Campos v. Skipper

• Decision Date: 15 May 2020
• Docket Number: 1:18-cv-1096
• Parties: CHRISTOPHER CAMPOS, Petitioner, v. GREG SKIPPER, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

CHRISTOPHER CAMPOS, Petitioner,
v.
GREG SKIPPER, Respondent.

No. 1:18-cv-1096

United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division

May 15, 2020

Honorable Gordon J. Quist Judge

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

RAY KENT UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This is a habeas corpus action brought by a state prisoner under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner Christopher Campos is incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections at the Michigan Reformatory (RMI) in Ionia County, Michigan. On February 21, 2013, following a four-day jury trial in the Kent County Circuit Court, Petitioner was convicted of two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-I). On March 19, 2013, the court sentenced Petitioner to concurrent prison terms of 30 to 50 years. The trial judge indicated that he imposed a 30-year minimum sentence, 5 years above the 25-year statutory mandatory minimum, in part to make up for the fact that he was ordering the sentences to be served concurrently rather than consecutively. Petitioner sought resentencing because the judge's premise-that the sentences could have been consecutive-was not correct. The court ultimately agreed and reduced Petitioner's minimum sentence to 25 years.

On September 18, 2018, Petitioner, with the assistance of counsel, filed his habeas corpus petition raising five grounds for relief, as follows:

I. There was insufficient evidence to convict of first degree criminal sexual conduct where there was no evidence of penetration

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II. The court failed to properly ensure that defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived the right to testify

III. The prosecutor improperly relied on denigration of defense counsel with remarks about the upsetting nature of the cross-examination of the complainant and by adding to the complainant's testimony in closing

IV. Petitioner was prejudiced by ineffective assistance of [trial] counsel.

V. Petitioner was prejudiced by ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

(2nd Am. Pet., ECF No. 3, PageID.152, 154-156.) Respondent has filed an answer to the petition (ECF No. 8) stating that the grounds should be denied because they are procedurally defaulted or meritless. Upon review and applying the standards of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (AEDPA), I find that the grounds lack merit.^[1]Accordingly, I recommend that the petition be denied.

Discussion

I. Factual allegations

The trial court described the underlying facts as follows:

The charges arise from allegations that defendant sexually abused his niece, Anjelica. Anjelica lived in Saginaw with her mother, Cecilia. Anjelica's father lived in Grand Rapids with his parents and his brother, defendant. Anjelica would sometimes stay with her father in Grand Rapids during time off from school, including the summers of 2010 and 2011. It was alleged that defendant sexually abused Anjelica during this time.

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The allegations came to light on February 23, 2012. Cecilia was visiting her mother in the hospital and she received a call from her sister stating that Anjelica had revealed inappropriate conduct by defendant. Cecilia returned home, asked Anjelica about what happened, and then called the police after Anjelica told her about defendant touching her. Arrangements were eventually made through the Children's Advocacy Center in Saginaw, Michigan, for a forensic interview with Anjelica and a subsequent medical examination. This led to a criminal prosecution and the February 2013 jury trial on two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct.

Anjelica was seven years old at the time of trial. At trial, she testified, “what [defendant] did is every time when my grandma was gone he would always take me to my grandma's room or his room and he would keep trying to do stuff to me.” When asked about what kind of “stuff” defendant would do, she said that he “will try to put his middle part into me and every time I try to move he'll just take me back on his bed or on my grandma's bed.” Anjelica referred to and identified different “no-no spots” during her testimony. She stated that defendant tried to put his “middle part” or “no-no spot” into her front and back no-no spots and it hurt when he did so. She testified that defendant also would touch her front no-no spot with his tongue, and he tried to put his no-no spot in her mouth, but she would not let him. She demonstrated how defendant wanted her to touch his no-no spot with her hand and explained how she would try to pull away but defendant would not allow it. She also described a “slime” that came out of defendant's no-no spot that was “like white mixed with a little yellow”.

