Campos v. State
| Decision Date | 28 January 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 11-14-00089-CR,11-14-00089-CR |
| Parties | SAMUEL CAMPOS, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
On Appeal from the 42nd District Court Taylor County, Texas
The jury found Appellant, Samuel Campos, guilty of aggravated assault.1 Appellant elected to have the trial court assess punishment. The trial court assessed punishment at imprisonment for twenty years with no fine and then sentenced Appellant. Appellant asserts two issues on appeal. We affirm.
The grand jury indicted Appellant for aggravated assault. PENAL § 22.02(a)(1). A person commits an offense of aggravated assault if that person commits an assault, as defined in Section 22.01 of the Texas Penal Code, and that person causes serious bodily injury to another person. Id. Aggravated assault is a second-degree felony. Id. § 22.02(b). A person adjudged guilty of aggravated assault shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of not more than twenty years or less than two years, and a fine may be imposed, not to exceed $10,000. Id. § 12.33.
Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, but we provide a recitation of the facts to provide context for the evidentiary arguments that Appellant asserts in his appeal.
Appellant's niece, S.J., and his cousin, Rena Lynn Arrazola, testified that, one spring evening between 7:30 p.m. and 8:00 p.m., they observed a black car stop in front of Appellant's house in Abilene, Texas. Each witness testified that a man got out of the black car and walked toward Appellant. Appellant was in his front yard, but he faced the house and had his back to the street. Arrazola and S.J. were on the front porch. Arrazola recognized the man as Brian Perez, so she yelled to Appellant, "Sam, it's Brian."
S.J. and Arrazola watched as Perez reached into his pocket, pulled out a gun, and pointed it at Appellant's forehead. Perez cocked the gun and threatened to kill Appellant and his family. Perez then approached S.J. and Arrazola, who were still on the front porch. Appellant told Perez, "I don't have a problem with you" and walked Perez back to his car. Perez then pointed the gun at Arrazola's two-year-old daughter, who also was in the front yard. Perez next turned and pointed the gun atS.J. Arrazola testified that she told S.J., Arrazola dialed 9-1-1, while Perez got back into his car and left.
Alanna Guzman, who was Perez's girlfriend at the time of the incident, testified that, at approximately 10:00 p.m. that night, she, her three children, and Perez drove through an intersection near Appellant's house on their way to Sonic. As they approached the intersection, Guzman noticed a group of about six men, which included Appellant, standing next to the curb drinking beer. Perez stopped at the stop light, placed the car into park, and exited the car. As Perez exited the car, the group of men moved toward him.
Guzman, who was still in the car, looked through the back window of the car and saw one of the men hit Perez in the head. She got out of the car and walked around to the back of the car. There, she found Perez unconscious on the ground as the men punched, stomped, and kicked him.2 Appellant twice stomped on Perez's head as Perez lay unconscious on the ground. Appellant hit Perez on the head with the butt of a small, silver pistol. After that, the men dispersed and fled the scene. Guzman could not find her cell phone, so she located her iPad in the car and contacted Perez's mother; Perez's mother then called the police. Guzman denied that she had a gun in the car or that Perez had a gun with him when he exited the car. Perez also denied that he had a gun or that Guzman had a gun on the night of the assault.
John Wilson, a detective with the Abilene Police Department, testified that law enforcement could not locate a gun at the scene of the assault. However,according to Detective Wilson, the injuries to Perez's forehead were consistent with him being hit in the head with the butt of a gun. Detective Wilson spoke to Guzman and identified suspects from the group of men that Guzman described. Two of the suspects remarked that there was a small, silver pistol at the scene of the alleged assault. After the assault, one of the suspects picked up the pistol and took it with him as the suspects fled. The suspects that talked to Detective Wilson reported that, after they fled, one of them threw the pistol into a creek at Will Hair Park. Although officers swept the creek in numerous searches with an industrial-sized magnet3 from Dyess Air Force Base, they never recovered the pistol.
