Campos v. United States
Decision Date | 24 April 2018 |
Docket Number | No. 16-51476,16-51476 |
Citation | 888 F.3d 724 |
Parties | Guadalupe Chaidez CAMPOS, Plaintiff–Appellant v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant–Appellee |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Javier N. Maldonado, Law Office of Javier N. Maldonado, P.C., John Paul Salmon, Mexican–American Legal Defense & Educational Fund, San Antonio, TX, for Plaintiff–Appellant.
Gerard J. Sinzdak, U.S. Department of Justice Civil Division, Appellate Section, Washington, DC, for Defendant–Appellee.
Before WIENER, ELROD, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.
Guadalupe Chaidez Campos sued the Government for false arrest and false imprisonment under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The district court dismissed her claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We AFFIRM the district court's dismissal but VACATE and REMAND so that the court may revise its final judgment to dismiss Campos's claims without prejudice.
In December 2012, Campos entered the United States without legal authority. United States Customs and Border Protection ("CBP") officers issued her a Notice and Order of Expedited Removal. Prior to Campos's removal, though, she pled guilty to one count of attempted illegal reentry, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Campos was sentenced to 11 months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release. While she was incarcerated, Campos applied for and was granted U nonimmigrant status. We will discuss the purpose and effect of that status later.
We will set out the factual events of the dispute by quoting from the first amended complaint. We start here because of the district court's statement that it "has not considered the substance or value of any of the Government's exhibits" offered in its motion to dismiss:1
What these allegations do not address is what the CBP officers did to investigate Campos's immigration status, what they found, and why they decided to remove her. Though the district court in its order dismissing the complaint stated that it did not consider the "substance or value" of the exhibits the Government attached to its motion to dismiss, the court did indicate that it considered "for context" that she pled guilty to attempted illegal re-entry after being previously removed, was sentenced by this same district judge, and served 11 months in prison.
Campos filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas against the United States, alleging violations of her civil rights and requesting relief under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"). Campos claimed that she was falsely arrested and imprisoned by the CBP officers because the officers detained her after she presented them with an EAD, which in her view conclusively showed entitlement to remain in the United States.
The Government filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Campos's FTCA claims because the CBP officers' actions fell within the "discretionary function exception" to the FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity. The district court agreed and dismissed. Campos timely appealed.
St. Tammany Par., ex rel. Davis v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency , 556 F.3d 307, 315 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Williamson v. Tucker , 645 F.2d 404, 413 (5th Cir. 1981) ).
The district court did not resolve any disputed facts. As to undisputed facts, the Government attached to its motion to dismiss affidavits of two CBP officers involved with the investigation on the day of Campos's removal and three documents related to Campos's 2013 conviction that sent her to prison for 11 months and also led to an order for her removal that would be enforced at the end of her incarceration. Some and perhaps most of the information in those exhibits would have been undisputed. As mentioned earlier, though, the court declared that it had not considered the "substance" of the exhibits. Instead, it considered for contextual reasons only the evidence of Campos's prior conviction, about which the complaint was completely silent.
We conclude that the district court, by its reference to using the conviction information for context, necessarily meant that it considered the undisputed record of Campos's conviction and its effects. This included the order for removal that gave the CBP officers a basis for a reasonable belief that she was impermissibly in the country and was subject to being removed.2 We reach that conclusion due to the district court's explaining in its order dismissing the case that a CBP officer has statutory authority to arrest without a warrant when "the agent has ‘reason to believe’ that the person is in the United States in violation of any immigration laws or regulations and is ‘likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained for [her] arrest.’ " See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2). When the court then held that these CBP officers had used this authority, there must have been information that provided a reason to believe, even if incorrectly, that Campos was present improperly. CBP officers do not have discretion to conduct an investigation, find nothing, and deport anyway.
When a district court does not detail the factual determinations it made to support its ruling, "an appellate court may determine for itself, on the basis of the record and any statements made by the district court ... what, if any, implicit factual findings it made." Williamson , 645 F.2d at 414. As will become clear, the only implied factual findings in the district court's order deal with Campos's prior conviction that led to an order that she be removed at the end of her prison term. Our analysis of the district court's ruling does not reveal any reliance on the affidavits of the CBP officers.
Thus, this dismissal was based on the complaint plus the undisputed facts of Campos's criminal history and of the removal order. "In such a circumstance, our review is limited to determining whether the district court's application of the law is correct and whether the facts are indeed undisputed." Ynclan v. Dep't of Air Force , 943 F.2d 1388, 1390 (5th Cir. 1991).
Campos presents three arguments. First, she argues the district court erred in concluding that her claims fell within the discretionary function exception because the law enforcement proviso controls over the exception. Second, Campos asserts the district court erred in applying the discretionary function exception because it is inapplicable here. Finally, Campos contends the district court erred in not applying the law enforcement proviso to her FTCA claims.
We first discuss the pertinent statutory provisions and then address each of Campos's arguments.
"Courts consider whether the FTCA applies via a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, because whether the government has waived its sovereign immunity goes to the court's subject matter jurisdiction." Tsolmon v. United States , 841 F.3d 378, 382 (5th Cir. 2016).
The FTCA waives the Government's sovereign immunity and permits suit against it for certain tort claims "in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances." 28 U.S.C. § 2674. The Act also provides federal district courts with exclusive jurisdiction over monetary damage claims against the Government for "personal injury ... caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while...
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