O'CAMPO v. Hardisty, 15535.
| Decision Date | 31 December 1958 |
| Docket Number | No. 15535.,15535. |
| Citation | 262 F.2d 621 |
| Parties | Florence O'CAMPO, Appellant, v. Edna HARDISTY, Paul H. Wright, R. V. Rushford, N. P. Hughes and N. Drakulich, Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Reuben G. Lenske, Lenske, Spiegel, Spiegel, Martindale & Bloom, Portland, Or., for appellant.
C. E. Luckey, U. S. Atty., Edward J. Georgeff, Asst. U. S. Atty., Portland, Or., for appellees.
Before FEE and HAMLIN, Circuit Judges, and BOWEN, District Judge.
Florence O'Campo, appellant herein, filed an action for damages in the Circuit Court of the State of Oregon for the County of Multnomah against five persons, one of whom was a former employee of appellant and the other four were employees of the Internal Revenue Service. She alleged that the five defendants conspired to ruin and destroy plaintiff's reputation as a nursing home operator and to breach the contracts which plaintiff had with various patients or persons who had contracted with plaintiff for the care of wards or relatives. The four government employees, served individually on June 20, 1956, joined in the removal of the case to the District Court of the United States for the District of Oregon (28 U.S.C. § 1442).1 On July 6, 1956, these defendants filed a motion to make more definite and certain, and also filed a request for admission of facts by the plaintiff in accordance with Rule 36, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. They also filed upon the same day a notice requiring the plaintiff to answer certain specified interrogatories within fifteen days from the date of service thereof in accordance with Rule 33, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff did not answer the request for admissions within the required time, or at all, and neither did she answer the interrogatories within the required time, or at all. Thereafter, the same four defendants on July 19, 1956, moved for summary judgment; and on August 31, 1956, the same four defendants filed a motion to dismiss because plaintiff had failed to answer the interrogatories within the time provided under Rule 33. A hearing was had upon these motions and after argument by both sides, summary judgment was granted by the Court and entered on November 12, 1956.
Thereafter, following a denial of a motion for rehearing, plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
The main charge in plaintiff's complaint was contained in paragraphs 5 and 6 thereof, which are set out below.2
The request for admissions filed by the four defendants, which was never answered by plaintiff, set forth generally the history of the dealings of the plaintiff with the Internal Revenue Service for a failure to pay withholding taxes in 1951 and 1955. It set forth that these taxes were delinquent, that negotiations had been had with the plaintiff by the Internal Revenue Service since 1952, that during those years and up to June, 1956, the plaintiff had failed to pay her taxes and had failed to keep her promises to pay those taxes made to the Internal Revenue Service, and that she also failed to answer requests to appear at the Internal Revenue Office for further conferences. The request for admissions further contained a statement that on June 6, 1956, plaintiff was informed by one of the four defendants that a seizure of plaintiff's real property would be made on June 11, 1956.3 It also set forth that on June 14, 1956, while the taxes remained unpaid, that a notice of seizure and sale was served by the Internal Revenue Service covering the plaintiff's real property upon Eighty-second Avenue in Portland where plaintiff operated a rest home on the premises and where a number of aged and bedridden patients were confined. It further set forth, however, that the premises were not padlocked by the Internal Revenue Agents. Finally, it set forth that on June 15, 1956, at 4:45 p. m. plaintiff appeared at the Internal Revenue Office in Portland, Oregon, paid her delinquent taxes, and that thereafter certificates of release of federal tax liens were filed of record by the Internal Revenue Service.
The request for admissions also contained the following first two paragraphs:
Under Rule 36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure the plaintiff, by her failure to answer the request for admissions as required by the rule, admitted the truth of all the matters contained in the request for admissions.
We may assume that it was Appellee's intention to determine from Appellant's answer to its request for admissions what acts of the agents the Appellant considered oppressive or outside the scope of their authority. Appellant, by her failure to answer or otherwise deny this request for admissions, admitted the facts stated therein.
There was also before the Court in the pleadings the verified petition of Appellees for removal of the case from the state court to the United States District Court which, inter alia, contained the statements as follows:
No denial was ever filed by the plaintiff of the facts set forth in this petition, and no motion to remand the case was ever filed by the plaintiff.
Rule 56(c), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that a summary judgment shall be rendered "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions * * show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
We hold that the unanswered request for admissions resulted in Appellant's admitting that at all times the Appellees were acting solely under color of their offices and by the authority of the Internal Revenue Laws. The unanswered verified petition lends even more weight to the soundness of the District Court's ruling. By failing to answer or otherwise deny the facts alleged in the petition, the Appellant admitted that the rest home was not padlocked,4 and that the proper authorities were notified to assure that arrangements would be made for the care of the patients therein.5
It has been held that governmental officers are not generally liable for their discretionary acts done pursuant to their lawful authority. See Cooper v. O'Connor, 1938, 69 App.D.C. 100, 99 F.2d 135, at page 139, 118 A.L.R. 1440, where the Court said:
It is, of course, much simpler to state the rule than to apply it. A delicate balancing of interests is apparent. Every application of the rule involves a determination of whether the...
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Beauregard v. Wingard
...838 as to second cause of action; Gregoire v. Biddle, 2 Cir., 1949, 177 F.2d 579, 581 as to second cause of action; O'Campo v. Hardisty, 9 Cir., 1958, 262 F.2d 621, 625 for an interesting discussion as to immunity of U. S. Internal Revenue Agents; see also concurring opinion of Mr. Justice ......
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Hoffman v. Halden
...are generally not liable for their discretionary acts done pursuant to their lawful authority. A panel of this court in O'Campo v. Hardisty, 9 Cir., 1958, 262 F.2d 621, recently cited and followed Cooper v. O'Connor, supra. This case was originally a state action against Internal Revenue ag......
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...16 S.Ct. 631, 40 L.Ed. 780; Bershad v. Wood, 9 Cir., 1961, 290 F.2d 714; Hoffman v. Halden, 9 Cir., 1959, 268 F.2d 280; O'Campo v. Hardisty, 9 Cir., 1958, 262 F.2d 621; Byrd v. Sexton, 8 Cir., 1960, 277 F.2d 418; Papagianakis v. The Samos, 4 Cir., 1950, 186 F.2d 257; Gregoire v. Biddle, 2 C......
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City of Greenwood, Mississippi v. Peacock Peacock v. City of Greenwood, Mississippi, s. 471
...is granted, the removed case is concluded at that stage, as a case of misuse of a state prosecution has been made out. Cf. O'Campo v. Hardisty, 9 Cir., 262 F.2d 621; De Busk v. Harvin, 5 Cir., 212 F.2d 143. In other words, the result of removal is not the transfer of the trial from the stat......