During trial, defense counsel asked Perez if he had ever been around weapons. Perez responded that he had "been around weapons" but that he had "never had one." Defense counsel asked Perez if he remembered "a Henry McGill incident" and then asked, "And you, in fact, shot the person [McGill] in the leg, right?" The State objected to defense counsel's questions as improper impeachment with an extraneous matter. The trial court asked defense counsel for a response to the State's objection and then gave defense counsel "some latitude" with his questions. Defense counsel asked Perez if the "Henry McGill incident" was "the only time [he] ever used a gun." The State objected and argued that defense counsel's question presented speculation that Perez shot McGill. Defense counsel rephrased the question and asked, "Did you shoot Henry McGill?" Perez responded, "No."
Defense counsel later asked Vivian Soto,4 the mother of Perez's child, whether Perez had a history with guns. Specifically, he asked if Soto had ever "seen [Perez] with guns" and if Perez was "ever involved in a shooting." Again, the Stateobjected to defense counsel's questions as improper impeachment of a witness. See TEX. R. EVID. 608. The State then requested a hearing outside the jury's presence. During that hearing, the State objected to any reference by defense counsel of Perez's involvement in the shooting of McGill; the trial court found that any questions about the shooting of McGill involved improper impeachment of Perez's previous statement that he had never been involved with guns.
Defense counsel responded to the State's objection and argued that "the man lived with guns, and that's what I'm going to prove." The trial court ruled that defense counsel could ask any question that addressed Perez's ownership, possession, or use of guns to impeach his previous statement, but did not allow any mention of the "Henry McGill" shooting. Defense counsel argued that he would like the opportunity to question Soto about that incident to prove Perez "has a propensity for dealing with violence." At that point, the trial court found the questions were prohibited by Rule 608, sustained the State's objection, and excluded the testimony.
Appellant, in his first issue, argues that the trial court erred when it excluded evidence under Rule 608 of the Texas Rules of Evidence and prohibited Appellant from impeaching Perez with evidence of Perez's involvement in the shooting of McGill. As part of his first issue, Appellant also argues that the evidence was admissible under TEX. R. EVID. 404. In his second issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred when it excluded testimony under Rule 701 of the Texas Rules of Evidence that Perez was under the influence of drugs at the time of the assault. We will address Appellant's Rule 404 arguments, followed by his Rule 608 argument, and then his Rule 701 argument.
We review the trial court's decision whether to admit or exclude witness testimony under an abuse of discretion standard. McDonald v. State, 179 S.W.3d 571, 576 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Willover v. State, 70 S.W.3d 841, 845 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court acted without any reference to guiding rules and principles. See Howell v. State, 175 S.W.3d 786, 792 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). A trial court does not abuse its discretion if evidence supports its decision to either admit or exclude witness testimony. Osbourn v. State, 92 S.W.3d 531, 538 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). But if the decision of the trial court is "so clearly wrong as to lie outside that zone within which reasonable persons might disagree," then there is an abuse of discretion. Cantu v. State, 842 S.W.2d 667, 682 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); see Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (op. on reh'g).
To preserve error regarding the exclusion of evidence by the trial court, a party must have attempted to introduce the evidence during trial, and the trial court must have excluded the evidence. See TEX. R. EVID. 103(a)(2); Basham v. State, 608 S.W.2d 677, 679 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980). The proponent of the evidence must have made the substance of the offered evidence known to the trial court through either a bill of exception or an offer of proof, unless the substance of the offered evidence is apparent from the context in which it was offered. See TEX. R. EVID. 103(a)(2); TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1; Guidry v. State, 9 S.W.3d 133, 153 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
Appellant asserts, in his first issue, that he should have been allowed to introduce evidence from Soto that Perez had been involved in a fight with another individual that led to the shooting of that individual. Appellant claims that thisevidence was admissible because he had an apprehension or fear of Perez. See TEX. R. EVID. 404(b)(2).5 Appellant argues that specific instances of Perez's prior violent conduct were admissible, under Rules 404 and 405, to establish that Perez was the first aggressor and that Appellant...
To continue reading
Request your trial