention into the merits of disputes when arbitration has bee......
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    ...of the award. Georgia–Pacific Corp. v. Local 27, 864 F.2d 940, 944 (1st Cir.1988); Campo Machining Co., Inc. v. Local Lodge No. 1926, 536 F.2d 330, 332 (Okla.1976). ‘The fundamental purpose of arbitration is to preclude court intervention into the merits of disputes when arbitration has bee......
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