Campos v. Coleman

• Citation: 319 Conn. 36,123 A.3d 854
• Decision Date: 06 October 2015
• Docket Number: No. 19195.,19195.
• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut
• Parties: Gregoria CAMPOS, Administratrix (Estate of Jose Mauricio Campos), et al. v. Robert E. COLEMAN et al.

319 Conn. 36

123 A.3d 854

Gregoria CAMPOS, Administratrix (Estate of Jose Mauricio Campos), et al.

v.Robert E. COLEMAN et al.

No. 19195.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Oct. 21, 2014.

Decided Oct. 6, 2015.

John W. Mills, New Haven, for the appellants (plaintiff Mauricio Campos et al.).

Kenneth H. Naide, with whom, on the brief, was John A. Kiernan, pro hac vice, for the appellees (defendants).

ROGERS, C.J., and PALMER, ZARELLA, EVELEIGH, McDONALD, ESPINOSA and ROBINSON, Js.

Opinion

PALMER, J.

In Mendillo v. Board of Education, 246 Conn. 456, 461, 495–96, 717 A.2d 1177 (1998), this court declined to recognize a derivative cause of action for loss of parental consortium by a minor child.¹ The primary issue presented by this case is whether we should overrule this holding in Mendillo. We conclude that we should.

The named plaintiff, Gregoria Campos, in her individual capacity and in her capacity as administratrix of the estate of her late husband, Jose Mauricio Campos (decedent), and the Campos' three children, Mauricio Campos, Jose Ernesto Campos and Jose Eduardo Campos (Campos children), brought this action against the defendants, Robert E. Coleman and LQ Management, LLC (LQ Management).² The plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that Coleman negligently had caused the decedent's death and included claims for the Campos children's loss of parental consortium.³ The defendants filed a motion to strike the loss of parental consortium claims in accordance with Mendillo, which the trial court granted. Thereafter, a jury returned a verdict for the decedent's estate on the wrongful death claim and for Gregoria Campos on her loss of spousal consortium claim, and the trial court rendered judgment in accordance with the verdict. The Campos children then filed this appeal, contending that we should overrule Mendillo and allow them to pursue their claims for loss of parental consortium. We agree with the Campos children that we should recognize a cause of action by a minor child for loss of parental consortium resulting from an injury to a parent, subject to certain limitations.

The facts underlying this case are tragic but straightforward. On September 15, 2008, the decedent was riding a bicycle on Westfield Street in the town of West Haven when he was struck by a motor vehicle that was owned by LQ Management and operated by Coleman. The decedent suffered severe injuries, resulting in his death three days later, on September 18, 2008.

Thereafter, Gregoria Campos and the Campos children filed an eight count complaint alleging, inter alia, that (1) Coleman had negligently caused the decedent's death, thereby entitling the decedent's estate to damages under the wrongful death statute, General Statutes § 52–555, (2) LQ Management also was liable for Coleman's negligence because it owned the motor vehicle that Coleman was driving and Coleman had been driving it with LQ Management's permission, (3) Gregoria Campos was entitled to damages for loss of spousal consortium, and (4) the Campos children were entitled to damages for loss of parental consortium. The defendants filed a motion to strike the claims for loss of parental consortium, as well as other claims not relevant to this appeal, and the trial court granted the motion as to the loss of parental consortium claims. The complaint was amended in accordance with that ruling.

The jury ultimately returned a verdict for the decedent's estate on the wrongful death claim and awarded damages in the amount of $2,948,000. In addition, the jury found that Gregoria Campos was entitled to damages for loss of spousal consortium in the amount of $1 million. The jury also found that the decedent had been 42 percent contributorily negligent and, accordingly, reduced the damages for the wrongful death claim to $1,709,840 and the damages for the loss of spousal consortium claim to $580,000. The trial court rendered judgment in accordance with the jury verdict and rendered judgment thereon.

This appeal by the Campos children followed.⁴ They claim that, although the trial court correctly determined that, in light of this court's decision in Mendillo, the defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on their claims for loss of parental consortium, Mendillo was incorrectly decided, and we therefore should overrule it.⁵ We are persuaded by this claim.

