Campos v. Fresno Deputy Sheriff's Ass'n
| Citation | 535 F.Supp.3d 913 |
| Decision Date | 21 April 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:18-CV-1660 AWI EPG |
| Parties | Cesar CAMPOS, Latana M. Chandavong, Neng Her, Hugh Yang, and Nick Vang, Plaintiffs v. FRESNO DEPUTY SHERIFF'S ASSOCIATION, County of Fresno, and Xavier Becerra in his official capacity as Attorney General of California, Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
Jonathan F. Mitchell, PHV, Pro Hac Vice, Mitchell Law, PLLC, Austin, TX, Talcott J. Franklin, PHV, Pro Hac Vice, Talcott Franklin P.C., Dallas, TX, Bradley A. Benbrook, Benbrook Law Group, Sacramento, CA, for Plaintiff Cesar Campos.
Jonathan F. Mitchell, PHV, Pro Hac Vice, Mitchell Law, PLLC, Austin, TX, Bradley A. Benbrook, Benbrook Law Group, Sacramento, CA, for Plaintiff Latana M. Chandavong.
Jonathan F. Mitchell, PHV, Mitchell Law, PLLC, Austin, TX, for Plaintiffs Neng Her, Hugh X. Yang, Nick Vang.
Monique Alonso, Messing Adam & Jasmine LLP, San Francisco, CA, Gary Marc Messing, Jason H. Jasmine, Messing Adam & Jasmine LLP, Sacramento, CA, for Defendant Fresno Deputy Sheriff's Association.
Monique Alonso, Messing Adam & Jasmine LLP, Natasha Saggar Sheth, California Department of Justice, San Francisco, CA, for Defendant Xavier Becerra.
Catherine Ellen Basham, Daniel Carl Cederborg, Fresno County Counsel's Office, Fresno, CA, for Defendant County of Fresno.
ORDER FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL BRIEFING AND ORDER SEVERING MATTER
This is a dispute between current and former members of the Fresno County Sheriff's Department regarding the collection of union dues and vacation hours by the County of Fresno ("the County") for the benefit of the Fresno Deputy Sheriff's Association ("FDSA"). Plaintiffs seek relief under state law theories and Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31 , 138 S.Ct. 2448 (2018) (" Janus "). The active complaint is the Second Amended Complaint ("SAC"). On November 12, 2020, the Court granted in part FDSA's Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6) combined motion to dismiss. See Doc. No. 74. The Court dismissed the first and third causes of action (which alleged only federal law claims) and issued an order to show cause why the federal claims against the County should not be dismissed for the same reasons that dismissal was appropriate as to the FDSA. See id. The Court did not address the state law causes of action but reserved a ruling pending receipt of the additional briefing. See id. After receiving additional briefing, the Court dismissed without leave to amend the first cause of action and the third cause of action for conduct that post-dated Janus . See Doc. No. 79. Based on the parties’ submissions, the Court also ordered the parties to file additional briefing regarding whether the good faith defense has been applied to a municipal entity like the County, whether any post- Janus cases have found a municipal entity like the County liable for taking fees or vacation hours, and whether Janus applies retroactively. See id. The County and Plaintiffs have now fully responded to the Court's order for additional briefing. For the reasons that follow, the Court will not dismiss any further claims, will sever the claims of Plaintiffs Her and Chandavong, permit these Plaintiffs to amend with respect to the FDSA, decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remainder of this case, and direct the Clerk to close this case.
In prior briefing, Plaintiffs argued that Her and Chandavong still had viable claims against the County for the County's confiscation of vacation hours that pre-dated Janus .
In supplemental briefing, Plaintiffs have cited numerous lower courts that have held that municipal entities are categorically barred from asserting a good-faith type of defense (which might be shorthand for qualified immunity) and no case questions whether a differing analysis or defense from that in Owen v. City of Independence , 445 U.S. 622 (1980) should apply. Only one unpublished case with no substantive analysis has applied the good faith defense to a post- Janus case. That case ( Adams v. Teamsters Local Union 429 , 2019 WL 8333531 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 5, 2019) ) simply assumed that the good-faith defense applied.
