Camps v. C & P Telephone Co., 80-1799
| Decision Date | 21 September 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 80-1799,80-1799 |
| Citation | 692 F.2d 120,223 U.S.App.D.C. 396 |
| Parties | 28 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 64, 27 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 32,317, 223 U.S.App.D.C. 396 Lorenzo CAMPS, Appellant v. C & P TELEPHONE CO., et al. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
Lorenzo Camps, pro se.
Raymond R. Baca, Atty., E.E.O.C., with whom Leroy D. Clark, Gen. Counsel, Philip B. Sklover, Associate Gen. Counsel, and Vella M. Fink, Acting Asst. Gen. Counsel, Washington, D.C., were on the brief, for appellee E.E.O.C.
Bernard M. Dworski and Charles M. Carron, Washington, D.C., were on the brief for appellee C & P Tel. Co.
Michael A. Murphy and Thomas H. Kohn, Washington, D.C., entered appearances for appellee Communication Workers of America, Local 2336.
Before ROBINSON, Chief Judge, and MacKINNON and EDWARDS, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge ROBINSON.
Appellant, Lorenzo Camps, seeks reversal of two orders of the District Court which in combination released all opposing parties from his Title VII lawsuit. By one of the orders, the Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company (C & P) and the Communication Workers of America (CWA) were dismissed on the ground of non-prosecution of the action as to them; by the other, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) was discharged alternatively on grounds of Camps' inability to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and his failure to respond to EEOC's motion for dismissal on that account.
We find that the District Court erred in halting the litigation against C & P and CWA, and accordingly we reverse and remand for resumption of the proceedings against those parties. Because, however, Camps did not contest in that court the dismissal of EEOC, and since the order effectuating it remains interlocutory, we conclude that any reasons Camps may have for altering that disposition are more properly addressed in the first instance to the District Court on remand.
Camps, a black male, filed a charge of employment discrimination with EEOC, asserting that he had been suspended and ultimately discharged by C & P because of his race. Several months later, Camps registered a second complaint of discrimination, this time against CWA, claiming that the union had failed to accord him proper representation in his effort to resolve his grievance against C & P. EEOC subsequently issued a right-to-sue notice, finding that there existed no reasonable cause to believe that either C & P or CWA had discriminated against Camps. 1
Acting pro se, Camps brought suit against EEOC, C & P, and CWA in the District Court pursuant to Section 706(f)(1) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 2 Camps complained that C & P had unlawfully harassed and finally discharged him because of his race, and then had conspired to impede the ensuing investigation of his claim. 3 He alleged that CWA also had racially discriminated against him by failing to represent him against C & P, in violation of union bylaws and in breach of an operative collective bargaining agreement. 4 EEOC, Camps asserted, had hindered rather than helped him with his accusations, and had not investigated his charges of discrimination adequately. 5 Because of these allegedly unlawful activities, he requested both monetary and unspecified injunctive relief. 6
EEOC moved to dismiss Camps' complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted against EEOC. 7 When six weeks had elapsed with no response from Camps, the District Court granted EEOC's motion. 8 The court, invoking a local rule, 9 treated the motion as conceded because it was unopposed, 10 and, in the alternative, ruled that Camps had not stated a legally remediable claim against EEOC. 11
The District Court later scheduled a status call with respect to the claims still pending against C & P and CWA. 12 Camps telephoned on the preceding day to verify the date and hour of the status call. 13 When, at the time appointed, the court convened, however, Camps was not present, and had not arrived when the court recessed approximately ten minutes thereafter. 14 Because of Camps' absence, the court dismissed the action against C & P and CWA for want of prosecution. 15
At oral argument before this court, Camps--still pro se --related the incident from his standpoint. He arrived 10 to 30 minutes late for the status call to find the courtroom closed and locked. He telephoned the judge's chambers--at approximately 10:03 a.m., the record discloses 16--and spoke with a law clerk. Camps informed us that his tardiness was "due to circumstances beyond [his] control," but that in his conversation with the District Judge's law clerk he was not asked, nor did he offer, any explanation therefor. 17 It is clear that he was told by the law clerk that his case had been dismissed, and was informed that he could ask the District Court to vacate the dismissal or appeal its decision. 18
Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a court may enter an involuntary dismissal of a case "[f]or failure of a plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with [the Civil Rules] or any order of court." The leading case on involuntary dismissals is Link v. Wabash Railroad, 19 wherein the Supreme Court held that Rule 41(b) codifies the inherent power of a court to dismiss a case for want of prosecution, 20 and proceeded to affirm a district court's sua sponte dismissal because of the failure of a plaintiff's counsel to attend a pretrial conference. 21 The lawyer's default there, however, was merely the culmination of a protracted course of dilatory tactics and other improper behavior 22 in litigation that had dragged on for six years. 23 The Link Court emphasized that its ruling was based on the full circumstances of the case, and specifically reserved decision on the question whether a single delinquency of counsel can ever justify dismissal under Rule 41(b). 24
In Jackson v. Washington Monthly Company, 25 and again in Butler v. Pearson, 26 this court addressed that very question. In each, we concluded that dismissal is rarely if ever appropriate when there is but a single instance of attorney-misconduct; 27 and in Jackson we took pains to sound a note of caution: Trial-court dismissal of a lawsuit never heard on its merits is a drastic step, normally to be taken only after unfruitful resort to lesser sanctions. And while appellate review is limited by the binding authority of Link to whether judicial discretion has been abused, a sound discretion hardly comprehends a pointless exaction of retribution. 28
Consonantly, in Jackson, where the District Court had dismissed an action with prejudice for failure of the plaintiff's lawyer to comply with an order to report on progress toward settlement, we reversed. 29 Similarly, we held in Butler that the District Court had improperly denied a Rule 60(b) 30 motion to reinstate an earlier-dismissed case solely because the plaintiff's attorney neglected to answer interrogatories. 31 We noted that the dismissal occurred eight days prior to the date established for completion of discovery, observing that answers to the interrogatories still might have been filed by that date, and sanctions less drastic than dismissal were never attempted. 32
We are advertent to the consideration that in each of these three cases, the misconduct at issue was that of an attorney rather than the plaintiff himself. But argument is hardly necessary to make the point that a pro se litigant, who may not fully understand the importance of precise compliance with court directives--including appearance times--should not be treated more harshly than litigants who have the funds to retain lawyers to advise and represent them. Members of the bar are not invariably punctual, and we are unaware of any general judicial practice of throwing their clients out of court the first time attorneys arrive somewhat late. 33 Certainly Camps' tardiness in the instant case, which may indeed have been excusable, 34 was no more egregious than that of counsel in Jackson and Butler, and we perceive no greater warrant for dismissal of his lawsuit.
As we indicated in Jackson, the absence of personal misconduct by a plaintiff having counsel is a factor worthy of consideration. 35 But we have not lost sight of the Supreme Court's admonition in Link that the difference between misbehavior of the plaintiff and that of his attorney is not so great as at first blush it might seem. Link teaches that when a plaintiff
voluntarily cho[oses an] attorney as his representative in the action, ... he cannot ... avoid the consequences of the acts or omissions of this freely selected agent. Any other notion would be wholly inconsistent with our system of representative litigation, in which each party is deemed bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent and is considered to have "notice of all facts, notice of which can be charged upon the attorney." 36
Since, then, the innocent client is merely to be treated as the alter ego of the misbehaving lawyer--with consequences no greater or lesser than the circumstances demand 37--our holding in Jackson and Butler that a single act of misconduct seldom if ever can justify dismissal should not differ when it is a pro se litigant, rather than an attorney who is at fault. Put another way, while arguably an errant pro se party should not fare better than a party served by an errant lawyer, surely he should fare no worse. Perhaps, too, when the misconduct of the pro se litigant and that of the attorney-representative are of the same nature and degree, the situations should be dealt with in a like manner. The critical factor in each instance should be the seriousness of the misbehavior, and not...
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Robbins v. Reagan, s. 85-5864
...dismissal, this court must consider the circumstances surrounding appellants' failure to comply with Rule 1-9(d). Camps v. C & P Telephone Co., 692 F.2d 120, 124 (D.C.Cir.1981). "Trial court dismissal of a lawsuit never heard on the merits is a drastic step, normally to be taken only after ......
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...is “an extremely harsh sanction.” Trakas v. Quality Brands, Inc., 759 F.2d 185, 186 (D.C.Cir.1985) (citing Camps v. C & P Telephone Co., 692 F.2d 120, 123–24 (D.C.Cir.1981)). Since disposition on the merits is favored, such dismissal may be considered as “a sanction of last resort to be app......
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...collectively as “Rodberg.” 5. We once said that “a single act of misconduct seldom if ever can justify dismissal.” Camps v. C & P Tel. Co., 692 F.2d 120, 123 (D.C.Cir.1981) (emphasis added). But that statement-to the extent that it may articulate a rule-is dictum. See Trakas v. Quality Bran......
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