Campos v. Fresno Deputy Sheriff's Ass'n
| Decision Date | 11 November 2020 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 1:18-CV-1660 AWI EPG |
| Parties | CESAR CAMPOS, LATANA M. CHANDAVONG, NENG HER, HUGH YANG, and NICK VANG, Plaintiffs v. FRESNO DEPUTY SHERIFF'S ASSOCIATION, COUNTY OF FRESNO, and XAVIER BECERRA in his official capacity as Attorney General of California, Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS, ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE, AND ORDER VACATING HEARING
This is a dispute between current and former members of the Fresno County Sheriff's Department regarding the collection of union dues by Fresno County. On February 27, 2020, the Court granted a Rule 12(b)(1) motion and two Rule 12(b)(6) motions and dismissed the First Amended Complaint.1 See Doc. No. 54. In response, Plaintiffs filed the Second Amended Complaint ("SAC"), which is the operative complaint. In general, Plaintiffs' contend that their union Defendant Fresno Deputy Sheriff's Association ("FDSA"), and their employer Defendant Fresno County ("the County") have unconstitutionally refused to accept their resignations from the FDSA, which has resulted in the unconstitutional collection of dues, service fees, or vacation hours from their paychecks. Currently before the Court is the FDSA's combined Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. For the reasons that follow, the motion will be granted.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a claim may be dismissed because of the plaintiff's "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) may be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or on the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. See Mollett v. Netflix, Inc., 795 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 2015). In reviewing a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), all well-pleaded allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Kwan v. SanMedica, Int'l, 854 F.3d 1088, 1096 (9th Cir. 2017). However, complaints that offer no more than "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Johnson v. Federal Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 793 F.3d 1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 2015). The Court is "not required to accept as true allegations that contradict exhibits attached to the Complaint or matters properly subject to judicial notice, or allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences." Seven Arts Filmed Entm't, Ltd. v. Content Media Corp. PLC, 733 F.3d 1251, 1254 (9th Cir. 2013). To avoid a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Mollett, 795 F.3d at 1065. In assessing a motion to dismiss, courts may consider documents attached to the complaint, documents incorporated by reference in the complaint, or matters subject to judicial notice. In re NVIDIA Corp. Sec. Litig., 768 F.3d 1046, 1051 (9th Cir. 2014). If a motion to dismiss is granted, "[the] district court should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made . . . ." Ebner v. Fresh, Inc., 838 F.3d 958, 962 (9th Cir. 2016). However, leave to amend need not be granted if amendment would be futile or the plaintiff has failed to cure deficiencies despite repeated opportunities. Garmon v. County of L.A., 828 F.3d 837, 842 (9th Cir. 2016).
From the Complaint and the Court's Docket, Plaintiffs Cesar Campos ("Campos"), Latana Chandavong ("Chandavong"), and Nick Vang ("Vang") are Deputy Sheriffs in the Fresno CountySheriff's Department. Plaintiff Neng Her ("Her") is a Community Service Officer in the Fresno County Sheriff's Department, and Plaintiff Hugh Yang ("Yang") is a retired Bailiff Deputy Sheriff from the Fresno County Sheriff's Department. Yang retired in March 2019. Plaintiffs allege that they have "a right to resign [from] their union at any time." Despite this right, the FDSA unlawfully refuses to accept Plaintiffs' resignations. SAC ¶ 10.