Plaintiffs state that they are aware of no post- Janus cases in which a municipal entity was held liable for agency fees or forced payments that were diverted from wages. In Aliser v. SEIU Cal. , 419 F.Supp.3d 1161 (N.D. Cal. 2019), a county was held not liable by successfully asserting a Monell related defense. Specifically, the county's actions were compelled by state law and thus, did not represent a policy or custom of the county. Plaintiffs argue that Aliser does not apply because the decision to divert vacation hours was a municipal policy that was not compelled by state law. Additionally, in reply briefing, Plaintiffs argue that nothing in Abood indicates that an employer can take vacation hours from non-union employees. Abood permitted employers to take a portion of membership fees from non-members. Here, what has been taken is vacation hours, not fees, and the same number of hours were taken from both members and non-members alike.
Finally, Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation , 509 U.S. 86, 113 S.Ct. 2510, 125 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993) holds that a federal rule that is announced and applied to the parties is retroactive. Application of the Harper rule leads to the conclusion that Janus should apply retroactively to this case. Additionally, in reply, Plaintiffs argue that the question of retroactivity is governed by Harper , not Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson , 404 U.S. 97, 92 S.Ct. 349, 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971).
The County argues that Adams applied the good faith defense to a municipal entity. Further, the Ninth Circuit has extended the good faith defense to private entities. While Owen held that governmental entities are not entitled to qualified immunity, there is a significant difference between the good faith defense and qualified immunity. In litigation against private entities, courts have recognized that it is unfair for a private entity who relied on a presumptively constitutional statute to be held liable while the state may invoke sovereign immunity and its officials may invoke qualified immunity. The same principles would apply here where the FDSA is entitled to a good faith defense, yet the County is not; the County simply acted in a ministerial capacity by transferring the hours in compliance with law. The County received no benefit from the transfer of hours. Instead, the FDSA used those hours to conduct business on behalf of members and non-members.
The County also argues that it is unaware of any post- Janus cases that have held a municipal entity liable for collecting fees or payments in accordance with Abood . In Aliser , the Northern District found that mere compliance with mandatory state laws does not cause a constitutional violation, and that the general decision to contract with unions using an agency shop arrangement did not cause any constitutional violations. Here, California law ( Cal. Gov. Code § 3502.5 ) authorized public employee union members to call for a vote on whether to impose an agency shop, and when the vote approves an agency shop, the public employer is under a mandatory duty to collect agency fees from its employees. Therefore, the County exercised no discretion in taking the vacation hours.
Finally, the County argues that courts have recognized that the language actually used in Janus suggests that retroactive application is not appropriate. All courts seem to assume that Janus applies retroactively and then deny relief primarily through application of the good faith defense. In deciding whether Janus applies retroactively, the Ninth Circuit dictates that the Court should apply Huson . Application of the three Huson factors (whether the decision establishes a new principle of law, whether retrospective operation will further or retard the rule's operation in light of the rule's history, purpose, and effect, and whether the decision could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively) indicates that retroactive application should not occur. Moreover, as indicated above, the County received no benefit from collecting the vacation hours and the FDSA used those hours for the benefit of Her and Chandavong.
Private parties are generally not entitled to qualified immunity.1 See Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 167-69, 112 S.Ct. 1827, 118 L.Ed.2d 504 (1992) ; Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 444 (9th Cir. 2002). However, private individuals and private entities may invoke a good faith affirmative defense to § 1983 liability. Danielson v. Inslee, 945 F.3d 1096, 1097 (9th Cir. 2019) ; Clement v. City of Glendale, 518 F.3d 1090, 1096-97 (9th Cir. 2008). The good faith affirmative defense can apply to actions taken in direct reliance on presumptively valid state laws and then-binding Supreme Court precedent. See Danielson, 945 F.3d at 1097 ; Clement, 518 F.3d at 1096-97.
Like private parties, municipal entities may not assert the defense of qualified immunity. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 63 L.Ed.2d 673 (1980) ; Hernandez v. City of San Jose, 897 F.3d 1125, 1139 (9th Cir. 2018). Unlike private parties, courts that have addressed a municipality's assertion of the good faith affirmative defense have generally rejected the defense based on Owen or cases that have followed Owen . E.g. Saye v. St. Vrain Valley Sch. Dist., 650 F.Supp. 716, 722 (D. Col. 1986).
Owen did not deal with the good faith affirmative defense as enunciated by the Ninth Circuit in Danielson and Clement . Instead, Owen dealt with whether a municipal entity may assert qualified immunity. Owen, 445 U.S. at 624-25, 100 S.Ct. 1398. However, while qualified immunity and the good faith affirmative defense are not identical, Owen ’s language and rationale are illuminating, if not...
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