Campos v. Johnson
| Decision Date | 21 March 1997 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. SA-96-CA-245. |
| Parties | Juan Manuel CAMPOS, Petitioner, v. Gary JOHNSON, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas |
Petitioner Juan Manuel Campos filed this federal habeas corpus proceeding pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. Section 2255 challenging not his June, 1990 Bexar County conviction for aggravated assault causing serious bodily injury, not the revocation of his release on mandatory supervision, but, rather, the manner in which state officials have calculated petitioner's credit for time served against his sentence. More specifically, petitioner argues that (1) state parole officials have erroneously treated his offense as an aggravated offense and refused to release petitioner on mandatory supervision, (2) petitioner has wrongfully been denied good time credits, (3) the refusal of state officials to credit petitioner for street time served prior to the revocation of his parole violates Double Jeopardy principles, and (4) petitioner's plea agreement included a specific provision that the offense to which petitioner entered his plea of nolo contendere would be a non-aggravated offense. For the reasons set forth below, petitioner's request for federal habeas corpus relief will be denied.
Petitioner Juan Manuel Campos was indicted originally on June 21, 1989 in cause no. 89-CR-2961 on a charge of aggravated assault, to wit, causing serious bodily injury by stabbing the complainant with a deadly weapon, i.e., a knife.1 On April 2, 1990, the trial court granted the prosecution's motion to amend the indictment to charge petitioner only with aggravated assault causing serious bodily injury, i.e., to delete the deadly weapon accusation.2 Petitioner entered a plea of nolo contendere to the amended indictment on June 11, 1990 and was sentenced to serve an eight-year term of imprisonment.3 Petitioner filed no appeal from his conviction or sentence. Petitioner was released on parole on or about November 4, 1991 but that parole was revoked on or about April 7, 1994.4
On September 11, 1990, petitioner filed his first state habeas corpus application, in which he argued that (1) there was insufficient evidence introduced in support of nolo contendere plea to support the aggravated aspect of his offense,5 (2) petitioner's nolo contendere plea was involuntary because petitioner had been led to believe that he would receive a probated sentence in exchange for his entry of such a plea, and (3) his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in connection with petitioner's plea by failing to advise petitioner that a person convicted of aggravated assault was ineligible for a probated sentence.6 In an Order issued October 22, 1990, the state trial court (1) found that the petitioner had pleaded guilty to an assault which caused serious bodily injuries, i.e., to a charge of aggravated assault, (2) found that, contrary to the petitioner's allegations, the trial judge had not included an affirmative finding regarding petitioner's use of a deadly weapon in the Judgment imposing sentence, (3) concluded that there was ample evidence to support the petitioner's conviction and the determination that the petitioner's assault had caused serious bodily injuries, (4) concluded that, under applicable Texas law the petitioner had been eligible to receive a probated sentence, but (5) found that the trial judge had simply exercised his discretion and denied the request for probation made by petitioner's trial counsel.7 On February 27, 1991, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied petitioner's first state habeas corpus application without written order based on the findings of the state trial court without a hearing.8
On March 19, 1996, petitioner filed his second state habeas corpus application, in which he argued that (1) state officials had arbitrarily refused to reinstate or restore petitioner's previously earned good times credits which had been forfeited upon the revocation of petitioner's parole, (2) this refusal to restore the petitioner's forfeited good time credits violated Equal Protection principles, (3) state law made restoration of petitioner's good time credits mandatory, and (4) petitioner was being wrongfully denied release on mandatory supervision.9 In an Order issued April 17, 1996, the state trial court (1) concluded that the petitioner was entitled to bring a successive state habeas corpus application because his second application presented new claims that could not have been presented in his previous application, (2) found that the petitioner had pleaded nolo contendere to a charge of aggravated assault causing serious bodily injury, (3) concluded that because of the aggravated nature of the petitioner's offense, under applicable Texas law, the petitioner was ineligible for release on mandatory supervision, (4) petitioner had been released on parole on November 4, 1991 but his parole was revoked on April 7, 1994, (5) concluded that petitioner was not entitled to credit against his sentence for time he spent on parole prior to revocation of same, and (6) recommended denial of petitioner's second state habeas corpus application.10 On May 22, 1996, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied petitioner's second state habeas corpus application without written order based on the findings of the trial court made without a hearing.11
On March 12, 1996, petitioner submitted his federal habeas corpus petition in this cause to the Tyler Division of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. That court subsequently transferred this cause to this Court, where it was docketed on March 18, 1996.12 In his original federal habeas corpus petition, petitioner argues that (1) state officials have erroneously construed his offense as an aggravated offense and refused to release petitioner on mandatory supervision,13 (2) he has been denied good time credits, (3) his continued incarceration violates Double Jeopardy principles because his flat time, plus his accrued good time credits, plus his time spent on parole more than exceeds the duration of his sentence, and (4) his nolo contendere plea was involuntary because the plea bargain that induced his plea included a provision that the offense to which petitioner entered his plea would be non-aggravated and would not involve an affirmative finding that the petitioner had used a deadly weapon during the course of his offense.14
On April 17, 1996, respondent filed a motion to dismiss petitioner's federal habeas corpus petition for failure to exhaust state remedies correctly pointing out, as of that date, the petitioner had failed to obtain a ruling from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals on any of petitioner's complaints raised in his federal habeas corpus petition.15 On May 16, 1996, while his second state habeas corpus proceeding was still pending in the state courts, petitioner filed a pleading in which misrepresented that he had, in fact, obtained a ruling on the claims he had set forth in his second state habeas corpus application.16 In an Order issued June 18, 1996, the Magistrate Judge directed the respondent submit all state court records relevant to petitioner's second state habeas corpus application to this Court and invited the respondent to withdraw his motion to dismiss petitioner's federal habeas corpus petition.17 In an advisory filed June 26, 1996, the respondent informed the Magistrate Judge that the petitioner had filed his second state habeas corpus application after he filed his federal habeas corpus petition and that petitioner had misrepresented the status of his second state habeas corpus proceeding as of May 16, 1996.18
On August 21, 1996, respondent filed a renewed motion to dismiss petitioner's federal habeas corpus petition, once again correctly pointing out that the petitioner had not exhausted available state remedies on his broken plea bargain claim, but also arguing, alternatively, that petitioner's unexhausted claims were procedurally barred and that petitioner's remaining claims did not warrant federal habeas relief.19 Petitioner never filed any response to respondent's supplemental motion to dismiss or for summary judgment.
On April 24, 1996, the President signed into law the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ["AEDPA"],20 which radically altered the standard of review by this Court in federal habeas corpus proceedings filed by state prisoners pursuant to Title 2 8 U.S.C. Section 2254.21 The Fifth Circuit has held that the new standard of review provisions of the AEDPA govern federal court review of all federal habeas corpus petitions filed by state prisoners, including those petitions pending as of the effective date of that enactment.22 Under the AEDPA's new standard of review, this Court cannot grant petitioner federal habeas corpus relief in this cause in connection with any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings unless the adjudication of that claim either (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.23
In petitioner's two state habeas corpus proceedings, the state courts expressly and specifically determined that petitioner was not entitled to state habeas corpus relief based on his complaints that either (1) there was insufficient evidence to support petitioner's nolo contendere plea to a charge of aggravated assault causing...
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