Campos, Chandavong, Vang, and Yang each attempted to resign their membership with the FDSA. Campos and Yang attempted to do so in August 2018 following the Supreme Court's decision in Janus v. AFSCME, 138 S.Ct. 2448 (2018). Vang attempted to resign his membership in February 2020. Chandavong attempted to resign his membership in 2014 but was not permitted to do so until December 2016. From December 2016, the FDSA continued to take fair share service fees from Chandavong. When these Plaintiffs attempted to resign their FDSA membership, the FDSA refused to honor the resignations and continued to take dues from their paychecks. In each instance, the FDSA responded that the Plaintiffs' resignations were ineffective because they did not conform with Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU") Article 17. The MOU is an agreement between the County and the FDS. MOU Article 17 indicates that memberships may be resigned one month before the MOU expired. The County and the FDSA continued to deduct membership fees from Campos, Vang, and Yang and did not recognize their resignations.2 Plaintiffs allege the failure to immediately honor and implement their initial attempts to resign violate the First Amendment and the Supreme Court's rulings in Janus and Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
Campos, Vang, and Yang completed a "County of Fresno Employee Representative Authorization Card" ("ERA Card").3 The ERA Card reads: See Doc. No. 40-4; SAC ¶ 18. Item 10 is entitled "Status" and has three boxes to check, "New," "Cancel," and "Change"; Campos checked "New." Id. Item 11 is entitled "Deduction Options," and required an employee to check one of three boxes. Id. The three "deduction options" are: "I choose to become a member," "I choose NOT to become a member or pay a service fee," and "I elect to pay a service fee." Id. Campos, Vang, and Yang selected "I chose to become a member." On the back of the card is a paragraph that is entitled in bold type and all caps: "Important - Please Read The Following Paragraph Before Signing Below." Id. That paragraph reads: "I understand that, if I have opted to become a member, my signature below authorizes the deduction of any amounts voted for pursuant to the provisions of my organization's constitution or bylaws at a general membership meeting and certified by the President of the organization and this authorization shall remain in force and effect until the withdrawal period specified in the Memorandum of Understanding for my job class and after being rescinded by me on the proper card." Id. (underline in original).
Plaintiffs allege that the ERA Cards do not obligate them to remain in the FDSA until the withdrawal period specified in the existing MOU. This is because: (1) the ERA Card is not supported by consideration and thus, cannot be a contract; (2) the ERA Card does not purport to require Plaintiffs to maintain their membership in the union, rather, it authorized only the payment of money through payroll deductions; (3) the ERA Cards describe a MOU in existence at the time the cards were signed, they do not refer to withdrawal periods in a future MOU; and (4) the ERA cards do not satisfy Janus's requirement of a waiver of constitutional rights.
Additionally, Plaintiffs allege that the FDSA takes 5.7 hours of an employee's vacation time and transfers those hours to its president to enable him to conduct union-related business. In February 2016, the FDSA started taking vacation hours from Her, even though Her had not become an FDSA member. The County and the FDSA continue to divert these vacation hours even after Janus and have done so without Her's consent. The FDSA continues to take vacation hours from Campos, Chandavong, and Yang, despite their resignations from the FDSA and despite the FDSA recognizing that Chandavong was no longer an FDSA member post-Janus.
From the above allegations, SAC brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, and several state law torts, including conversion, trespass to chattels, replevin.
With respect to the first cause of action, the FDSA argues that Plaintiffs failed to follow this Court's instructions in the prior dismissal. Plaintiffs have not included factual allegations regarding the invalidity of consent or invalidity of the membership contract. Instead, the relevant allegations are simply legal conclusions. Further, Plaintiffs improperly rely on Janus as part of their argument that they can unilaterally drop their membership. This Court already concluded that Janus does not create a right to unilaterally drop membership when membership was voluntarily entered into. Additionally, there are no new allegations in the SAC that would bring the FDSA within the ambit of being a state actor.
With respect to the third cause of action regarding vacation hours, the FDSA argues that this claim is moot as to Her and Chandavong and fails to state a claim against the remaining Plaintiffs. First, as of the April 27, 2020 pay period, vacation hours are no longer deducted from non-FDSA members and all such previously deducted vacation hours have been restored to non-members retroactively to July 1, 2018 (i.e. immediately post-Janus). This moots the claims of Her and Chandavong. Second, Campos and Yang voluntarily joined the FDSA. Thus, they are not entitled to restoration of hours due to their contractual obligations to FDSA.
With respect to the fourth cause of action, FDSA argues...
To continue reading
Request your trial