In Mendillo, a majority of this court ultimately declined to recognize a minor child's claim for loss of parental consortium resulting from a tortfeasor's conduct. Mendillo v. Board of Education, supra, 246 Conn. at 461, 495–96, 717 A.2d 1177. At the outset of our analysis of this issue in Mendillo, however, we candidly acknowledged that “many of [the arguments in support of recognizing such a claim] have considerable appeal....” Id., at 480, 717 A.2d 1177. In particular, we recognized that a minor child who, by virtue of a tortfeasor's conduct, has been deprived of the love and companionship of a parent “has suffered a genuine injury, and a serious one.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 478, 717 A.2d 1177. Underscoring this point, we explained that “we [had] recently reaffirmed that it is our state's public policy to promote the welfare of the family, and that the interest of children in not being dislocated from the emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association ... with the parent has constitutional significance.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., quoting Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 310, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998).

We also acknowledged the argument made by the plaintiffs in Mendillo that “permitting compensation for loss of parental consortium will enable the emotionally injured child to secure the therapy that will, in turn, help to heal the wounds

caused by his or her loss.... [N]ot only will the minor child benefit, but society will also benefit if the child is able to function without emotional handicap. This may well offset any increase in insurance premiums.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mendillo v. Board of Education, supra, 246 Conn. at 479, 717 A.2d 1177.

As we further observed in Mendillo , another argument favoring the recognition of a derivative cause of action for parental consortium is the fact that this court already had recognized analogous causes of action for loss of spousal consortium; Hopson v. St. Mary's Hospital, 176 Conn. 485, 493, 408 A.2d 260 (1979) ; and bystander emotional distress.

Clohessy v. Bachelor, 237 Conn. 31, 49, 675 A.2d 852 (1996). With respect to the former, we acknowledged the view, as expressed by the Supreme Court of Washington, that “permitting a husband or wife but not children to recover for loss of consortium erroneously suggests that an adult is more likely to suffer emotional injury than a child”; (internal quotation marks omitted) Mendillo v. Board of Education,

supra, 246 Conn. at 480, 717 A.2d 1177, quoting Ueland v. Pengo Hydra–Pull Corp., 103 Wash.2d 131, 134, 691 P.2d 190 (1984) ; and noted the contention of the plaintiffs in Mendillo that, following our recognition of a derivative cause of action for spousal consortium in Hopson, the “logical [next step] from ... Hopson ['s] protect [ion of] the emotional or sentimental aspects of the husband-wife relationship [is the] protection of the similar aspects of the parent-child relationship.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mendillo v. Board of Education, supra, at 479, 717 A.2d 1177. With respect to our decision in Clohessy, “in which we recognized, for the first time and subject to certain limitations, that a parent and a sibling can recover damages for the emotional anguish they had [suffered] by witnessing the parent's other young child being fatally injured by the defendant's negligence”; id.; we noted the argument of the plaintiffs in Mendillo that the “[a]pplication of this court's logic in Clohessy to the question of whether a tortfeasor's liability should extend to ... loss of [parental] consortium properly instructs that the time is similarly ripe to recognize such cause of action in this state.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

Finally, we observed what the plaintiffs in Mendillo had “characterize[d] as the emerging national trend recognizing ... [a] cause of action [for loss of parental consortium]....” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 479–80, 717 A.2d 1177. We further observed that, in support of this argument, the plaintiffs in Mendillo had “cite[d] to a number of jurisdictions that have, since 1980, recognized a cause of action for loss of parental consortium.” Id., at 480, 717 A.2d 1177.

Notwithstanding the conceded force of these arguments, we ultimately declined to recognize a cause of action for parental consortium, “primarily on the basis of: [1] the fact that recognition of the cause of action would require arbitrary limitations; [2] the additional economic burden that recognition would impose on the general public; [3] the uncertainty that recognition would yield significant social benefits; [4] the substantial risk of double recovery; and [5] the weight of judicial authority.” Id., at 485, 717 A.2d 1177. Justice Berdon issued a concurring and dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Katz, in which he disputed these points in maintaining that the court should adopt this cause of action because its benefits outweighed its costs. See id., at 514, 717 A.2d 1177 (Berdon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

Upon reconsideration of the relevant considerations, including the five factors that this court found determinative in Mendillo, we now agree with the concurring and dissenting opinion in Mendillo that the public policy factors favoring recognition of a cause of action for loss of parental consortium outweigh those factors disfavoring recognition. More specifically, we agree that the unique emotional attachment between parents and children, the importance of ensuring the continuity of the critically important services that parents provide to their...