(Kent Cty. Cir. Ct. Op. and Order, ECF No. 9-12.)^[2]

The jury heard testimony from officers who investigated the charges, an expert in forensic interviewing, the doctor who examined the victim, the victim's mother, and the victim. In addition to cross-examining those witnesses, Petitioner's counsel also called Petitioner's sister to the stand. Petitioner opted to not testify. The jury deliberated for about three hours before finding Petitioner guilty as charged.

Petitioner, with the assistance of counsel, filed a notice of appeal in the Michigan Court of Appeals. Counsel also assisted Petitioner in seeking post-judgment relief in the trial court. See (Mot. for New Trial, ECF No. 9-13, PageID.535-571; Mot. for New Trial Hr'g Tr., ECF No. 9-9.)

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On November 14, 2013, the trial court denied Petitioner's motion for new trial; however, the court resentenced Petitioner as described above.

After the trial court denied relief, Petitioner filed his brief in the court of appeals, raising several issues, including three claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel that are part of his present petition. (Pet'r's Appeal Br., ECF No. 9-13, PageID.594-596.) By unpublished opinion issued August 12, 2014, the trial court denied relief on Petitioner's appellate claims and affirmed the trial court. (Mich. Ct. App. Op., ECF No. 9-13, PageID.529-533.)

Petitioner, again with the assistance of counsel, filed an application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court, raising the same issues he had raised in the court of appeals. (Pet'r's Appl. for Leave to Appeal, ECF No. 9-14, PageID.725-727.) By order entered May 28, 2015, the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. (Mich. Order, ECF No. 9-14, PageID.723.)

On August 16, 2016, Petitioner, with the assistance of new counsel-his present counsel-filed a motion for relief from judgment raising the same issues he raises in this petition, with the exception of the three ineffective assistance of trial counsel issues he had already raised on direct appeal. By memorandum issued December 20, 2016, the trial court denied Petitioner's motion. (Kent Cty. Cir. Ct. Op. and Order, ECF No. 9-12.) Petitioner and his counsel then filed applications for leave to appeal the trial court's denial of Petitioner's motion in the Michigan Court of Appeals and the Michigan Supreme Court. The Michigan Court of Appeals denied leave by order entered December 21, 2017, “because defendant . . . failed to establish that the trial court erred in denying the motion for relief from judgment. (Mich. Ct. App. Order, ECF No. 9-15, PageID.851.) The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave by order entered September 12, 2018,

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“because defendant . . . failed to meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D). (Mich. Order, ECF No. 9-16, PageID.927.)

Petitioner, still with the assistance of counsel, then timely filed his petition in this Court. (Pet., ECF No. 1.) He has amended his petition twice. (1st Am. Pet., ECF No. 4; 2nd Am. Pet., ECF No. 5.)

II. AEDPA standard

The AEDPA “prevents federal habeas ‘retrials'” and ensures that state court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under the law. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 69394 (2002). An application for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person who is incarcerated pursuant to a state conviction cannot be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the adjudication: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based upon an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). This standard is “intentionally difficult to meet.” Woods v. Donald, 575 U.S. 312, 316 (2015) (internal quotation omitted).

The AEDPA limits the source of law to cases decided by the United States Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). This Court may consider only the holdings, and not the dicta, of the Supreme Court. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000); Bailey v. Mitchell, 271 F.3d 652, 655 (6th Cir. 2001). In determining whether federal law is clearly established, the Court may not consider the decisions of lower federal courts. Williams, 529 U.S. at 381-82; Miller v. Straub, 299 F.3d 570, 578-79 (6th Cir. 2002). Moreover, “clearly established Federal law” does not include decisions of the Supreme Court announced after the last adjudication of the merits in state court. Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 37-38 (2011). Thus, the inquiry is limited to an examination of the

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legal landscape as it would have appeared to the Michigan state courts in light of Supreme Court precedent at the time of the state-court adjudication on the merits. Miller v. Stovall, 742 F.3d 642, 644 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Greene, 565 U.S. at 38).

A federal habeas court may issue the writ under the “contrary to” clause if the state court applies a rule different from the governing law set forth in the Supreme Court's cases, or...